Picked up and read this book as a result of this thread. An excellent and well written description of how our counterinsurgency efforts are not wired tight and the type of warfare the troops are fighting and how they go about doing it. The Commander-in-Chief or the Secretary of Defense should be getting briefed by officers at the battalion or composite division level based on this book. I rate the book A++++. Though Iraq is no Vietnam and Fullujah was no Hue City, I can see some similarities in the chain-of-command that are inexcusable when it was ripe to use force to quell the violence in Fullujah. Allowing Fullujah to become a miniature Taliban type holdout only resulted in a tougher fight later. Someone should have been listening and responding to recommendations from the MEF. I was just stunned at the creation and implementation of the so-called Fullujah Brigade.