Quote Originally Posted by Rob Thornton View Post
Tom,
Here is one my boss and I were bantering back and forth. Is the concept of "Inter-Agency" cooperation soley a military buy in, or does it go both ways? He sent me an article out of the Foreign Affairs Journal that caused me to look hard at this question. In that "90 & 180 day objectives" document I sent you I brought up that regardless of how good ISF gets, without some reconstruction funds to get projects going, the Iraqi public will not establish faith in local government; no faith in local government = en environment in which insurgents can support.

We've heard about the PRTs (Proincial Reconstruction Teams), what we need are CRTs (City Reconstruction teams). Teams that like you had mentioned could be drawn from American Society to function within the role of their acknowledged profession. Doctors, lawyers, Small Buisness gurus, telecommunications specialists, power plant engineers, agricultural engineers, city planners, family planners, firemen, hazordous waste guys,etc. - all the skills that cities have come to rely on to keep a city functioning. Everybody has heard about the National Guard guys who are often more valuable fulfilling their civilian role here then their MOS (they do a good job at both), so why have we not asked the question why?

We need practical experience in these roles, not just well educated OGA (Other Govt. Agency) types. Their would have to be unity of command, and with that would come the provision of personal security. But lets say that at a certain watermark in the transition of security, host nation security forces took up the role securing their AOR (which of course is the plan), and the auxillary role CF (Coalition Forces) took on was the facillitation of reconstruction?

I'll stay away from formng a concrete oppinion about a military draft question because I don't have a resonable comparrison (my PEBD was 85), but I do recall the horror stories of armed FODs going into the barracks, but that may have been more the result of a social/cultural problem associated with the times. However an offer to forego paying back massive student loans and some incentives along the lines of a GI Bill, or other like ideas might get us the kind of professionals we would need for Reconstruction Teams - maybe even offer their kids a free state school 4 year scholarship and offer them & their families Active duty Healthcare benefits, PX, Commissary priviliedges while serving - oh and pay them at the same professional rate you'd pay military doctors, lawyers, etc.

In staying with the theme of the thread, its a new era in warfare with new enemies, and we need to adapt faster then the enemy
Best Regards, Rob

Rob,

Critical issue one addressed in an opinion piece somewhat disguised as a news report by Austin Bay, a retired colonel, recounting lunch with the SecDef, on the need to realign the Nat Sec Structure to achieve "Unified Action, " yesterday on the Early Bird under the title "...With Forecasts" in the Wash Times.

I saw what I would call somewhat "Unified Action" in the USG reaction to Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The senior leaders "played well" together and the agencies fell in behind them. On the intel side, we had some knife fights but by and large it was a semi-unified effort.

At the pointy end of things in 2 very different embassies, I saw one case of complete and utter chaos and one of true unified action through a country team that worked very well together--so much so that we were altering viewpoints and affecting decisions in Washington. The first was in Zaire and it was a charlie foxtrot which began when the Charge (since we had no ambassador) announced he thought the refugee crisis in July 94 would be over in a couple of weeks. He refused to go to Goma until State ordered him to when the USAID Administrator announced he was coming out. When airlift started to flow, the same guy wanted a by name list of everyone coming so he could decide who would get country clearances; I had to threaten to call the Joint Staff and relay his demand before he backed off. He never got any better and OGA (aside from AID) didn't either.

In contrast, Kigali worked well. DoD mobilized. The NSC mobilized. State mobilized. AID was superb; we had the AID chief of staff with us for months at a time. The effort was truly extraordinary: Rwanda and the Balkans were the 2 standing items of interest in the NSC and the White House--driven of course by a need to recoup much face lost in the USG's stance during the genocide.

The other reason for extending time in grade/service is to provide time for the additional education and developmental experiences required by 21st Century complex warfare. If we want our military to have experience with other USG Agencies or Alliances to experience the rest of the DIME or if we want strong, resident masters Degrees in International Relations, Economics, Social Sciences that takes a couple of extra years not currently provided for in a career with many tactical, military gates
As Jim Greer states above looking at US military culture we have to train ourselves in working across agency boundaries; we have to do the same thing on the State, AID, and other agency basis. The challenge we have is overcoming the cultures inside those agencies--as does the culture inside the military--must be changed. AID actually has the least distance to travel in making such changes. The get it done make it happen culture inside the military exists in AID. Getting such cultures to mesh in PRTs is made more difficult when they form on the fly. OFDA and its Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) are semi-permament teams that form according to need like we form JTFs. I believe we need standing JTFs or at least ready JTFs that form, execrise, and stand down all the while remaining on call. I believe also that we need to increase the JIIM aspects of such JTFs and start forcing other agencies to play with us.


Best

Tom