None of Eden's rebuttals deal with these facts:
1. Islam is the only hope for a unifying principle/theme in COIN ops there;
2. The enemy is co-opting the religious leaders not due to theological/ideological/moral superiority but due to our exposing them to the coercive power of the insurgency.
I hear the "it might not work" and "Mullahs are not homogenous" etc...
GEN McCaffery's position that "we can shoot our way out of Afghanistan" is rather obvious in that we are dealing with a nasty religious-based insurgency there. It is a war of ideas. A war of cultures. And if as Eden states
"our stated goal in Afghanistan - a state where their [religious leaders] influence is marginalized."
is true, can you provide any evidence of this policy? Because that is suicide in a counterinsurgency. The more you marginalize religious leaders, the more you radicalize them. For God's sake, gentlemen, haven't we learned this already in OIF?
No one is offering a silver bullet - but I am submitting that we aim the pistol at the enemy instead of at our own heads.
Last edited by MSG Proctor; 08-01-2008 at 03:26 PM.
"Its easy, boys. All we have to do is follow my simple yet ingenius plan..."
Joe Galloway on McCaffery?
Galloway had to have loosely paraphrased GEN McCaffery, a man I respect and admire.
Two combat brigades will make a huge difference in Afghanistan if skillfully employed. A combat brigade can do more than kill Taliban. And combat brigades bring with them leaders; creative, intelligent, and motivated leaders.
Our leaders can figure out how to solve problems that involve more than kinetic options.
Not trying to in any way deny
that this is a very important aspect to focus on, that saidOriginally Posted by MSG Proctor
consider the rule of the Taliban over the years and how much "control" they actually had over many of these very areas we are talking about. For the most part aside from occasional visits to remind the locals who was in charge, or simply to take advantage of ones position in order to get what they would want. Even during that time how much was local security handled by anything other than locals.
In otherwords that part was pre-existing and would be a focus for change simply in how its done and what the tie-ins to the central govt are. As mentioned before the religious leaders/tribal leaders are almost interchangeable if not the same in many cases and along those lines this differs greatly from Iraq where although the power structures existed they seemed fairly often to be in seperate hierarchies
In order to bring change in those outlying areas they will have to develop a desire to tie in to the larger cities/ govt and that wont happen until the (Whats in it for me) aspects of their leaders are peaked in possibilities for differences. Long story short although those leaders of the faith will have a large part to play the factors which would draw them into the larger govt seem to be outside their faith base and more in the lines of normal human characterisitics.
Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours
Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur
I think what is transpiring here is not that you gentlemen do not understand Afghanistan; its that you don't understand the Islamic religion.
Your western analagous filter precludes you from seeing what is obvious to the Afghans: any attempt to marginalize Islam in even the smallest, slightest ways is sealed with the kiss of death.
But go ahead - continue to analyze Aghanistan like eastern Europe or Viet Nam. Islam recognizes no separation of religious and civil life, and every western attempt to impose it on the Afghans will be met with (a) gratutitous milking of CF bennies or (b) violent resistance.
Religion is deeper, stronger, more resilient and more important than statism, military interventions, or democracy. You can either co-opt it as an IO theme or be beaten with it by the long term stake holders.
I apologize for my strident tone but having already fought this battle in OIF it is frustrating to see us hamstring our efforts in OEF by a wooden, modernist adherence to the wrong definitions of self-government, self-determination and religious ideology.
Afghanistan will never be Turkey or even Iran but it needn't be the perpetual Gethsemane of western ideologies.
Last edited by MSG Proctor; 08-01-2008 at 04:01 PM.
Interesting conundrum.
I think number 2 is correct and number 1 may be but submit that our ability to implement number 1 will be limited by the follow-on "...not homogeneous" and other factors; not least by this:I'm unsure it is a stated goal but if it is, it's an exercise in futility if that goal is to be attained in less than a couple of generations. Even then it is at best dubious. While I'm unsure it is a stated goal, I have little doubt that it is the intent or at least the unstated desire of some in high places -- and that, unfortunately, desired sooner rather than later..."our stated goal in Afghanistan - a state where their [religious leaders] influence is marginalized."
is true, can you provide any evidence of this policy?
What I do know is that approaching Afghanistan with western thought processes, religious or irreligious, and anticipating a quasi-western society is likely to not succeed. Nor do I think it has to do so. Best is frequently the enemy of good enough...
Ah. The wisdom of the ages. Well said, Ken. The goal in Afghanistan should be a stable Islamic state that is a partner in the WoT and is not dependent on narco-economics. Please flush the idea of a secular, 'moderate' Islamic republic and deal with the only IO venue fit for fostering concord (mosque preaching) and the only operable unifying principal (Islam).
One might suggest that in addition to the "western analogous filter" you identified earlier, one can add the concept of a "state." I would agree that Islam is the "only hope for a unifying principle" but seriously doubt it is unifying enough to hold "Afghanistan" (a state whose unnatural borders were drawn by outsiders) together for any significant length of time. Even if the US were to somehow succeed in establishing such a state, Afghanistan's neighbors will be sure to meddle as they always have once the US departs.
So while the goal you've provided is theoretically more achievable than a western-style secular democracy, it's one that I think is not ultimately in America's interest, nor a goal the US can husband into existence even it it were.
Entropy:
your post assumes two things;
1. Afghans will remain unchanged by the information revolution;
2. Partnering with the empire will not bring about deliverable advantages for the infant Afghan state.
IMO the greatest obstacle to a stable Afghanistan is the poppy industry. Legitimate industry has a funny way of dispelling illegitimate commerce. Look at South Korea, a nation with virtually no natural resources - and is now a top 10 world economy since US intervention.
Have hope, folks. And think 1776, not 2001.
1776? Wouldn't that be when the backwater locals rose up against the beneficent Empire and the foreign troops that sought to uphold the rule of law?
Or was it the revolution of rebellion against imposed religious ideology in favor of self-determination?1776? Wouldn't that be when the backwater locals rose up against the beneficent Empire and the foreign troops that sought to uphold the rule of law?
No.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
MSG Proctor where have you been hiding......that is some Strategic Stuff you got there
So in other words most here agree that the war is lost because its objective of a stable, power monopoly central state that keeps AQ out won't happen?
A victory (using unaspiring definitions of victory that I usually don't share) would then only be possible if the very goals of the war were changed by our governments (especially deleting the "secular" and allow sharia - you know that won't happen).
What's the difference to just leave and let the civil war parties fight on, supporting the non-Taleban civil war parties along the late 2001/early 2002 invasion model?
It's not like all warlords had disappeared, after all. Afaik they're just saving their forces for the final fights after the Westerners left, just like most militias in Iraq do afaik.
I don't think that's what anyone said.
You have a bad tendency to try to apparently misquote or misunderstand others...
No one said that; what was said was that it would not accord to the western 'democratic' vision.I believe that...A victory (using unaspiring definitions of victory that I usually don't share)First place, there's no such thing as 'victory' in a COIN operation, all one can do is achieve an acceptable outcome, I see no difficulty in obtaining that in Afghanistan...would then only be possibleSince our governments are adapting on a daily basis to realities on the ground, I think that's quite incorrect. Since Sharia is already in effect in Afghanistan, I'm curious as to on what you base that statement....if the very goals of the war were changed by our governments (especially deleting the "secular" and allow sharia - you know that won't happen).Probably true; they have long memories over there. However, the answer to your question is generational change and hopefully improvement in attitude. We're there to antagonize and thus accelerate that change from five or more to about two generations-- your kids will see the result. Be patient..It's not like all warlords had disappeared, after all. Afaik they're just saving their forces for the final fights after the Westerners left, just like most militias in Iraq do afaik.
Why?
Actually, two whys:
What in that is inimical to our interest?
Why cannot the US and the rest of the coalition in Afghanistan do that?
Depends.
Not the diaper; depends on whether you accord to the Scotch Irish view of that rebellion or not...
I don't tend to, frankly. I'm not a big revolutionary war type, but my experience with studying history in general (and my specialty areas in particular) leads me to be very suspicious of any *single* cause put forward for a major event. Religion played a role, but so did economics, ambitions (both of people and groups), and a certain amount of manipulating (conscious or otherwise) of outside parties. While religion might have played a role for the (suddenly interesting) Scotch Irish group, I doubt that it played quite as well with the more mercantile interests. Just one of those things...Not the diaper; depends on whether you accord to the Scotch Irish view of that rebellion or not...
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
The Canadians started it...I don't tend to, frankly. I'm not a big revolutionary war type, but my experience with studying history in general (and my specialty areas in particular) leads me to be very suspicious of any *single* cause put forward for a major event. Religion played a role, but so did economics, ambitions (both of people and groups), and a certain amount of manipulating (conscious or otherwise) of outside parties. While religion might have played a role for the (suddenly interesting) Scotch Irish group, I doubt that it played quite as well with the more mercantile interests. Just one of those things...
If you can edudate the people in Afghanistan - at least so they can read and write - everything else becomes completely irrelevant. The mullahs and imams preach the message, and without people being able to read and write and comprehend the Qu'ran in a different manner than these mullahs, it is a lost cause.
As Ken said, 20 years minimum. More like 40 IMO.
"Speak English! said the Eaglet. "I don't know the meaning of half those long words, and what's more, I don't believe you do either!"
The Eaglet from Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland
Interesting, though I would point out that Afghanistan is not Iraq, and any attempt to fit our OIF model to Afghanistan is as likely to fail as any proposed by us poor blinkered westernizers. Anyway, thanks for the corrective - I came away from Afghanistan thinking that the real power brokers were those who could bankroll the largest private armies, normally through criminal enterprises.
Also, while I agree that you can't marginalize Islam in Afghanistan, you can marginalize the local mullahs. One, they are neither as universally respected nor as influential as they would like us to believe; two, this is exactly what the bad guys are doing or attempting to do, through a combination of bribery, coercion, and invitations to the bandwagon.
It would be beneficial to hear more details on your plan to 'co-opt Islam' as an IO theme.
Just keep in mind that NATO and the US public are unlikely to support an extended and expensive campaign that, twenty years from now, leaves Afghanistan as a semi-stable theocracy.
Posting Permissions
Bookmarks