Quick-firing guns with contact-fuzed shells and machine guns enforced a tactical revolution in infantry tactics early in the 2th century.

Now we know about comparable changes; extremely scary sensor capabilities approaching to "Star Trek" levels, enormous wireless communication capabilities, artillery shells that can hit a single field observation post from 40 km afar with a single round and small arms so powerful that being seen for a couple of seconds almost equals being dead against a competent foe.

The tactics generation born in WW1 and updated for APCs, IFVs, anti-tank infantry weapons and assault rifles CANNOT be up to date under these circumstances.

There NEEDS to be a new infantry tactics generation in use in the next war against competent and well-equipped enemies (the last one ended in 1945) or we'll see disasters as were seen in 1914-1917.

Old treatises on infantry tactics from WW2 and Vietnam don't help much. They can still tell us about the psychology of combat and some ruses, but not much about tactics.
Small war experiences like Afghanistan and Iraq highlighted some shortcomings and added some minor capabilities, but many of the lessons are 180° wrong simply because the enemy is not modern and not competent. A soldier can wear a heavy vest and patrol, day after day, and survive for months.
He'd be dead within minutes if he did that in a high intensity conflict against competent enemies. The whole armour protection rally of the past years is probably 180° off.

So, that's the problem that I see. I can only hope that those people who work and think behind confidentiality barriers (that I cannot penetrate well) are working hard and well on the challenge. I hope they are not working on just incrementally advanced WW2 tactics.

I fear that's not the case, as the indicators for this are rare.

The camouflage efforts that I see in Western armies are like placeholders, signals that camouflage was not forgotten entirely. Electronic combat is in my opinion vastly under-rated, battlefield sensors are not available in the necessary quantities, software-defined radio development is too slow, TO&E are still pretty close to the 50's, hard-kill defenses for heavy combat teams are not widespread yet, experiments in the field are rather rare.

Our armies should be busy with experiments and professional ideas exchanges even beyond the language barriers.
We should have tenders for idea development just like we have tenders for hardware development.