French military (catch all)

[TT]

Ken White posted: Maybe they either know something
________________________________________
Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
...I really don't know why European powers degrade their forces to expedition forces voluntarily.
A collective defense based on assumptions and memories of a past time doesn't seem to be very solid.
you don't -- or they could just have opinions that differ from yours. Either way, everyone from the Albanians to even the normally and nominally neutral Swedes and Swiss and to include your own country are doing just that.

Fuchs, allow me to take a short stab at answering your question, for as Ken rightly notes, ‘everyone is doing it’. I have had the good fortune to lead a team of researchers that looked at seven European states with respect to ‘transformation’ (something else they are all ‘doing’) – specifically, the focus was on expeditionary warfare, EBAO, and Network-enabled operations (closest to the US Network Centric Warfare) -- and the answer to why depends on the state in question, and usually there are several reasons.

A common reason across the seven states was the changing security environment – European military organizations recognize that the prospect of an armed invasion of Europe by a hostile state military a la the cold war is currently very remote and that what their governments had been tasking them to do, through the 1990s and into the 2000s to the present, is what are in essence expeditionary operations (ranging from war fighting through to humanitarian relief) which they were not very well configured to undertake. Thus there was a perceived need to develop the capabilities to be deployable and usable. In some cases there is evidence that some were at least in part driven to undertake the shift to being more expeditionary by the national military organization’s perception that they needed to be seen by their governments as being deployable and employable, or, to put it another way, politically usable/useful if you will. Worth noting that in some cases the mil orgs themselves took the lead and in other cases the political leadership at least pointed them towards expeditionary operations.

This last points to a second driver, which is that if the mil orgs in question continued to focus on defending their or NATO’s borders absent a clear and present threat then, then they ran the real risk of their governments starting to cut funding even more than they have already. Very much related to this is that undertaking change to become more expeditionary confers ‘legitimacy’ on the organizations, confers the perception that they are a modern military like other military organizations (in other words, other mil orgs are doing it, so they need to do it) - for both internal and external purposes. So important to why they are making this change is budget share (or maybe just retaining budget share), which legitimacy helps with this internally but legitimacy as well helps externally in term of the perception of fellow and/or allied military organizations (professional respect - and yes, self respect plays here). And yes, as noted already, in part the external legitimacy issue is with respect to NATO (and the US).

And third, and related to the first, for some states all current and recent operations are NATO ‘out of area’. In short, operational experience has forced them to identify a need to become more expeditionary capable (this is probably particularly true of states such as Poland, which only in the last year or two has started to undertake ‘transformation’).

That noted, this does not mean that the various national militaries are all on the same path – some are farther along to becoming more expeditionary capable than others. Moreover, in some cases, while the 'narrative of change' is that they are becoming more expeditionary capable, in practice the changes (org, procurement) suggest otherwise – in other words, they more ‘talk the talk than walk the walk’ (so the narrative confers internal and external legitimacy). Finally, this also does not mean that the changes being undertaken are necessarily the most appropriate changes (whether this be doctrine/concepts, procurement, organizational structural change) - but this is another discussion.

Oops, not so short……

[Fuchs]

From a historical point of view, the "remote" possibility isn't so awfully remote.

Recall the situation of France in 1928, for example.
Twelve years later they were weakened by a world economic crisis, overrun by a power that was marginal till 1935 and would probably have been overrun few years later by just another power (USSR) that was an equally "remote" threat in 1928.

And then there's an ethical problem.
How dare we to accept new NATO members if we aren't willing to think seriously about how to protect them?
Instead, some are expecting them to provide expeditionary forces for some distant adventures that have no advantageous effect for their national security.
Isn't that unethical?

Disclaimer:
I'm not all against small wars. I've got strict criteria, though. It would be much easier to convince me to intervene in Biafra, Rwanda & Darfur scenarios for a couple of months than to send a FFG for a pointless multi-year patrol off the Lebanese coast or some infantry with APCs to Afghanistan.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

...I'm not all against small wars. I've got strict criteria, though. It would be much easier to convince me to intervene in Biafra, Rwanda & Darfur scenarios for a couple of months than to send a FFG for a pointless multi-year patrol off the Lebanese coast or some infantry with APCs to Afghanistan.

Given your often stated rationale for the use of force best being applied only to issues of national survival?

While those above named operations you would support would be of beneficial humanitarian impact their continuance poses no threat to Europe while the two you do not support can arguably have an adverse impact on Europe, probably not to an existential level but certainly to an increased terrorism and dissent level.

Priorities...

[Fuchs]

Originally Posted by Ken White

Given your often stated rationale for the use of force best being applied only to issues of national survival?

While those above named operations you would support would be of beneficial humanitarian impact their continuance poses no threat to Europe while the two you do not support can arguably have an adverse impact on Europe, probably not to an existential level but certainly to an increased terrorism and dissent level.

Priorities...

I believe I discussed Afghanistan in detail somewhere in this forum. I see no useful contribution to national security in contributing to that civil war.


Actually, I wrote a rule set for application of military power and alliances long ago and checked it against many historical cases - and was satisfied to have fixed my own compass for such affairs.
It had/has two sufficient justifications for warfare;
- a promising attempt to protect th own national security (possibly enlarged to collective defense of the sovereignty of all members of an alliance)
- (non-obligatory) intervention against genocide (not violent ethnic cleansing) for ethical reasons

That's just a personal rule set and nobody needs to agree with it - but I can guarantee that I am consistent in my stance towards the question "war or not war". It's just not a very obvious and simple rule set that could be understood by fragmentary observation of symptoms.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

I believe I discussed Afghanistan in detail somewhere in this forum. I see no useful contribution to national security in contributing to that civil war.

by any reasonable definition -- are a part of the effort to dissuade some Islamist fundamentalists from violence. If you believe Germany has no interest in deterring that for long term benefit, I'd suggest you may be in error. If, OTOH, you believe there's a better way to go about that dissuasion, that's a different matter but it appears that the folks in Berlin have opted for that approach -- even if many Germans disagree.

Actually, I wrote a rule set for application of military power and alliances long ago and checked it against many historical cases - and was satisfied to have fixed my own compass for such affairs.
It had/has two sufficient justifications for warfare;
- a promising attempt to protect th own national security (possibly enlarged to collective defense of the sovereignty of all members of an alliance)
- (non-obligatory) intervention against genocide (not violent ethnic cleansing) for ethical reasons

That's just a personal rule set and nobody needs to agree with it - but I can guarantee that I am consistent in my stance towards the question "war or not war". It's just not a very obvious and simple rule set that could be understood by fragmentary observation of symptoms.

All well and good. As long as you realize it is a personal rule set and allow others to disagree in good faith, no one should complain.

I'd simply suggest that anyone disagreeing with you is not necessarily stupid or immoral; they might just have arrived at different and perfectly acceptable conclusions from the same or similar facts.

You might consider that a change in circumstances you have not foreseen may cause you to add a reason or two -- and that economic, military or political reality may cause others to ignore your rules. You're entitled to your rules and others are just as entitled to theirs. All of us should be able to accept differing ideas without implying anyone who doesn't agree with our ideas is dangerously ignorant.

[TT]

Fuchs Posted: From a historical point of view, the "remote" possibility isn't so awfully remote.

'Remote' is relative concept. I doubt anyone thinks an invasion or threat thereof is impossible. But, remember, in the late 1990s and early part of this decade the only plausible threat was Russia, and even today, ten years on, Russia while certainly making a lot of noise is not an enemy. Ten years from now, who knows.

Fuchs posted: And then there's an ethical problem.
How dare we to accept new NATO members if we aren't willing to think seriously about how to protect them?
Instead, some are expecting them to provide expeditionary forces for some distant adventures that have no advantageous effect for their national security.
Isn't that unethical?

I agree that NATO, or rather most of NATO's member military orgs are not well suited to defending the Alliance's eastern borders unless they were to be forward deployed to these allies territories.

But NATO currently is not willing to forward deploy forces on the scale and scope needed to posture a real defense them, in part as there is no obvious major threat of invasion and in part (and possibly in larger part) as NATO does not want to aggravate relations with Russia, which would see major NATO forces forward deployed into East and Central Europe as threatening.

So, how is NATO to support them should some lesser contingency arise? - particularly if most NATO forces currently are not particularly deployable and employable at any reasonable distance in a reasonable time frame. In short, in the current environment developing expeditionary capable forces - deployable, sustainable, combat capable forces (or forces for lesser contingencies) - actually will provide NATOs member states with the means to support their eastern allies should the need ever arise (this applies particularly to ground forces, for air forces can be surged forward more readily).

If Russia should start to emerge down the road as a serious renewed threat, NATO can revisit its decision not to forward deploy member military forces to its new allies' territories.

[Rex Brynen]

France ends four-decade Nato rift

BBC News
17:31 GMT, Wednesday, 11 March 2009

French President Nicolas Sarkozy has announced his country is to return to Nato's military command, reversing four decades of self-imposed exile.
Mr Sarkozy confirmed the decision in a speech to defence experts at the Ecole Militaire staff college in Paris.

President Charles de Gaulle pulled France out of Nato's integrated military command in 1966, saying it undermined France's sovereignty.

[Tom Odom]

Originally Posted by Rex Brynen

France ends four-decade Nato rift

BBC News
17:31 GMT, Wednesday, 11 March 2009

DeGaulle is flipping like a pancake....

Critics say France will now be no more than "a clone of Great Britain".

But Mr Sarkozy said there was no sense in France - a founder member of Nato - having no say in the organisation's decisions on military strategy.

La France a clone of dee Eeenglish?! Non! Non!

Best
Tom

[jmm99]

Zarkozy's Socialist opponent had this to say (from the OP link; bold added by JMM):

"Nothing today justifies returning to Nato military command," said the leader of the opposition Socialists, Martine Aubry.

"There's no hurry, no fundamental need, except for this Atlanticism that's becoming an ideology."

"Atlanticism" is not a term used much here. Two older, background articles are here and here. Our old buddy, Dominique de Villepin, has also criticized Zarkozy's "Atlanticism".

I have a hard time seeing a "North Atlantic Union" - from a US perspective; but the Atlantic Rim countries do have common interests. So, a NATO and a SATO (bringing in the southern countries along the lake) would be a possibility for the future - leading to an ATO ?

Just a wild, futuristic thought on what is here a sunny day.

[davidbfpo]

Now France is to return to the military structures so carefully created and managed since 1966, oh yes plus the new members - where will the French actually sit? An extra chair at the conference table, easy. Placing French officers back in command posts, IMHO is a lot more difficult. For example will Germany and the UK relinquish their spots? Dep. SACEUR for example.

Can anyone recall which posts the French held before leaving?

I welcome the French return for a host of reasons and it will IMHO slow down the EU becoming a super-state (a debate that lingers on in Europe).

davidbfpo

[Van]

Will France returning to the NATO command structure fix problems or create problems? Or both, and in what ratios? Over what time frame; 1 year, 5 years, 10 years?

Given France's historical behavior towards collaboration (with allies), the French conduct during SFOR, IFOR, and the Kosovo campaign, their relationship with Iraq between 1992 and 2002, and that I have personally heard French officers state that France is the logical counterweight to U.S. global power and influence, my assessment is that this will be immediately disruptive and in the long run detrimental to NATO.

Within the U.S., there are vocal factions that think that France is incapable of error, so, of course, it could get some of the further Left folks reconsidering NATO or their attitudes about France. This is an interesting dynamic, and could be disruptive in PoliSci departments through American academia. So there is an upside.

How will Russia view this? The Soviet Union and later Russia always viewed NATO as an explicit threat because of the claim that it was a defensive alliance*, and that NATO's purpose is attack was proven in the Balkans, when NATO attacked and occupied (from their perspective) Slavic territory. France coming back into the C2 structure will be viewed as an explicit threat.

And the EU... Threatening Russia is bad juju for the EU, and putting 600 years of mostly ugly history back into NATO will also be disruptive. Thinking about it like this, I am getting less clear on what France's true objective is...

I'm bringing popcorn, this should be a good show.

*To Russian thinking, 'defense' is striking before you can be struck, and crushing your enemy's will to fight, not building a wall. Every time we said 'defensive', they heard something very different.

[George L. Singleton]

Originally Posted by Rex Brynen

France ends four-decade Nato rift

BBC News
17:31 GMT, Wednesday, 11 March 2009

A historic overview: As a 2nd and lst Lt. based out of Pakistan I made several R&R trips (my tour of duty was two years in then West Pakistan) landing at either Chatereau or Everoux, both then being US Air Bases in our then NATO ally nation of France. DeGaulle's blatant dislike of America (Johnson was then President) did not carry down to the ordinary French citizens, who went out of their way to be helpful to me, traveling alone on trains and walking the streets of Paris later on as a sightseer.

Jump forward to today, our local Alabama Air National Guard until a year ago deployed for annual training to a French Air Base where unique operations benefitted from our refueling tankers. So, our military presence has been in France, again, for several recent years.

President Sarcozy is clearly pro-American, I personally like him, and am happy at this development. There is always room around the table for another friend and ally, who I for one am glad to see rejoin NATO.

On one other poster's comment that pan-Atlantic organization/economics seemed somewhat questionable, as far back as 1987 when I graduated from Air War College the paper I had to write to graduate suggested that in future economic interrelations and cooperation would be as important if not more important than just military cooperation in our ever shrinking world. I still feel this way, and of course, I support building the joint US-European future Air Force refueling tanker in Mobile, Alabama as well!

[jmm99]

from JMM
I have a hard time seeing a "North Atlantic Union" - from a US perspective; but the Atlantic Rim countries do have common interests.

I also suggested an ATO as a futuristic possibility, where ATO could be Atlantic Treaty Organization (military) or Atlantic Trade Organization (economic), or both. However, in considering this futurism, I suggest re-viewing the video "Cowboys herding cats" for a perspective on what would be involved.

"Atlanticism" is supposedly Zarkozy's motive (see links in my prior post).

Since we (US) have a "more perfect union", I see no need for a "North Atlantic Union" - especially when the EU has not advanced to the point we were at under the Articles of Confederation.[*]

But, at all costs, avoid "Running with the Squirrels" - and never, never get into the cage with This Cat.

------------
[*] As to successful confederations, I can think of only two large-scale examples: the US and Canada. The Swiss also come to mind on a smaller scale.

[George L. Singleton]

Since we (US) have a "more perfect union", I see no need for a "North Atlantic Union" - especially when the EU has not advanced to the point we were at under the Articles of Confederation.

The US foundered early on with our Articles of Confedertion which we did away with or our nation (US) would probably not exist as it does today, imperfect though it is and will always be...nothing we do will ever be perfect per se.

Canada's experience with Confederation is to me, at least, different, one supposes in part due to Canada still having a Crown appointed Lt. Governor and much symbolism and pomp which in the main adds value to tourism there and appeals to the parliamentary style of democracy. Canada for now even seems to have smoothed over and better incorported the French speaking folks in Quebec and elsewhere and seems well fit to have of late Prime Minister's who are literate in both French and English, French for hundreds of years having been, past tense, the language of diplomacy...now superceded largely by English...after all.

NATO has accomplished, correct me if I am wrong, essentially a standardization of weaponry, caliburs, interchangeability of parts for whatever. The area which I think (?) may still be weakest is communications standardization, which as a stand alone topic might be a good focus for a new thread of discussion on SWJ.

NATO (my opinion) is serving us well in Afghanistan where a large physical area is unevenly populated by a large Pukhtun majority but where our main alliance strength remains in the largely non-Pukhtun northern part.

The days of CENTO and SEATO are over and gone so only NATO has stood the test of time...and I think it was correct, after an apparently huge internal meeting squabble, for NATO to reopen it's Russian Liaison Arm.

Rumor mongering and baitng to create unhelpful to current needs points of view alleging such useless and outmoded things as Russian bombers being based in Cuba in future is to me antidiluvian thinking and a waste of words and time.

[Blackjack]

Thought this thread could use an update on the French rejoining NATO. France apointed to two General officers to NATO. The first is an Air Force Pick and the Second is a Marine.

Deux généraux français vont être nommés très prochainement à la tête de grands commandements de l’Alliance atlantique.

Le conseil des ministres a approuvé le 3 juin les candidatures suivantes.

Le général d’armée aérienne Stéphane Abrial, actuel chef d’état-major de l’armée de l’air (CEMAA ) prend le commandement d’ ACT , le commandement allié Transformation, à Norfolk (Etats-Unis) à compter du 10 septembre 2009. Il succède à ce poste au général américain James N. Mattis (Corps des Marines des Etats-Unis). La mission du ACT est de diriger, au niveau stratégique, la transformation des structures, des forces, des capacités et des doctrines militaires de l’OTAN pour améliorer l’efficacité militaire de l’Alliance. ACT constitue avec le commandement allié pour les opérations (ACO ), l’échelon le plus élevé de la structure de commandement militaire de l’OTAN .

Seconde nomination : le général de division Philippe Stoltz prend la tête du commandement des forces alliées basé à Lisbonne (Portugal) à compter du 20 Juillet 2009. Cette structure a autorité notamment sur la Force de réaction rapide de l’OTAN, la NRF (Nato Response Force). Le commandement de Lisbonne est un des 3 commandements qui dépendent de ACO.

Les nominations font l’objet d’un décret signé par le Président de la République, Nicolas Sarkozy. Décret publié au Journal officiel du 8 juin 2009. Elles interviennent près de trois mois après le retour de la France au sein du commandement militaire intégré de l’OTAN, les 3-4 avril 2009, à Strasbourg lors du Sommet de l’Alliance atlantique . Ces candidatures sont proposées et entérinées par Alliés dans le cadre des procédures de l'OTAN.

-Ministere De La Defence

General Abrail's Biography

General Stoltz Biography in English.