Social Scientists Work Being Involuntarily Classified

[selil]

Not sure if it relevant or not, but I was asked "nicely" to produce a document, and then review a consolidated document. Not what I would call "research" just me being a nice guy helping a fellow traveler out. This was all clean, totally, unclassified. I then edited, submitted, and walked away from the project. The generation of the document was totally open source and my experience.

I attempted to download the document at a later date from the government website where it had been posted but it had been classified FOUO, and the re-classified and since the classification is FOUO I have no idea at what level. I did not know a classification could be classified or I may simply not understand the mechanisms in play.

Now this was me being a nice guy, not "research", but I wonder if am I carrying around a top secret uber national security risk in my archives folder? Are Natasha and Boris looking for me right now? More important could I get somebody in trouble by having the original copy? This could mean free beer for life or something.

[John T. Fishel]

Cav Guy, I'm not entirely sure what NIPR net is. I understand the SIPRnet is secure. But let me talk about something really unclas and unofficial - this site and my email (ou.edu). Generally, if I don't want something spread widely, I use my email account. It is relatively secure - not completely - but relatively so. If I want to discuss it more widely, I would do so here - knowing that I risk some bad guys having access but recognizing that not everybody monitors this site. If I want to carry on a discussion here more privately I go PM. There is also and always snail mail and the telephone. Bottom line, I think, is the uncommon qualities of common sense and good judgment.

Sam, FOUO is NOT a classification but a protective marking. So, your doc has not been classified at all. Here are a couple of suggestions depending on how much you want to screw with the system:
1. Ask the guy you were helping out to email you a copy - after all it's yours.
2. Take your original (or recreate it if you must), put your name on it, and post it to your blog along with the story.
3. Contact the agency that made it FOUO and threaten to sue them for violation of copyright - which exists even if you never registered it, as I'm sure you know.

Let us know how it all comes out.

Cheers

JohnT

[Abu Suleyman]

BLUF: The free flow of information is good, and we in this forum should educate ourselves, and those around us to ensure that information continues to flow.

I think that it is obvious that I have touched a nerve here, and the problem is far greater than I originally feared. The question, then, is where do we go from here.

As I see it, the problem is actually ignorance. (Isn't ignorance so often a part of the problem.) Of course there are three levels of ignorance:
1) On the part of the government and government officials there is ignorance on the actual policy and the role that classifications and caveats play.
2) On the part of academics there is ignorance about security clearances and procedures (and how to work with them, instead of against them).
3) On the part of everyone on the role that non-governmental people could play in 'fixing problems'. Basically, I don't know that there is any plan at all, outside of fits and starts like HTS.

Far from being helpless in this forum, there are many educated and connected people here. I think that if we do our homework, we could come up with enough information. I am looking into trying to find out what is already available, but if anyone knows of classes that you can take on classification procedures, that would be great.

I look to the recent past, when Fermi and Oppenheimer helped end WWII by building the nuclear bomb, and luminaries such as George Kennan shaped foreign policy. (In fairness, Kennan was a Statie at the time.) Now we have an 'Us vs. Them' mentality, where 'Us' is the government (to include some contractors) and 'Them' is the people.

I am not a Utopian who believes that state secrets should be out in the open. Nevertheless, there is already an abundance of information available which is not classified. I am also showing my political science colors when I say that I believe, even at the cost of sharing it with those who wish us in the West ill, we should make sure that information is more available rather than less. We cannot turn off the Internet, nor hide under a rock. It is far better that we talk about where we want to go and how to get there with as many people as possible to get as good an idea as possible.

Open the curtains and let the light shine in!

[John T. Fishel]

spot on - at least from my perspective. But then, we political scientists should stick together.

One additional comment regarding Kennan: His Long Telegram was the intellectual rationale for the containment policy and the strategy contained in NSC 68. Kennan published it under the nom de plume of "X" in Foreign Affairs while still in government. Clearly supports your premise of openness (as well as national self confidence).

Cheers

JohnT

[Cavguy]

Cav Guy, I'm not entirely sure what NIPR net is. I understand the SIPRnet is secure. But let me talk about something really unclas and unofficial - this site and my email (ou.edu). Generally, if I don't want something spread widely, I use my email account. It is relatively secure - not completely - but relatively so. If I want to discuss it more widely, I would do so here - knowing that I risk some bad guys having access but recognizing that not everybody monitors this site. If I want to carry on a discussion here more privately I go PM. There is also and always snail mail and the telephone. Bottom line, I think, is the uncommon qualities of common sense and good judgment.

The problem is the control over the forward button on other people's computers.

NIPR is the unclassified military commercial internet backbone. It is the internet connection everyone has in DoD for computer use. It is not really restricted in any way than it is maintained through DoD gateways/routers rather than an ISP's.

One thing I know the SWJEDs and others deal with is documents not labeled with a handling restriction. I see a lot of good AAR's from the field, with great tips for the troops. In them are tactics, techniques, and procedures that are not classified, but sensitive. I wouldn't want AQIZ to know about how company commanders are placing the .50 cal in their defensive perimeters in Afghanistan. However, that is not to the level of SECRET information, IMO. (actual base/location of data would be, but TTP is not generally) If it gets classifed secret, or confidential, I just reduced the number of people with access (not clearance, there is a difference) to see it by 99%. So these day's get gets labled UNCLASS/FOUO REL (release) NATO, etc. The understood instruction is "only distribute to those with official need, but unclassified". The second issue is unclassified assessments of operations/performance. Without a handling restriction, every email you send may wind up on the Washington Post, taken out of context, which reduces the community's willingness to share information.

In the pre-internet age this was done through branch mags and a multitude of pamphlets. The enemy had limited access to them just due to physical separation and the costs to reprodouce, and then only after some time. Today these documents spread instantly.

I don't know what the answer is, I just know that whether intended or not UNCLASS/FOUO has come to be the label that people attach to documents that are unclassified that we would prefer to stay within DoD, or at least allied, circles. Moving everything to SIPR isn't the answer, because of limited stations/access, and inablity to share SIPR with coalition partners.

If it's not the right answer, we need to develop something to replace its use. We all know FOUO may leak out, but at least most responsible people (like the SWJED editors) won't forward FOUO stuff outside the military. Just bad OPSEC, and bad business.

[Steve Blair]

One of the things I see from a researcher's standpoint is that a good deal of stuff that used to be "for public release" is now being swept into AKO/AF Portal/other restricted access. Standard doctrine publications are part of this, and now Armor has gone behind the Internet "iron curtain." Not especially helpful for those of us that have an interest in such things, and I think it also extends beyond that.

I tend to run closer to John and Abu's position (at least as I understand it). On one hand the military complains that people don't understand them, and then they start restricting access to what used to be open source information that might help people understand them. Sure, there's stuff you don't want the bad guys to know. I get that, and it makes sense. But I'm starting to feel that the broom is sweeping too wide now.

[Cavguy]

One of the things I see from a researcher's standpoint is that a good deal of stuff that used to be "for public release" is now being swept into AKO/AF Portal/other restricted access. Standard doctrine publications are part of this, and now Armor has gone behind the Internet "iron curtain." Not especially helpful for those of us that have an interest in such things, and I think it also extends beyond that.

I tend to run closer to John and Abu's position (at least as I understand it). On one hand the military complains that people don't understand them, and then they start restricting access to what used to be open source information that might help people understand them. Sure, there's stuff you don't want the bad guys to know. I get that, and it makes sense. But I'm starting to feel that the broom is sweeping too wide now.

Agree with the over-cautiousness. When the CSA issued the blog/internet OPSEC clampdown message in 2005 it had an immense chill. Everyone over-reacted. The army setting up special units to troll blogs and websites for OPSEC violations didn't help either. LTG Caldwell is leading the charge out from the dark ages, but as always, the Army has trouble not overcorrecting.

[Entropy]

As an intel guy I guess I'm of two minds on this issue and I've seen similar debates take place within the intelligence world. One of my jobs used to involve trying to get intelligence downgraded and/or released for the same reasons Cavguy lists for pushing info down to the unclass level - access. Information is of no value if the people who need it don't have access. In the intelligence world, a careful weighing takes place and information is often "sanitized" to remove source or whatever it is that keeps the info at the higher level. There are procedures and policies to accomplish this as well as personnel who are trained to do it.

One thing that concerns me with the unclassified caveats is that it's not clear (to me at least) who adjudicates whether something is sensitive or not. Without some standard and without knowledgeable people weighing the costs and benefits of placing information in the classified, unclass or FOUO categories, there is likely to be inconsistency in how the caveats are applied. Another problem, which will hopefully be corrected through standardization, is that too often a document is simply labeled FOUO without any idea of what parts are actually sensitive. Paragraph markings are a good thing. Finally, there doesn't seem to be an expiration for FOUO unlike actual classified information. At what point does a FOUO document become simply unclassified with no restriction? Who knows. That's a problem.

[Abu Suleyman]

As an intel guy I guess I'm of two minds on this issue and I've seen similar debates take place within the intelligence world. One of my jobs used to involve trying to get intelligence downgraded and/or released for the same reasons Cavguy lists for pushing info down to the unclass level - access.

Overclassification, and unnecessary classification are a seperate although related problem, and probably still on topic. However, what I am most concerned about is actually the taking of things that were never classified, and perhaps not even produced by the government and then classifying them.

Here's a counterfactual example: I have heard, but cannot confirm, that Tom Clancy's "Hunt for Red October" and he and Larry Bond's work in "Red Storm Rising" were so close to the real thing that intelligence agents for both countries initially believed that they had a security leak, but that in reality it was primarily conjecture and derived from information readily available in the public library at the time. (For the purpose of this example assume that the previous premise is true.) What if the government had classified "The Hunt for Red October"? That is what many people are concerned about; that if they work with the government or even study issues related to the government and security issues they may have they work classified even though the information it is based on remains in the public domain.

I agree that U.S. TTP's or current operations shouldn't be revealed. I don't think there is any value in hiding doctrinal manuals behind the AKO Electron Curtain, but it doesn't give me nearly as much heart burn. But plenty of people seem to believe that while two wrongs don't make a right, enough UNCLASS data compiled together can make a SECRET document, and that just strikes me as crazy.

[wm]

Overclassification, and unnecessary classification are a seperate although related problem, and probably still on topic. However, what I am most concerned about is actually the taking of things that were never classified, and perhaps not even produced by the government and then classifying them.

Here's a counterfactual example: I have heard, but cannot confirm, that Tom Clancy's "Hunt for Red October" and he and Larry Bond's work in "Red Storm Rising" were so close to the real thing that intelligence agents for both countries initially believed that they had a security leak, but that in reality it was primarily conjecture and derived from information readily available in the public library at the time. (For the purpose of this example assume that the previous premise is true.) What if the government had classified "The Hunt for Red October"? That is what many people are concerned about; that if they work with the government or even study issues related to the government and security issues they may have they work classified even though the information it is based on remains in the public domain.

I agree that U.S. TTP's or current operations shouldn't be revealed. I don't think there is any value in hiding doctrinal manuals behind the AKO Electron Curtain, but it doesn't give me nearly as much heart burn. But plenty of people seem to believe that while two wrongs don't make a right, enough UNCLASS data compiled together can make a SECRET document, and that just strikes me as crazy.

The waiter's response was, "Stop screaming and waving it about by its tail. Everyone else will want one."


A serious consideration is neither to confirm nor deny. Someone like a Tom Clancy may produce a document that contains stuff that, had it been published by an arm of the DoD would have been classified at some level fron Confidential up to TS Burn Before Reading. That does not matter. What does matter is the reaction of those "in the know" to such a book.

In cases like this it is better just to note to oneself that the horse left the barn but not worry about shutting the door. Shutting the door is a dead give away that something bad just occurred.

[John T. Fishel]

In your scenario, the saving grace is that once something is out you really can't get it back. So, in this internet era, even if all cpies of Hun were pulled it would still be available on the internet. I expect there would be multiple You Tube videos of Clancy reading it.

Cheers

JohnT

[Entropy]

But plenty of people seem to believe that while two wrongs don't make a right, enough UNCLASS data compiled together can make a SECRET document, and that just strikes me as crazy.

From the root classification authority, here is what may be classified:

Information shall not be considered for classification unless it concerns:

(a) military plans, weapons systems, or operations;

(b) foreign government information;

(c) intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology;

(d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources;

(e) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism;

(f) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;

(g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism; or

(h) weapons of mass destruction.

On aggregate unclassified information becoming classified, the EO says this:

Compilations of items of information that are individually unclassified may be classified if the compiled information reveals an additional association or relationship that: (1) meets the standards for classification under this order; and (2) is not otherwise revealed in the individual items of information. As used in this order, "compilation" means an aggregation of pre-existing unclassified items of information.

On the other hand, it also says this:

Basic scientific research information not clearly related to the national security shall not be classified.

This has traditionally applied mainly to the technical sciences (ex. laser or aerodynamic research), but perhaps one solution is to make it clear the social sciences are included in that provision.

I have some more to say on the subject, but am heading out for lunch - MTF.

[Rex Brynen]

But plenty of people seem to believe that while two wrongs don't make a right, enough UNCLASS data compiled together can make a SECRET document, and that just strikes me as crazy.

It depends very much on who is doing it, for whom. Obviously, a private citizen pulling together an analysis from unclassified material and OSINT doesn't justify the subsequent classification of that material. If they are a former government employee it doesn't either, unless perhaps their open source analysis reveals awareness of something very sensitive (through its framing or assumptions) that they were exposed to in classified form before.

If open source collection and analysis is done in official capacity, or under contract, it is a very different thing--even if the material is open source, the fact that the government is interested in having it compiled, the conclusions that were drawn, the apparent purposes to which it might be put, and the political/foreign policy implications of disclosure might all be enormously sensitive.

I've often had contract work based on OSINT classified, and for good reason.

[Cavguy]

I tend to run closer to John and Abu's position (at least as I understand it). On one hand the military complains that people don't understand them, and then they start restricting access to what used to be open source information that might help people understand them. Sure, there's stuff you don't want the bad guys to know. I get that, and it makes sense. But I'm starting to feel that the broom is sweeping too wide now.

I fielded the same complaint from a major (military friendly) author recently, who got great access from the USMC and less from the Army. When criticized that his upcoming book is "Marine centric", his basic response was "they gave me access, I tried the army, but they wouldn't give me access to FOUO stuff I need to tell the stories".

Current security guidelines make no distinction between sharing with a US civilian (retired military) and a terrorist from Afghanistan. What drives the caution is the fear of losing a security clearance, which can end a career.

[Steve Blair]

I fielded the same complaint from a major (military friendly) author recently, who got great access from the USMC and less from the Army. When criticized that his upcoming book is "Marine centric", his basic response was "they gave me access, I tried the army, but they wouldn't give me access to FOUO stuff I need to tell the stories".

Current security guidelines make no distinction between sharing with a US civilian (retired military) and a terrorist from Afghanistan. What drives the caution is the fear of losing a security clearance, which can end a career.

I understand that, but a fair amount of the stuff that got swept up used to be classified for public release, distribution unlimited. Unless they recently upped the status on common FMs, that's how they were listed. Now...gone behind AKO.

FOUO is an interesting classification, as Entropy pointed out. When exactly does it roll down? Does it ever?

I understand the security clearance concern. That makes sense. But I don't think anyone's seriously considering the second and third level impact this shotgun approach could have in the long term for the Army (or they are it's not making much headway). IMO, anyhow.

[Darksaga]

The reality is the roll some social scientist are filling down range are such that they are included in operations. So they are going out to the DAC meetings. They are speaking with the populous. They are doing link analysis. Those operations are inherently classified.