Georgia's South Ossetia Conflict - Military Commentary

[Stan]

Photos by 1 photographer, who moved with Russian troops.

http://lsd-25.ru/2008/08/14/voyna-v-...iya-babchenko/

Great link and photos, Kaur !
Not to sound ungrateful, but it seems all those burning tank shots are the same 4 or 5 in all the Russian press. Begs the question: Just how many Georgian tanks were "actually" destroyed by Russian armor?

On another note, looks like we're cleared to go there and help out, as long as we dress like civilians

Ilusat Päeva Sulle, Stan

[Jedburgh]

FPRI, 13 Aug 08: Russia Resurgent: An Initial Look at Russian Military Performance in Georgia

.....No doubt Russia’s military action in Georgia will prompt many countries to view Moscow in a sharper light, from the capitals of Europe to Beijing and Tokyo. However the world eventually interprets Russia’s intervention in Georgia’s civil conflict—whether as a “humanitarian effort” as Moscow portrays or as a “full scale invasion” as Tbilisi portrays—it does demonstrate the Russian military’s renewed ability to prosecute a relatively complex, high-intensity combined arms operation. Still, the evidently high state of readiness of such a broad array of Russian military units across all three services raises more questions about Moscow’s intentions and planning prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

[jmm99]

should end anyone's thoughts about how the Georgians should have defended their border (sealing the Roki Tunnel, etc.).

One wonders what old Uncle Joe (½ Geo., ½ Oss.) would think about all of this - as the Russians took his home town of Gori.

Joseph Stalin was born Ioseb Besarionis Dzhugashvili in Gori, Tiflis to Besarion Dzhugashvili, an Ossetian [8] cobbler who owned his own workshop, and Ketevan Geladze a Georgian who was born a serf.
[8] Simon Sebag Montefiore. Young Stalin. 2007. ISBN 978-0-297-85068-7 p19

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Stalin

[Ken White]

FPRI, 13 Aug 08: Russia Resurgent: An Initial Look at Russian Military Performance in Georgia

IIRC, the Russians had moved elements nearer to Georgia back in June-early July as a counter to the biennial Immediate Response Exercise (US, Georgia, Armenia and others) that began 15 Jul and ended 28 Jul. There's a lot more we don't know, open source, than we do but based on what I've seen since they had probably instituted provocations or very at least tacitly encouraged Georgia to attack, I suspect the fine hand of the FSB and a long time -- a year or more -- contingency plan. Time will tell.

Such a plan likely included all the things cited in the linked article and quite probably entailed prep, rehearsals and moves well prior to May or June predicated on Russian plan execution at Endex of the JEX and the beginning of the Olympics. Add to that some of the comments above in this thread and I don't see any significant improvement in Russian performance -- other than use of the media -- and, importantly, Vlad's shrewdness and will, which should not be underestimated.

Who, of course, was out of town and on international TV at the time, thus having a perfect alibi -- and allowing Dmitry to appear to be the BBMFIC. He loves it when a plan comes together...

[kaur]

I agree more with this opinion.

Still, for serious military analysts, the remarkable thing has been how little Russian performance has changed over the years (and decades, and even centuries). Overwhelming force—the sledgehammer blow—remains the Russian approach to warfare. Nothing wrong with that in theory—it’s essentially the Powell Doctrine (which the Bush administration ignored in Iraq, leading to a near-disaster). The problem is that the Russian military remains indiscriminate in its targeting and horribly sloppy in its execution. Their sledgehammers tend to hit everything in the general area.

http://www.armchairgeneral.com/assau...a-conflict.htm

OPFOR Battle Book ST-107 gives better overview.

Only outsider who who has entered Tshinvali.

http://www.hrw.org/doc?t=europe&c=georgi

[Cavguy]

Was thinking along 'Charlie Wilson's War' today, wondering what could have blunted the Russians within the Georgian capability to employ.

The answer I came up with would have been Javelin Missiles. Fire and forget, will take out a T-80 (or an M1). Could have made life nasty in the armored columns.

Just a late night musing.

[kaur]

Cavguy, I was in Estonian military in the middle of 90-s. It was time when in the service was quite many officers who sereved in the Soviet army (in the rank of majors and up). During 1 exercise couple of those Soviet ones worked as advisers to young officers, who had finished Finnish military school. We were playing OPFOR column and moved to west. Half a day our units moved like snails under the instructions of Finnish military school graduates. In front of every possible ambush site recce was sent out. If cou calculate that recce on foot moves 1 km per hour, then it was slow going. Soviet school people got enought and instructed to "bomb" every possible amush site. Finnish ones opposed that there are farms etc. Soviet ones said "Just do it!". After first order, referees reported destroyed ambush. Finnish ones continued this pattern and columns were moving average 40 km per hour and we were showing middle finger to guys crawling out from the bushes. So much about ROE and possible Javelin sites.

[Rank amateur]

Cavguy, I was in Estonian military in the middle of 90-s. It was time when in the service was quite many officers who sereved in the Soviet army (in the rank of majors and up). During 1 exercise couple of those Soviet ones worked as advisers to young officers, who had finished Finnish military school. We were playing OPFOR column and moved to west. Half a day our units moved like snails under the instructions of Finnish military school graduates. In front of every possible ambush site recce was sent out. If cou calculate that recce on foot moves 1 km per hour, then it was slow going. Soviet school people got enought and instructed to "bomb" every possible amush site. Finnish ones opposed that there are farms etc. Soviet ones said "Just do it!". After first order, referees reported destroyed ambush. Finnish ones continued this pattern and columns were moving average 40 km per hour and we were showing middle finger to guys crawling out from the bushes. So much about ROE and possible Javelin sites.

The terrain in Georgia offers more potential ambush locations.



Also, Hezbollah countered the bombing of potential ambush locations by spending 5 or 6 years digging in. With only a handful of roads, deep buried IEDs and EFPs would've been effective. Of course, we didn't want the Georgians doing that. Plus, making the Russians angry probably would've convinced them to flatten Tbilisi. "Don't poke the bear" is probably Georgia's only option. To bad we forgot that. It's really too bad they forgot that.

[kaur]

Just to add some backround info to my last post.

Terrain.

Mosaic of Forests, Meadows and Marshes

Almost half of Estonian territory (47.6 per cent) is under forest and woodlands; the area of forest stands has more than doubled during the last 50 years and is still growing.

Forests and woodlands are not evenly distributed in Estonia. The largest forests can be found in the northeast and in Mid-Estonia — a zone stretching from the Northern coast to the Latvian border.

Owing to abundant precipitation and slight run-off, Estonia is rich in wetlands. There are some 165 000 marshes greater than one hectare in area, of which 132 peatlands are larger than 1000 ha. The total area of marshes and swamp forests measures 1 009 101 ha which is over one fifth (22.3 per cent) of the country’s territory. Only Estonia’s northern neighbour, Finland, has a higher percentage (31) of peatland.

Approximately two thirds of the marshes in Estonia began as lakes which were gradually turned into quagmires by the spreading shoreline vegetation. The rest of Estonian swamps were formed by an opposite process, the paludification of mineral land.

http://www.einst.ee/publications/nature/

It's all about TTP, but during the exercise I described, opponent failed.

About foresest. Most of the collective farms are dead. Grandparents, who were mostly peasant are now in the end of their life cycle. Children are useing those farms mostly like summer houses. This all means that there is no need for fields for agricultural purpuse. What happens to the field, if you don't use it? During first ten years there are bushes. After that comes forest.

[Cavguy]

Cavguy, I was in Estonian military in the middle of 90-s. It was time when in the service was quite many officers who sereved in the Soviet army (in the rank of majors and up). During 1 exercise couple of those Soviet ones worked as advisers to young officers, who had finished Finnish military school. We were playing OPFOR column and moved to west. Half a day our units moved like snails under the instructions of Finnish military school graduates. In front of every possible ambush site recce was sent out. If cou calculate that recce on foot moves 1 km per hour, then it was slow going. Soviet school people got enought and instructed to "bomb" every possible amush site. Finnish ones opposed that there are farms etc. Soviet ones said "Just do it!". After first order, referees reported destroyed ambush. Finnish ones continued this pattern and columns were moving average 40 km per hour and we were showing middle finger to guys crawling out from the bushes. So much about ROE and possible Javelin sites.

Thanks for the insight. As a tanker, I just know the fire and forget cpability of the Javelin scares me. Capable of top attack from 2.5k, with night sights, the "shoot and scoot" capability would seem ideal for a light unit seeking to harass armored formations. Get in range, pop a few off, and withdraw fast. Might work as the stinger did against the Russian helicopters in Afghanistan. It is also remarkably easy to use. Stories from SF employment with Pesh in northern Iraq (OIF 2003) is that Javelins decimated an Iraqi BN and forced a withdrawal.

Doesn't suprise me on the Russian counter-ambush tactics. Their COIN philosophy from Chechnya is brutal and effective.

[Van]

Cavguy said:

Was thinking along 'Charlie Wilson's War' today, wondering what could have blunted the Russians within the Georgian capability to employ.

EFPs?

[Cavguy]

Cavguy said:


EFPs?

Requires knowing the standard Russian lines of advance, and a population willing to hide the emplacers. EFP's work best in the "urban jungle" where the insurgent can get close to the road and hide in the populace.

Javelin is much more flexible.

[jmm99]

re: cavguy & kaur
....Finnish military school....

Curious if there was any discussion with Finnish officers (as opposed to the Finnish trained officers) about differences in Russ & Finn anti-ambush tactics - and the reasons for the Finnish tactics.

I suppose one reason might be that the Finns are such inherently sensitive people.

A better reason, I suspect, would be reflection back to the Winter-Continuation War and to avoid when advancing running into the defensive "motti" tactic (cutting up Russian armored columns into bite-sized pieces). Of course, Suomi has a lot more suomaat (swamplands) and erämaat (hunting wildernesses) to allow such tactics - and a hell of a lot of good ambush places to be "bombed"..

--------------------------
The Finns elected the Spike, rather than Javelin, for their own defensive purposes.

Finns buy Israeli missile tested on Lebanese civilians
Nicholas Blanford
Daily Star staff
Finland has agreed to purchase an Israeli anti-tank missile that members of UNIFIL’s Finnish battalion saw being test-fired against civilian targets in south Lebanon over a 16-month period. ....

http://www.generalaoun.org/july8-12.html
http://www.eurospike.com/downloads/E...2-Aug-07-f.pdf

Finn use of Spike & not Javelin; going to MBT LAW for this year & next.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equipme...e_Finnish_Army
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spike_(missile)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FGM-148_Javelin
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NLAW

Puolustusvoimille uusia lähipanssarintorjuntaohjuksia
20.12.2007 09:25
Puolustusvoimat hankkii uusia, huippunykyaikaisia NLAW-lähipanssarintorjuntaohjuksia, jotka toimittaa ruotsalainen Saab Bofors Dynamics Ab. Hankinnan arvo on 38 miljoonaa euroa. ...

http://www.mil.fi/laitokset/tiedotteet/3635.dsp

[reed11b]

How good is Russian IR capability and profilition?? Is it close to matching ours from the mid to late 90's? Also any word on effectivness of the Russian "Active" defenses against the Javelin? I ask becouse good IR capability could be a strong counter to the Javelin.
Reed

[Render]

Wouldn't Finnish tactics be somewhat predicated on a lack of available manpower (ie cannonfodder), a perennial shortage of ammunition and equipment, and an institutionalized national unwillingness to acquire new territory?

All of which are issues not relevant to the average graduate of Frunze.

SISSI,
R

[badtux]

How good is Russian IR capability and profilition?? Is it close to matching ours from the mid to late 90's?

The Russians claim that they're upgrading their T-72's with gear to deal with IR ATGM's, but like many Russian claims it is to be taken with a grain of salt. The T-90 is supposedly armed with the appropriate sensors and devices for dealing with IR and laser-guided missiles and the Russians claim it can deal with Javelin, but how well it works in actual combat... (shrug).

In any event, Javelin is good, but would not have been effective in this war because the rugged terrain was controlled by the Ossetian irregulars, who would have simply taken out any hunter-killer teams that tried to set up there. I am not sure how well you are familiar with the mountainous terrain of the region, but once you get away from the foothills that you saw near Tskhinvali, the terrain goes pretty much vertical and it's pretty much impossible to move through it without serious mountaineering gear or on the established roads -- which were under the control of the Ossetian irregulars. The terrain makes Afghanistan look like Florida ruggedness-wise. Once tanks reach the plains, then you have the problem of the sheer size and bulk of the Javelin system plus vulnerability to air strikes plus tanks and artillery using HE on you. It is not until you get to the cities that the hunter-killer teams would become effective, and Russia avoided sending tanks into the cities and towns until it was clear that the Georgian military had evacuated them.

In short, Javelin is good but it is not a "magic bullet" by any means. If you control the rugged terrain beforehand (which Georgia did not), you can do a Hezbollah and gopher into the hillsides along the only usable routes for tanks, but Georgia did not have that option here. You may be able to get a few hunter-killer teams into place despite all of this via some serious mountaineering, but the size and bulk of the Javelin system means that they couldn't bring many in, they'd be able to take out a few tanks at best, and the Russians would just push the burning tanks off the road into the gorge and keep going.

Finally, regarding NATO, treaty obligations, and so forth, treaties are worth the paper they're signed on in the real world. Nations uphold things like mutual defense treaties when it is in their national interest to do so. If it is not in their national interest to do so, they say "Sorry, you're on your own." That is real world, as vs. fantasy land. I have been thinking hard and cannot think of any NATO state that would see going to war against Russia over Georgia as being in their national interest. Even if Georgia had actually been a NATO member, the response of many major NATO states would have been "Sorry, but you incited this by shelling Tskhinvali, so you're on your own," which, given that NATO actions require unanimity, would have tabled any NATO response. Even under the more stringent standards of U.S. tort law, if you consider the NATO treaty as a contract, Georgia's shelling of Tskhinvali would have been considered "bad faith" and thus rendered that self defense clause null and void (is it self defense if you yourself started the war?). Some folks here seem to have an overly ambitious notion of the power of paper. Sorry, folks. In international relations, it all boils down in the end to enlightened self interest and power. The paper is useful only insofar as it makes explicit such. Otherwise, it is just a piece of paper. In the case of the current Georgian action, Georgia having that piece of paper in hand would have changed things not a lick -- it is not in the self-interest of Europe to start WWIII over Georgia, and thus it would not have happened.

[Jedburgh]

Just today morning I found from Russian MoD site that they are denying involvement of Chechen "Vostok" and "Zapad" units. This info has vanished now. Reuters says that "Vostok" is in.

NCW, 15 Aug 08: Wanted Chechen Commander Leads his Battalion against Georgian Forces

Kavkazky Uzel reported on August 13 that members of the Chechen-manned Vostok battalion of the Russian Defense Ministry’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) were among the Russian forces that invaded Georgia. According to the website, the Vostok fighters were located in area of the Georgian town of Gori along with Sulim Yamadaev, the Vostok battalion commander. Yamadaev, who became a target of Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov’s wrath following a confrontation and apparent shootout last April involving Vostok members and security forces loyal to Kadyrov, was put on Russia’s federal wanted list earlier this month.

Kavkazky Uzel quoted a correspondent for the Gazeta.ru website as saying that he had been told by several Russian servicemen that Yamadaev and the Vostok battalion were deployed in the “conflict zone” in South Ossetia. Meanwhile, the website of the newspaper Gazeta, reported on August 12 that the Vostok battalion was located near Gori and that Yamadaev had led it in an assault on the Georgian village of Kvemo-Nikoz.....

[Rex Brynen]

Finally, regarding NATO, treaty obligations, and so forth, treaties are worth the paper they're signed on in the real world. Nations uphold things like mutual defense treaties when it is in their national interest to do so. If it is not in their national interest to do so, they say "Sorry, you're on your own." That is real world, as vs. fantasy land. I have been thinking hard and cannot think of any NATO state that would see going to war against Russia over Georgia as being in their national interest. Even if Georgia had actually been a NATO member, the response of many major NATO states would have been "Sorry, but you incited this by shelling Tskhinvali, so you're on your own," which, given that NATO actions require unanimity, would have tabled any NATO response.

That's not an entirely accurate reading of Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which doesn't require any unanimity at all for individual member states to take action. However, the treaty doesn't require armed force in response to an armed attack, but rather "such action as [each state] deems necessary."

Treaty obligations, i would argue, have somewhat more weight than simply transitory self-interest, for a variety of reasons: the create incentives to demonstrate credibility, they modify public and international expectations, and they create webs of institutional interest and interaction that modify the ways situations are analyzed and interests are perceived within government. NATO membership, for example, has profoundly changed the way that the Canadian military, the Canadian government, and the Canadian public view the world.

Indeed, its precisely because most NATO members see the Treaty and alliance as something more than a fiction that most were opposed to Georgian membership.

[jmm99]

from Render
....Finnish tactics be somewhat predicated on a lack of available manpower (ie cannonfodder), a perennial shortage of ammunition and equipment, and an institutionalized national unwillingness to acquire new territory?

Assuming the sequence of policy > strategy > operations > tactics, the predicates you cite (Russian preponderence in manpower and equipment; and Finland's non-interventionism) go more to its national defense policy - defensive & counterpunching.

Counterpunching operations would depend on the path(s) of the Russian invasion: (1) coastal plain - Viipuri, Helsinki, Turku-Tampere, Vaasa, Oulu, Tornio (as in the successful 18th & 19th century Russian attacks); and/or (2) into Central Finland from Russian Karelia (not successful in Winter-Continuation War).

All of that would end up driving tactics, but those would depend on what personnel and equipment are still available; and the landscape (which in Central Finland is tough - except to Finns).

The MoD is tight-mouthed about scenarios; and Russia is not featured as the big, bad enemy.

The new White Paper, The Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy, published in September 2004, guides national defence policy. The document is prepared cooperatively in different ministries and is approved by Parliament. The latest report focuses on Finland’s changing security environment and defines the line of action in the field of defence policy.

http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml?l=en&s=61

But, why else have 64 F-18s - to attack Sweden ?

Finnish equipment is not bad, but it is not about to defeat Russia in an all out attack - see links in # 63 and

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finnish_Defence_Forces

Georgian Defense Forces were not in the same order of magnitude as Finland's - assuming the latter can get mobilized before the Novgorodians cross the border.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_Georgia

---------------------------------------
What I make of the 2004 White Paper and associated documents - Phase I would be a conventional defense, hopefully killing as many of the enemy as possible before getting killed.

Phase II, not really stated in official documents, would be the Juho Paasikivi policy, as related in spring 1944 by John Scott, a Time-Life reporter:

Repeating to me what he had probably told Molotov - a description of what the result would be if Russia overran Finland. Paasikivi stood up, shook a bony finger in the air and said: "We will shoot from behind every stone and tree, we will go on shooting for 50 years. We are not Czechs. We are not Dutchmen. We will fight tooth and nail behind every rock and over the ice of every lake. I will not fight long. I am old, but others will fight."

The idea of this mutual suicide pact is to require Russia to answer the question: "Do we really want to do this ?" Uncle Joe Stalin answered "nyet".

Since Suomi is a homogeneous country, what it may or may not do has little relevance to Georgia. But, it will be interesting to see what effect Russia's Georgian adventure will have on upcoming Finnish defense budgets. Right now, quite a few euros are being spent on improved command, control and communication networks - all in the White Paper & associated documents.

[Rank amateur]

Requires knowing the standard Russian lines of advance, and a population willing to hide the emplacers.

Not to contradict a rising star such as yourself, but my take is that when there are only a handful of roads, you know the lines long before the war starts and you can also place EFPs long before the war starts. Maybe it wouldn't have worked in S. Ossetia, but the Russians didn't stop there.

Relevant, because there are only a handful of roads through the mountains between Iraq and Iran. Also, I believe Hezbollah was able to take out some tanks with EFPS/deep buried IEDS placed before the war started/ (From memory; I could be wrong.)