Quote Originally Posted by TheCurmudgeon View Post
I throw this out as an open question – how do you win the support of the rural people of Afghanistan?
This is the absolutely central question. I think it probably has multiple dimensions to it (just off of the top of my head):

1) What is it that the central government needs to do in order to secure--or, perhaps more immediately, "rent"--the loyalties of peripheral Pashtun rural populations? Service provision might be part of this, but it would be a mistake to assume that all intrusions into existing rural autonomy are welcomed. Asking the locals is always a good way of finding out, although one has to do this in a way that predisposes them to provide the answers that they think you want to hear.

2) Who are they key powerbrokers in this, and what to they need and want? This often isn't the same issue as #1. Indeed, a critical issue for them might be having their authority recognized or reinforced, assuming a key role in dispensing patronage, etc. This might be difficult to reconcile at times with the broader task of building central state capacity, or in cases where satisfying some community leaders causes tensions with others.

3) Can local populations shift safely allegiances? Are they secure enough to do so? How can this be provided--external forces, ISAF, flipping local leaders, changing the attitude of second tier, local quasi-Taliban elements, etc. It is essential to understand the dilemma that the locals are in, when cooperation with Kabul or ISAF might be met with punitive Taliban attacks.

4) To what extent are broader political issues (political representation, corruption, etc)? This might well vary from area to area (and from local power-broker to power-broker).

5) To what extent are demonstration and domino effects important? The survival of local rural populations requires that they pay close attention to how the political (and economic) tides are shifting around them. Positive momentum--and the fear of missing a "departing train" (if I can use that analogy in rural Afghanistan!) can be a powerful asset. Negative momentum (like dramatic jail breaks in Kandahar) can act as a major deterrent to cooperation.

6) How does issue framing count? Can locals be convinced that the foreigners really want to leave once things are stable? This seems essential if local defensive nationalisms are not to be aggravated.

I think the more you break the question down, the closer we get to a whole array of relevant issues and possible answers.

Part of the key, I think, is moving local perceptions of central government authority along a continuum from threatening > irrelevant > helpful > indispensable.