Revising FM 3-24: What needs to change?

[Cavguy]

All,

At the organization I work for (COIN Center) there is some discussion of revising and updating FM 3-24/MCWP 33.3.5.

There is certainly a wide body of criticism of FM 3-24, to which most of the regulars here are familiar with. Many units who have employed the FM have found strengths and shortfalls in the manual when put into application.

Here's some starter questions, but don't limit yourself:

1) What was helpful/useful in FM 3-24?

2) What is missing in FM 3-24?

3) What needs amplification?

4) What needs de-emphasis?

5) What is flat wrong or needs removal?

6) Does the manual strike the balance between specific, applicable knowledge and theory of operations?

7) How does the manual hold up in application in Iraq/Afghanistan, and does its principles hold up outside of Iraq/Afghanistan?

Chapter/paragraph would help in the discussion, but is not necessary.

If you need to read the good book, (wink to Gian), it's here.

We are considering a conference here at Leavenworth early next year to flesh out some of these issues, I thought this would be a good place to start.

Niel

[slapout9]

Cavguy, I am not sure which section this belongs in but in the future I would look at expanding the use of the MP's. They should be the primary force used in the Hold phase of clear, hold and build. Slap

[selil]

Can I add onto what SLAP said and state they need a better write up on corrections and jails for all phases?

[SWJED]

I would say that COIN intelligence needs some expansion in the update and a good section on religious influencers should be added.

[Rank amateur]

I don't know if you saw this on AM, but the PDF had some excellent points:

Wednesday, June 25, 2008
FM 3-24 Roundtable

One of Charlie's favorite members of the Sosh Mafia emailed this morning to say that the recent Perspectives on Politics roundtable on FM 3-24 is now available to the huddled masses. Steve Biddle, LTC Doug Ollivant, Stathis Kalyvas, and Wendy Brown all weigh in (that, btw, is a serious murder's row of COIN commentary).

The PDF

[SWJED]

I don't know if you saw this on AM, but the PDF had some excellent points:

Wednesday, June 25, 2008
FM 3-24 Roundtable

One of Charlie's favorite members of the Sosh Mafia emailed this morning to say that the recent Perspectives on Politics roundtable on FM 3-24 is now available to the huddled masses. Steve Biddle, LTC Doug Ollivant, Stathis Kalyvas, and Wendy Brown all weigh in (that, btw, is a serious murder's row of COIN commentary).

The PDF

Yes, it was posted to the SWJ Blog - thanks for adding it here.

[Randy Brown]

I don't know whether Steven Metz (link to his June 2007 monograph "Rethinking Insurgency" here) has previously posted it elsewhere on SWJ, but this just crossed my desktop in one of those serendipitous L2I-net "the research gods must be happy" moments. It's a four-page summary of an October 2007 Strategic Studies Institute/Brookings Institute colloquium, a somewhat-tritely titled "COIN of the Realm: U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategy." It's available in PDF.

Key insights discussed in this document include:

• Regardless of whether counterinsurgency (COIN) will be the dominant form of military activity in the future or simply one of several, the United States needs an effective national strategy which explains when, why, and how the nation should undertake it.
• The basic assumptions of the current approach need revisited, especially those dealing with the role of the state, the strategic framework for American involvement, and the whole-of-government approach.
• Given the demands placed upon the armed forces by the current campaigns, most of the effort has been on tactics, training, and doctrine. Ultimately strategic transformation is at least as important if not more so.
• Rather than thinking of counterinsurgency and warfighting as competing tasks, the military and other government agencies must pursue ways to integrate them, thus assuring that the United States can address the multidimensional threats which characterize the contemporary security environment.

I offer it here in hope of assisting backbenchers like me to frame their own questions/comments/concepts about FM 3-24 version 2.0.

[John T. Fishel]

I have just finished reading the Perspectives on Politics symposium on 3-24. Before responding to Niel's charge with regard to useful elements of the symposium for updating the manual - there are some - let me make a few general comments. Steve Biddle and Douglas Ollivant (PhD Pol Sci IU a generation after me) have some real understanding of the manual and the issues. Biddle's comments are a bit dated. Kalyvas is dead wrong in his interpretation of (a) Galula, (b) Sir Robt Thompson, and (c) the manual. He also picks one of the most obscure publications on COIN from the Vietnam era as the epitome of the best analysis from that era. "Rebellion and Authority" by Leites and Wolf is a Rand Corp economic analysis of insurgency using largely data from Vietnam. Interesting but hardly the most profound. Finally, what can one say of Wendy Brown's screed? Neo-marxist, not understanding the nature of Vietnam, Iraq, COIN, the US military, or even the chain of command as specified by the Constitution, National Security Act, and Goldwater-Nichols.

Nevertheless, Brown raises a real issue that is reinforced by Ollivant in his sole area of weakness. Brown cites David Price's critique of the manual for plagiarism and shoddy research (that we have discussed in this forum extensively led by Marc T). As a "victim" of that "plagiarism" and general lack of citation of a whole body of work (see especially my work with Max Manwaring and Max's work with others, particularly our article in Small Wars & Insurgencies Vol 3 No 3 Winter 1992 and our most recent book, Uncomfortable Wars Revisited). Max and I both think there is no issue here - we were just happy that our concepts made it into the most recent manual. But there is a substantive consequence of not acknowleging previous work - esp previous FMs. Ollivant reiterates the charge that there was nothing in doctrine or research in the years following Vietnam. Yet, there was quite a lot beginning with FM 100-20 Low Intensity Conflict 1981 (which was pure COIN) thru Max Thurman's charge to SSI in 1984 to study the correlates of success in COIN. That study produced the SWORD Model in 1986 (made available to the scholarly world in 2 books prior to its detalied publication in our 1992 article) and critical to the development of FM 100-20 Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict 1990 (but finished in 1987 and published jointly with the USAF). The Army/AF Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC) was established at Langley AFB in 1986 as was the Small Wars Operations Research Directorate (SWORD) in Southcom at about the same time. SWORD proposed, and Gen. Fred Franks agreed to expand the LIC (COIN) curriculum at CGSC by a 2 day symposium called Southcom Days that ran thru 1989, at least. Much of the focus was on the insurgency in El Salvador. FM 100-5 introduced the term OOTW but maintained the doctrine from 100-20 as did the 1995 JP 3-07 (which called it MOOTW). In short, there is a long history of military and academic interaction on this subject post Vietnam. (Kalyvas, obviously, has not read the right literature. ) A long way to getting to the point: a revision should make the history of the development of the post-Vietnam doctrine clear and get it right. Practitioners on the ground like Fred Woerner, John Waghelstein, and Ambassadors Deane Hinton, Tom Pickering, and Ed Corr should get credit for their contributions in El Salvador. The anonymous doctrine writers at Leavenworth should get the respect they deserve - to remove some anonymity, they include LTCs (R) Don Vought and John Hunt and COL (R) Jerry Thompson who honchoed the 1990 FM 100-20. This would serve to expand the point that Ollivant makes that there is a continuing battle for the soul of the Army over the nature of the American Way of War.

Ollivant's other point is that COIN needs to be placed in the larger context of many "wars amongst peoples". Here, I would note that the research and pubs that Max and I have been involved with could help give context since we used the SWORD Model with respect to CD, CT, PKO, and now Max is applying it to the phenomena of gangs.

Cheers

JohnT

[Old Eagle]

Excellent recap, John. I, too, was surprised by the commentary of the participants.

Both Max Thurman and CSA Vuono understood that as critical as deterrence was, we would never fight at the Fulda Gap. In fact, as I recall, Vuono's first OCONUS trip as CSA was not to Europe, as had been customary, but to Central America.

[slapout9]

What does SWORD stand for? Can the model be posted? Interested from the Gang aspected mentioned above.

[marct]

John, I think you are absolutely right in the need for more information on the historical development of the doctrine and, IMO more importantly, the thinking behind the doctrine. That was one of the reasons why I was calling for a "scholarly" or "annotated" version (full citations, etc.) of FM 3-24.

I've been watching and reading a fair bit about the reaction to COIN doctrine (thanks, Gian !) and trying to think of ways to reduce some of the cognitive dissonance introduced by the use of pseudo-koans such as "sometimes, less is more". I think that one of the crucial ways in which this could be done is to define the universe of discourse or, at the minimum, set some decent fuzzy boundary conditions on it.

For example, you noted Wendy Brown's piece as being

Neo-marxist, not understanding the nature of Vietnam, Iraq, COIN, the US military, or even the chain of command as specified by the Constitution, National Security Act, and Goldwater-Nichols.

and I think that's a pretty fair characterization of it. But, while I do think she misses the practical point, she has hit on a much larger point. Of course, being an Anthropologist, I have to make that point by telling a story .

In February, I was listening to a talk by Tom Barnett where he's talking on about the interface zone between the global economy and the third world and how the wars of the next century will be fought to bring the Third world into the global economy. Now this actually matches the perceptual structures underlying Brown's position and is the underlying structure of the economic reconstruction inherent in COIN practice. In effect, for both of these people, COIN doctrine is the formalization of the kinetic branch of economic warfare; an ongoing, "long war", that both appear to assume is inevitable.

This assumption of inevitability, along with the shared assumption of an economic base driving the conflict, shapes and conditions the concepts that are used in FM 3-24. What is most worrisome to me is that this shaping assumes a form of "centralization" (for want to a better term) that is grounded in theory but not in reality (as a example, Kilcullen's Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt shows the dangers of assuming such a centralization).

Now, I've got nothing against grounding doctrine in theory, but I do have a real concern about grounding it in bottom-down theory that structurally and perceptually excludes many of the things that are happening in reality.

Anyway, that's my 0.198 cents...

[Steve Blair]

What does SWORD stand for? Can the model be posted? Interested from the Gang aspected mentioned above.

From John's post:

Small Wars Operations Research Directorate (SWORD)

.

No worries, Slap. I missed it the first time through, too....

[Rank amateur]

I thought Brown made two good points: in spite of her obvious bias.

She refereed to research that says political disputes aren't driven by grievance as much as greed. In more practical terms, the people who have the oil in Iraq are never going to share the money with the people who don't: regardless of how much capacity building or hearts and minds work the boots on the ground do. Big problem, if true.

Two: the manual is binary; the political situation in Iraq is multifactional. My pet bugaboo and another huge problem. Arguably, clearing and holding Sadr City gives Maliki less reason to compromise with his opponents: many have wondered if Maliki is actually more interested in using military power to weakening his political opponents than stability. An issue Biddle refers to as "Interest alignment with the host government." (I may or may not have something intelligent to say on this issue later.) But if our objective is political reconciliation, these are the issues that could lead to strategic failure in spite of tactical success.

[Bill Moore]

John I'm familiar with the SWORD model, but have yet found a concise description of it, or a graphic representation. My on-line searches led to numerous articles that talk about SWORD, but never really address the bottom line. Can you send a link, or links, to white papers or articles that accurately address the SWORD model?

The one diagram I did see was basically a triangle, and very simliar to Dr. McCormack's Diamond Model (Naval Post Graduate School), which you may be familiar with. I believe the SWORD model was the genesis of Diamond Model after researching the SWORD, but that is speculation on my part. The Diamond Model is relatively easy to interpret and apply at all levels from the tactical to the strategic level (in my opinion), and would probably be a good addition to the new 3-24.

Thanks for your help, Bill

[Gian P Gentile]

I thought all four reviews were excellent in their own ways and brought out needed criticism of a manual that needs to be debated; heavily and deeply.

I agree with Marc T's notion of grounding the manual in reality on the ground; I would add that the manual's narrow selection of history and theory (population-centric, that is) causes it to be a narrowly applicable doctrine for the many realities of insurgencies that the United States might face. Hence the point I have made previously about the American Army becoming dogmatic in its approach to coin.

John T; what is it about Biddle's review that you thought was "outdated?"

And I believe, contrary to your stark dismissal of Kalyvas's review, that he is actually and absolutely spot-on correct in his assessment of FM 3-24. It is, depending on how you want to look at it, Galula Heavy or Trinquier Light. Go back and read the thing; its premise demands a response of protraction, heavy amounts of American combat boots on the ground to secure the population in order to separate the insurgents from the people and ultimately establish the host government as legitimate. How is this not the protracted people's war approach of the 1960s aka Thompson, Galula, Trinquier, etc?? Point to anwhere in the manual where there are other options for an american counterinsurgent force to pursue other than population-centric? There is one 5 line paragraph in Chapter 5 on "limited options" for coin. But that is it.

The entire FM needs to be deconstructed and rebuilt the same way active defense doctrine was heavily debated between 76 and 82 and in the process fundamentally changed. Unfortunately, most folks in the Army see FM 3-24 at its end point as was FM 3-0 in 1986. Or, in other words, most folks think it just needs some polishing around the edges, I on the other hand, thinks it needs to be rebuilt.

gg

[Ken White]

...But if our objective is political reconciliation, these are the issues that could lead to strategic failure in spite of tactical success.

strategic failure with respect to Iraq?

Follow on question; Is our objective political reconciliation? If so or if not, why?

[Ken White]

I thought all four reviews were excellent in their own ways and brought out needed criticism of a manual that needs to be debated; heavily and deeply.
...

Or, in other words, most folks think it just needs some polishing around the edges, I on the other hand, thinks it needs to be rebuilt.

I also agree that it is overly formulaic and emphasizes numbers (mass) as opposed to tactical agility.

[Steve Blair]

I would almost prefer to see it go in the direction of the USMC warfighting stuff (MCDP 1 series)...something that is grounded in the history and theory with practical examples from a wide spectrum of COIN. It shouldn't (IMO) focus on Iraq to the exclusion of all else (since there's a fair chance it will be needed elsewhere...and maybe not in a traditional COIN context). I don't think such a deep rewrite is being considered, but it certainly needs better sourcing, better historical examples of techniques working and (equally important) not working. I'd like to see an example of an approach working in one situation and failing in another because the people on the ground failed to look at the entire context of their situation and instead pulled out a "book solution" and suffered for it.

And of course the American Army's getting dogmatic in its approach to COIN...it's done that with just about every warfare type it's encountered during its history. This doesn't surprise me.

[John T. Fishel]

SWORD was the Small Wars Operations Research Directorate - founded as the Southcom LIC Cell (SLICC). Bad name so it became SWORD. After Galvin became SACEUR, SWORD came under the J5 as the Small Wars Operations Research Division. A year later, it was disbanded. But its contributions to the war in El Sal were significant as well as to the doctrine.

The article does not exist in electronic form. PM me and perhaps we can come up with something.

Cheers

JohnT

[John T. Fishel]

to grasp its meaning.

My reading of the doctrine - 3-24 and its predecessors - does not presume any sort of inevitability. My understanding of insurgency is that it is far more complex and that while it may seek to achieve incorporation into the global economy on favorable terms, it also may have nothing to do with the global economy or even reject it entirely. One could argue that AQ, as a global insurgency, wants to turn the entire global order on its head starting with religious freedom/diversity, moving to a political endstate (or series thereof), and finishing off with adapting modern technology to 7th Century Islamic polities. If I am correct, then Brown really has little to say that is useful - which was my start point based on her inability/unwillingness to determine the facts of what she is wrting about and her lack of understanding of concepts, starting with military doctrine. (She seems to think it is some kind of quasi religious dogma whereas, an old Military Review article captures it best in its title, "Doctrine Not Dogma.")

I guess I really didn't like her piece very much - must be pretty obvious.

Cheers

JohnT