A Battle Over 'the Next War'

[Norfolk]

My concern, especially in light of some of the discussions on this board, is that such a strategy might be risk free.

For example, 20% (if I recall correctly) of Nigerian oil production is unavailable due to "insurgent" (or whatever we want to call it) activity. Now assume that a near peer attempts to foment the same in other locations (say Indonesia). The investment in financing and weaponry is tiny, the impact is large, and any attempt at intervention by the US will be met with considerable international and domestic hostility.

[]

The point I was driving at, is that a near peer doesn't have to challenge us in a conventional war. A series of LICs scattered around the world, with the near certainty of international and domestic opposition to armed response, would eventually bleed us into "defeat."

Properly conceived and executed it could work out quite well. Provided that supporting an insurgency in, for example, the Niger Delta results in the displacement and subsequent replacement of Western petroleum corporations by those of the insurgents' sponsoring power in a timely manner. Whether "timely" is a time frame of several years or a decade or so depends of course upon whether petroleum prices during that transitional time frame are bearable or not. Otherwise the effort may be self-defeating, particularly if it results in intervention (in some manner) by Western troops to contain or destroy the insurgency. In short, a very provocative concept with a potentially high payoff, but runs some possibly high risks as well.

The imminent prospect of British troops being dispatched to advise and assist the Nigerian Government against MEND of course comes at the same time as Britain strains to sustain 2 other LIC's. Unless a short and very sharp campaign disposes of or at least brings MEND under control in relatively short order, a need for additional troops and resources may arise.

Rex wrote:

I would throw a couple of caveats into this discussion (I always carry around a few, just in case )

First, what near-peer? The term might make a nice euphemism for China, and helps to justify F-22 purchases, but they're hardly near-peer in any meaningful sense of the word, and won't be for a considerable time. This isn't to say there aren't national security challenges to the US arising from increasing Chinese power, but its a long, long way from the Cold War.

Second, the PRC near-peer is--unlike the old USSR--deeply interdependent on trade with the West for its economic well-being. It is also equally vulnerable to having its own emerging partnerships (for example, natural resource extraction) hampered by LIC. Its economic growth is hurt as much as anyone's by oil price increases. I would also suggest that its foreign policy has typically been rather less adventurist that the Soviet Union was at times.

Finally, truly effective insurgencies can't simply be generated by the insertion of money and subversive encouragement (although there are places where money will buy you a lot of chaos).

Not to underestimate the importance of consequences of LIC, but the danger of the West "bleeding" that way isn't one that keeps me awake at night.

Partly agreed; LIC in foreign lands is a double-edged sword for the sponsor, and may or may not even achieve sought-after objectives, though it tends to be materially inexpensive for the sponsor. Politically/strategically that may come at a steep cost; Iran's sponsorship of LICs in at least two parts of the ME, while inflicting great political damage on Iran's enemies at times, have also helped to ensure it isolation from much of the rest of the world. Moreover, Iran's political and strategic objectives have not met with fulfillment - so far. For example, a client regime in Iraq remains a future possibility, but has not yet fully crystalized, nor has Lebanon been definitively resolved in favour of Iran's proxy. In both cases Western powers (and in the latter, Israel too) stand in the way, not to mention several very nervous Sunni Arab regimes.

But engaging Western powers in foreign LICs is not the only way to go; there is a far more lucrative - but much, much higher risk - theatre for waging LIC. Right in Western power's own homes. Some militant Aboriginal groups in parts of the U.S. and Canada have ample pools of discontent (and increasingly, money) to draw upon to potentially intimidate or destabilize Governments in order to achieve their ends. There are a few spots a little over a half-hour's drive from where I live that are effectively controlled by the Warrior Society and as such are no-go areas; until the Oka Crisis of 1990 outside Montreal, one of the last significant events of aboriginal unrest had occurred in these areas back in the 1930s, and were brought under control by RCMP intervention.

Likewise, with the exception of the Wounded Knee standoff in 1973, until 1990 there had been little in major aboriginal unrest since the Wounded Knee Massacre of 1890. Now, the Warrior Society operates almost with impunity in and out of many reserves, especially in New York and Ontario. Interestingly, several years ago a freighter from China that docked in B.C.'s Lower Mainland turned out to be carrying 5,000 AK's; the US Coast Guard had been tracking the vessel and informed Canadian authorities. This after an earlier incident when another Chinese freighter that docked in a port on the US West Coast likewise turned out to be secretly carrying several thousand AK's. This of course does not demonstrate a deliberate PRC policy of sponsoring potential future insurgencies within North America, but it does demonstrate some potential for such.

Given the growing problems within Mexico and the spill-over effects into the South West US, not to mention the potential for future Mexican separatism in those areas, a subtle and more or less deniable level of covert support for separatist efforts could really wreak havoc on US political stability and possibly cohesion under certain circumstances. Europe of course has its problems with Muslim immigration right now. Like I said, very high risk, but under the right circumstances, potentially very high payoff. Those inclined to gamble - and history is full of powerful leaders who have done just that - might find that sort of bet irresistible.