China's Emergence as a Superpower (till 2014)

[William F. Owen]

In the meantime, here are a few reasons why China should be regarded as a future military threat.

1. In most of it's 4,000 + year history, it has dominated Asia as a military and cultural power.

2. Sun Tzu's The Art of War is the world's oldest manual of military strategy, and his principles are still applied with success today.

3. Chinese martial arts are the origin of all Asian martial fighting forms, and have influenced those of the rest of the world, including our own.

4. The U.S. has no existing defense for implementation of an Unrestricted Warfare attack, as proposed by two Chinese Colonels in 1998, and which is being implemented in China's current cyberwarfare strategy.

5. "China continues to invest heavily in the modernization of its military, particularly in strategic weapons and capabilities to support power projection and access denial operations." Read the PREPARED STATEMENT OF
MR. RICHARD P. LAWLESS DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ASIAN & PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS BEFORE THE U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 2007

1. I think Japan managed to dominate Asia, far more than China in recent history. Modern China is a product of an adaptive form of Communism, not it's 4,000 years of culture. They got their asses handed to them on a plate by the Vietnamese in 1979.

2. Sun Tzu's art of War/Strategy is not highly regarded by the Chinese military, at least not the former PLA members I have talked to. Even Mao came unstuck when they tried to export "On Guerilla Warfare" to non-Confucian based cultures.

3. Martial Arts is nothing to do with warfare.

4. The two Chinese Colonels are no better informed than anyone else. It's a typical product of Chinese military thought, that sounds clever, but that probably falls short in performance.

5. So they say. The Chinese military budget is smoke and mirrors of the worst order.

NOW - I am not saying the Chinese are not a threat, but I work in the Far East, I have worked with the Chinese, and they are no more skilled, cunning or clever than we are. They just don't have democracy to hold back ambition, but they are severely constrained by things like status, face and image.

Why would we assume them to be more capable than the Russians?

[tequila]

I think the "Japanese moment" in Asian history is over. Japan, because of its cultural cohesiveness resulting from its position as a mountainous island, has always been able to embrace massive and radical change more quickly than most other countries. It did it during its rise as a unified state during the Nara period, when it embraced a massive infusion of cultural and governmental innovation from China and Korea, and it did it during the Industrial Revolution. However it cannot compete as a local power against a strong China.

If China in the modern age was going to be held back by things like ancient cultural traits, China could never have accomplished the economic transformation that has occurred over the past 35 years. The changes that have occurred in a single generation have gone directly against so many of the fundamental classical traditions of Chinese history as to constitute a genuine revolution, more so even than in 1948.

Culture matters, but cultures are not fixed constants. They undergo constant change to adapt to the underlying fundamentals of the societies they inhabit, and no more so than when the economic superstructure has changed as radically and completely as it has in China in the past generation. Old assumptions need to be revisited.

[JeffC]

5. So they say. The Chinese military budget is smoke and mirrors of the worst order.

I was going to spend more time on this, but when I read your above reply to my point of Lawless's report, I decided against it. I'm happy to debate facts, but there's no debating a refusal to consider facts.

[tequila]

Similar things could be said about the U.S. defense budget, which the government has literally given up on accounting for.

There is enormous waste and fraud in every defense budget - more so when they are swathed in official secrecy. China is hardly an exception. But what is largely not disputed is that China is spending large amounts of money in an attempt to modernize and professionalize its armed forces. While this is hardly the easiest thing to do in the world, China has built in the last thirty years some of the world's most advanced industrial processes and efficient factories. They do not compete only in low-rent textiles and assembled goods but also in consumer electronics, automobile and machine parts, steel, computers, etc. etc.

If one believed that some sort of cultural model barring China from modernization and professional competence was an accurate descriptor, one would have to answer how it is possible for China to build a world-competitive industrial economy across the panoply of manufacturing and services but yet prove incapable of creating a competent military force.

[tequila]

Good basic primer on the China/U.S. dollar relationship, from James Fallows in The Atlantic.

[Jedburgh]

China Brief, 14 Feb 08: Soldier Scholars: Military Education as an Instrument of China's Strategic Power

....There is another element of China’s military transformation that tends to receive much less attention: professional military education (PME). Over the last three decades, China has undertaken significant efforts to enhance the quality of its military education system. The expansion of non-commissioned officer (NCO) education over the last decade within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) illuminates an important—yet understudied—element of China’s broader military modernization efforts. Washington policymakers should take note of Beijing’s investments in military education as they may yield key insights into Chinese military strategy as well as its grand strategy.....

[Norfolk]

Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2008, Office of the Secretary of Defense:

From the Executive Summary -

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is pursuing comprehensive transformation from a mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its territory to one capable of fighting and winning shortduration, high intensity conflicts along its periphery against high-tech adversaries – an approach that China refers to as preparing for “local wars under conditions of informatization.” China’s ability to sustain military power at a distance remains limited but, as noted in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, it “has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages.”

China’s near-term focus on preparing for contingencies in the Taiwan Strait, including the possibility of U.S. intervention, is an important driver of its modernization. However, analysis of China’s military acquisitions and strategic thinking suggests Beijing is also developing capabilities for use in other contingencies, such as conflict over resources or disputed territories.

The pace and scope of China’s military transformation have increased in recent years, fueled by acquisition of advanced foreign weapons, continued high rates of investment in its domestic defense and science and technology industries, and far reaching organizational and doctrinal reforms of the armed forces. China’s expanding and improving military capabilities are changing East Asian military balances; improvements in China’s strategic capabilities have implications beyond the Asia-Pacific region.

and:

The international community has limited knowledge of the motivations, decision-making, and key capabilities supporting China’s military modernization. China’s leaders have yet to explain in detail the purposes and objectives of the PLA’s modernizing military capabilities. For example, China continues to promulgate incomplete defense expenditure figures, and engage in actions that appear inconsistent with its declaratory policies. The lack of transparency in China’s military and security affairs poses risks to stability by increasing the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation. This situation will naturally and understandably lead to hedging against the unknown.

This is a large file, some 29.6 MB. Hat tip to Panzerkom at SDF.

[AdamG]

Some good photos at:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/majo...rine-base.html

China has secretly built a major underground nuclear submarine base that could threaten Asian countries and challenge American power in the region, it can be disclosed.

[Ken White]

Secret because they just found out about it? Threaten? How so, how does a base threaten? Seems like the Subs could but I'm unsure how a base does...

[franksforum]

From the RSIS site in Singapore:

"Confronted with the overwhelming superiority of the US Navy, China has embarked on an asymmetric naval strategy to mitigate American naval power. Relying heavily on submarines, cruise and ballistic missiles and modern fast attack craft, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is fast developing a powerful sea denial capability."

Full text of the commentary is available at the below link:

http://www.ntu.edu.sg/rsis/publicati...SIS0572008.pdf

[Ron Humphrey]

From the RSIS site in Singapore:

"Confronted with the overwhelming superiority of the US Navy, China has embarked on an asymmetric naval strategy to mitigate American naval power. Relying heavily on submarines, cruise and ballistic missiles and modern fast attack craft, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is fast developing a powerful sea denial capability."

Full text of the commentary is available at the below link:

http://www.ntu.edu.sg/rsis/publicati...SIS0572008.pdf

Good thing nobody's planning on invading the sovereign space of China, and of course they only want this capability for defensive and not expeditionary purposes.

At least that's what you hear all the time. Call me silly but I still think something's funny and I haven't figured out what the joke is yet.

[Norfolk]

Call me silly but I still think something's funny and I haven't figured out what the joke is yet.

Ron, take it from me that the only way it'll end up seeming funny is after the water torture is over.

[Adam L]

Good thing nobody's planning on invading the sovereign space of China, and of course they only want this capability for defensive and not expeditionary purposes.

At least that's what you hear all the time. Call me silly but I still think something's funny and I haven't figured out what the joke is yet.

Ron, take it from me that the only way it'll end up seeming funny is after the water torture is over.

It's nice to know I'm not alone in that thought.

Adam L

[Norfolk]

"New Facility Offers Carrier Building Capability", at Chinese Defence Today.

Even comes with a pic of a model of the new Changxing Shipyard with an aircraft carrier in drydock.

Basically, the article is describing how the relocation of the original (and historic) Jiangnan Shipyard in central Shanghai to Changxing Island at the mouth of the Yangtze River will not only result in an increase in shipbuilding capacity to some 12 million dwt by 2015 (some 50% of China's anticipated total capacity), but will also provide the facilities to construct one or two new 50-60,000 ton CVs. Not quite news, but rather a progress report.

[Watcher In The Middle]

the 'China Miracle' comes to an abrupt halt:

Oil price shock means China is at risk of blowing up
By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Last Updated: 10:54am BST 07/07/2008

The great oil shock of 2008 is bad enough for us. It poses a mortal threat to the whole economic strategy of emerging Asia.

The manufacturing revolution of China and her satellites has been built on cheap transport over the past decade. At a stroke, the trade model looks obsolete.

No surprise that Shanghai's bourse is down 56pc since October, one of the world's most spectacular bear markets in half a century.

Asia's intra-trade model is a Ricardian network where goods are shipped in a criss-cross pattern to exploit comparative advantage. Profit margins are wafer-thin.

Products are sent to China for final assembly, then shipped again to Western markets. The snag is obvious. The cost of a 40ft container from Shanghai to Rotterdam has risen threefold since the price of oil exploded.

Link to Article

The consequences to this would be unbelievable. That "$1.8 trillion" will melt away like an early May snowstorm if the "China Miracle" comes to a abrupt end.

This is a story to pay attention to, because it's really happening around the edges. The impacts of something like this are staggering, and not just to China/SE Asia.

[Van]

Chinese power projection is problematic. As far as I can figure out, the only use for Chinese submarines is to quietly dispose of sailors they're not fond of. Aircraft carriers are little better, even when they've had the Varyag tied up at Dalian (see Google Earth) for a case study/template. However, if the objective is someplace they can walk, I'd be worried.

Based on China's actions, rather than U.S. assessments or Chinese statements, the economic hegemony appears to be the goal. Even the military region commanders in China seem to spend more time with diplomacy than combat training (except for the MR with their equivalent of NTC, but that is one out of seven, and that MR does not have any external border).

I'm not just being contrarian, nor am I a starry-eyed believer in the nobility of the goals of China. U.S. analysts have been consistently guilty of mirror-imaging in assessments of China and the result has been an effort to paint China as a direct threat rather than a very subtle and patient one. More to the point, we consistantly discuss China as an expansionist power rather than the Middle Kingdom, the center that expects respect to be paid and desires influence rather direct control.

[Rex Brynen]

An interesting counter-argument on China's rise to superpower status (and a "near-peer" challenger):

A Long Wait at the Gate to Greatness
By John Pomfret
Washington Post
Sunday, July 27, 2008; Page B01

Nikita Khrushchev said the Soviet Union would bury us, but these days, everybody seems to think that China is the one wielding the shovel. The People's Republic is on the march -- economically, militarily, even ideologically. Economists expect its GDP to surpass America's by 2025; its submarine fleet is reportedly growing five times faster than Washington's; even its capitalist authoritarianism is called a real alternative to the West's liberal democracy. China, the drumbeat goes, is poised to become the 800-pound gorilla of the international system, ready to dominate the 21st century the way the United States dominated the 20th.

Except that it's not.

Ever since I returned to the United States in 2004 from my last posting to China, as this newspaper's Beijing bureau chief, I've been struck by the breathless way we talk about that country. So often, our perceptions of the place have more to do with how we look at ourselves than with what's actually happening over there. Worried about the U.S. education system? China's becomes a model. Fretting about our military readiness? China's missiles pose a threat. Concerned about slipping U.S. global influence? China seems ready to take our place.

But is China really going to be another superpower? I doubt it.

[Ken White]

and a local China scholar -- and that's just two of whom I happen to be aware. With about six years in the Orient to bounce against my two in the ME, I'm pretty well convinced that in the ME, things are never as they seem while in the Orient, they are exactly as they seem.

All an excessively lengthy way of saying I think he's right...

[Fuchs]

The rise of PR China is much less the issue than the erosion of classic military power attributes of the West.

The shipyard industry of the U.S. is tiny, inferior to Croatia's or Poland's - but its navy is the biggest one.
Western steel production is much greater than in WW2 - but dwarfed by steel production in China.
Our electronics industry is good - but lots of electronics production happens in Asia.
Our chemical industry is strong - but new production plants are typically either close to natural gas resources or in Asia (because that's where so much of the manufacturing industry is now).
We still have huge populations - but their age structure and the rise of China and India to relevance dwarfes our mobilization strengths.

Even if you believe that major conventional wars are a thing of the past - we should adjust the perception of ourselves to reality.
It's not just the rise of developing countries that changes the balance - it's also our relative and often even absolute decline in many areas.

It would be dangerous to base our foreign policy on the feet of clay that the perception of our own strength really is.
Maybe the ongoing wars help our populations and politicians to understand the message.

[Watcher In The Middle]

is that we (the "West") look at China through Western eyes, and concepts. That's our filter, it what we've grown up with, so it's understandable. Problem is, we miss stuff as a result. Here's a great example of something missed:

China's `Underground' Loans Top $1.5 Trillion, Wen Wei Po Says
By Patricia Kuo

Aug. 3 (Bloomberg) -- So-called ``underground'' lending in China exceeds 10 trillion yuan ($1.5 trillion), the Wen Wei Po newspaper reported, citing lenders and market watchers it didn't identify.

Funding made available by unauthorized lenders including pawn shops and auction firms is thriving as banks tighten credit after a series of interest rate and reserve ratio increases, the Chinese-language newspaper said. Some such loans carry interest rates higher than 5 percent a month, it said.

LInk to the Article

Now, this is "off-the-books" lending that's not part of any official statistics, and in modern Western society, literally has no counterpart (Well, maybe loan sharking). But imagine $1.5 trillion dollars annually worth of loan sharking.

Or maybe a different, but more realistic comparison. How about the Chinese equivalent of sub-prime real estate mortgages?