One of the weaknesses that I observed in how we do business is that we expect the IO planner to be source of all IO plans. He cannot and should not be. He coordinates their amplification, as you noted. Schmedlap
I agree we don't need an IO planner at Bn, we need information objectives that enable Co's and below to shape their AO's accordingly based on the local situation and the unit's capabilities (one size doesn't fit all). The information objectives provide an umbrella strategy that everyone can support to the best of their ability.

The example that Hacksaw gave,
If I as PLT LDR/CO CDR stop to buy a soda at a vendor, remove my sunglasses/headgear and engage in a conversation that asks nothing of the vendor than how life is treating him and his family... there is whole number of messages and impressions I am communicating
is PSYOP, but of course the PSYOP bureaucrats will tell you it isn't because it isn't an approved theme, etc. ad naseum. First we build a relationship (supporting activity), then we slip in a few talking points when appropriate (PSYOP). OPSEC, EW, Deception don't necessarily amplifiy this, I think that is a stretch. That would require synchronization at a higher level, and we know that it won't happen, something will get lost between the brain fart at Bde and execution at squad level.

Some guys understand the importance of PSYOP in irregular warfare (IW) and instinctively know how to shape people's thoughts, while others don't don't. What's new?

After thinking about it, I don't think our so called IO activities will actually lead to information superiority. That is an unrealistic objective for IW. It simply the nature of an insurgency, that the insurgents will generally have better intelligence/information about us, then we do about them. We need to develop realistic information (or PSYOP) objectives for IW that allow the Soldiers to understand them, thus take appropriate actions to pursue them, versus some lofty idea end state.

If we can agree on that, or at least get a unit to agree on it this concept, then the next step is education and training to enable the staff and ground pounders to implement the concept.

I recommend we stop calling it IO, because we'll default to the lazy man's doctrine where we simply lumped a much of stuff together and called it IO. We have been conducting these types of operation throughout our history, so I'm not sure why we are calling it a revolution in military affairs? The RMA was we got away from the basics, and once again it didn't work too well.