Quote Originally Posted by Entropy View Post
I certainly don't assume #1. But at the same time I don't assume the information revolution is going to make the creation of an enduring and viable central authority (of whatever stripe) in Afghanistan any easier.

As for #2, no, I don't assume partnering won't bring advantages, but then again I don't assume that it will bring advantages either. The problem, as I see it, is not so much supporting a nascent Afghan state (which is what we're doing), but making that state legitimate in the eyes of the populace that State purportedly represents.

And I see little similarity between South Korea and Afghanistan. The history, culture and geographic position of each are wildly different.
Entropy:
Thanks for clarifying your positions. I would like to respectfully respond...

The information revolution overcomes the problem of linkage with outside forces. It may help the central gov't in Afghanistan promulgate its messages for national unity/identity in the long run. The erection of a serviceable and truly transnational information infrastructure is still a generation away.

The text I bolded above is the classical definition of a COIN problem statement. Winning legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghans (not a monolithic entity) requires vigorous cultural, religious and economic engagement. There is no strategy for achieving success in a COIN fight in Afghanistan that does not include Islam.

As for Korea, while I do not intend to conflate apples/oranges here, Korea had few connections with the outside world, a devastated infrastructure, had just emerged from a brutal Japanese occupation, had little natural resources and hostile powers on its border. There are some similarities between the two models IMO.