Roger your earlier points on the ASV. I'd also be interested to find out if they were ever used in mixed tracked-and-wheeled formations, or used to overwatch dismounted troops in urban settings.
My only (indirect) experience with MRAP is with a couple of engineer units performing route-clearance missions. Given the intent of GEN Petraeus's Rule No. 4 "Get out and walk--move mounted, work dismounted"--I'm curious if you could shed any non-OPSEC skinny on how the MRAP worked in the MiTT mission.
(And, in a possible corollary to Petraeus, I swear I once heard SECSTATE Rice make an MRAP-related on-air comment to National Public Radio in late-2007. It was something about how "sometimes, you have to get out of the Buffalo." Haven't been able to find the cite since. It's part of an ongoing research project, if anyone else can point me to the original quote.)
I liked how Fuchs started to break the intellectual problem down as a wish-list for equipment capabilities, as well as the rationale behind each of his criteria. Granted, he prefaces his comments in terms of High-Intensity Conflict (HIC), rather than Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC), but I like the approach. In fact, I originally thought that's where this thread might be headed: Using a couple of existing platforms as conversation starters and examples, what would you want out of a future mobile infantry platform?
(Of course, remember the Alamo--and remember the painful developmental process of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle.)
It's an interesting question, and one that forces a horse-and-armored-cart dilemma, the parallel being "how-do-you-want-to-fight" vs. "how-your-current-equipment-constrains/enables-you-to-fight."
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