DO is dead, hail Enhanced Company Operations!

[Ranger94]

Without breaking any confidences I can say that I was informally consulted as to my opinions of DO by one of the men responsible for the concept. As outline to me at the time, it seemed to make sense.

About a year later I got to talk to one of the men involved in actually making it happen and it then made very little sense compared to what I had discussed and the written papers did not impress me.

I think DO became "new and clever". - and the more I work on and study this area, the more I believe we need to keep things "iron-bar-simple."

William Owen (and anyone else),

Do you have recommendations for further reading on why it failed? Specifically, what effect did the use of 6man squads have on the overall outcome?

Use of 6man teams and 12man "heavy" teams have been used extensively by some Army units during OIF rotations. Some say that this set up is "advanced math" but with good SOPs, detailed mission planning and understanding of C&C it can be made very simple. The system worked well to cover a larger area with fewer resources than traditional platoon sized assets.

[William F. Owen]

William Owen (and anyone else),

Do you have recommendations for further reading on why it failed? Specifically, what effect did the use of 6man squads have on the overall outcome?

Use of 6man teams and 12man "heavy" teams have been used extensively by some Army units during OIF rotations. Some say that this set up is "advanced math" but with good SOPs, detailed mission planning and understanding of C&C it can be made very simple. The system worked well to cover a larger area with fewer resources than traditional platoon sized assets.

Well I'm not sure I am more qualified than anyone else on this matter, and no, I can't site anything written that specifically relates to the decision to abandon DO. ...but.

a.) I don't think the USMC ever really wanted to do it. With Rumsfeld gone, they got let off the hook, so jumped. - and as a concept it was poorly explained and reasoned - at least is some material. The USMC wanted to avoid saying "we need to be better infantry," - and all armies are avoiding grasping this nettle.

b.) I don't think the concept writers had any idea of how much support 6-8-12 men need. Look at what happened with Op Anaconda and Redwing. Even in Northern Ireland, a very benign environment, a 4-man covert O.P. needed an entire Platoon on QRF.

c.) I think the number of men in a "team" is a distraction. It's who is on the end of the radio and who close enough to help, that makes the difference.