A few quick thoughts:

1) Fuchs, I must admit that I often think you have some interesting and valuable insights, yet somehow wrapped in a needlessly antagonistic presentation. And, as a Canadian, I say that as a professional anti-American (well, excepting Vermont and Texas, and possibly the New York Rangers— plus, of course, any television show created by Joss Whedon).

2) I would agree with Bob Killebrew that the Russians have been prodding and poking and nibbling at the Georgians for years, and their "peacekeepers" are anything but. However, I wouldn't be so quick to dismiss the widespread reports that Georgian troops assaulted Tskhinvali with scant regard for the safety of the local population (see, for example, the HRW report from the scene here). Of course, the Russians and Ossetian irregulars have acted with equal disregard for civilians, and indeed the latter have deliberately targeted them (as HRW also makes clear). However, one implication of Georgian military operations in South Ossetia is that the overwhelming majority of the local population (about 2/3rds Ossetian before the recent fighting, and probably well over 3/4 Ossetian now) are vehemently opposed to returning to Georgian rule, ever. I'm not sure that genie can be put back in the bottle.

3) A major issue in all of this, which remains unanswered, is what the hell were the Georgians thinking? No matter how much they might have been in the "right," it was a foolish move doomed to failure from the start. To what extent did US security assistance, and (rather foolish, in my view) efforts by Washington to promote Georgian membership in NATO play a role in fostering unrealistic expectations of Western support? Should the US have picked up on Georgian preparations for this offensive?

4) Policy responses need to think about the long term, and also recognize the need to factor in how things look from Moscow (even if we think Moscow is mistaken).