The Modular Brigade Combat Team

[Norfolk]

Fuchs wrote:

Is that a typo?

Sadly, no. It could have been a reinforced Battalion though.

Pet Rock, that is...

Agree with all you said; this in particular:Spent a few years in Cav and recon Platoons in Infantry units; only Cdr I had who had a clue what to do with the element in either recon or security modes was an old infantry COL who'd led an I&R Platoon during WW II.

Most of the others were fairly malleable and I could usually convince a series of S3s and an occasional S2 to let us do the right thing -- but there was the occasional hardhead who insisted on dumb missions or methods and, even lacking them, it should not be that way.

I recall being told at Knox back around 1980 that the biggest shortfall in NTC rotations was failure at R&S. Heard that again and again in the late 80s and in the 90s and heard the same of JRTC after it got rolling -- and I'll bet it's still true. I've seen entirely too much misuse and seen people get needlessly killed from that ineptitude.

I mentioned before that my son (A former RSTA C Troop 1SG) had commented at a war game that we did not do recon at all well and the new Troop TOE with Tanks was overkill. He then got told by a Cav COL that "...we (the US Army) don't have the patience to do Recon right so we just go out looking for trouble and to do that you have to have armor." I've given that a lot of thought. The patience aspect is a true statement in a sense -- but the issue is NOT with the Scouts, it's with the overlarge Staffs that don't have enough to keep them occupied and continually play the "Car 54 Where are you" routine on the net -- that's where the impatience is. It's not usually the Commanders, it's the staffs.

Not to mention that I expect the M1A2++ is going to run about $7M -- awfully expensive for a "recon" vehicle...

Whatever, we've been on the wrong side of that curve since WW II -- Northwest Europe has a lot to answer for...

It really, really needs to be fixed.

Like several others here, RTK's observations about the BCT in general and the recce and surveillance side of things in particular are spot-on and rectification is required, urgently on the recce side. As an outsider on the matter of the BCT concept here, but not a disinterested observer (seeing as how the SBCT TO&E and especially the RSTA SQN TO&E in particular have been adapted and modified for Canadian purposes fo the sale of interoperability), I note that his and others' points match almost all those deficiencies that have been identified in Canadian service, particularly the consequences of the deemphasis upon ground reconnaissance in favour of "sensors", et al. There is no substitute or being able to sneek-and-peek and to be able to dominate the ground between yourself and the enemy. Sensors are useful, often very useful, but they do not dispense with the need for proper reconnaissance, in all its forms.

I am a little surprised though by the reaction against including MBTs in the 90's Div Cav Sqns. That said, in no way am I disagreeing with anyone that always defaulting to performing reconnaissance-by-fire mode is a bad thing; as has already been stated, it's fundamentally a leadership and training issue. But it needs to be affirmed at the same time that heavy armour has a role to play in ground reconnaissance at Formation-Level, and not just "light" recce elements. While sneek-and-peek really is necessary for proper (and most) ground reconnaissance, so is the ability to fight for information if and when you have to, or being able to perform in the covering force role and not just the screening role.

British and Canadian Armoured Recce units were good at most forms of ground reconnaissance until more recent years, but because they lacked any heavy armour, they were unable to fight to gain information if they needed to. All they could do was try to get out of Dodge if they ran into something that they couldn't hide from, or sit still and await the arrival of regular armour if they came upon a path or place they daren't go themselves. Recce have to be able to both fight and to watch and listen to do their job; each as tactically appropriate or necessary.

Oh, and I agree with everyone else; the BCT should have three maneuver Bns and the RSTA -- properly organized. Light Inf Bns should also have four rifle Cos.

I have been watching the whole BCT thing - IBCT, SBCT, HBCT - unfold for a while now and been slowly grinding my teeth. Besides the glaring lack of the third maneouvre battalion in the IBCT and the HBCT, the two CABs of the HBCT have also simultaneously both intrigued and dismayed me. Perhaps if the HBCTS were called RCTs instead I might buy the concept; that would also be conditional upon employing said RCTs as just that, and understanding that they are not Brigades, but rather Battle Groups.

And I would argue that all Inf Bns should have 4 Rifle Coys.