Revising FM 3-24: What needs to change?

[Rank amateur]

AM has an excellent post on what I was discussing.

Are the SoI SOL?.

Yes, more SoIs have been integrated, but not nearly enough. And every step appears to require twisting Maliki’s arm to the breaking point. With Maliki's newfound (over)confidence in the capabilities of the ISF, moreover, he is growing less amenable to this kind of tactical pressure every day. There is a genuine possibility that the prime minister will basically tell the “thugs,” “criminals,” and “terrorists” in the SoI to go screw themselves.

According to doctrine "breathing space" is supposed to lead to reconciliation. In Iraq, the opposite is happening. The less violence there is, the more incentive Maliki has to tell his oppenents to "screw themselves."

Paetreus would have more leverage over Maliki if Maliki still needed us to restrain Sadr, but

a) Maliki snookered us into taking care of that problem for him according to Maliki's timeline.

b) According to doctrine - and correct me if I'm wrong - you can't go wrong by clearing and holding, but as we've seen by clearing and holding Sadr City we lost political leverage.

What is strategic failure with respect to Iraq?

Follow on question; Is our objective political reconciliation? If so or if not, why?

Since we stayed to promote democracy and avoid civil war, I think most people would consider a civil war or the end of democracy a strategic failure.

I've admitted before that I have no idea what our objective in Iraq is.