Leading infantry tactics theoreticians/experts today

[Ken White]

managed at Co / Bn / Bde level. I think the Div should disappear (except for Artillery Divisions for HIC ) and Corps should control (lightly) up to 9-10 Bdes plus the spt package, an Avn Bde and that Arty div.

Four of every maneuver element is better than three, enables better bounding overwatch and rotation off line. Also allows for mix of 2 Tk Co and 2 Mech Inf Co at Bn. Allows one element for Assault and three for breakthrough and follow up. Four Firing Batteries allow two to be ready to fire no matter how much you move. All sorts of advantages. The triangular setup was a German invention to force unbalanced formations and defense -- same thing can be achieved by better training.

Span of control as currently defined is engendered more by lack of trust and fear of failure than by practical considerations -- unless you want to count peacetime manning and personnel management problems as practical (which I don't). Better training can overcome that. Not mixing branches is not maintenance or training driven, it's branch parochialism driven (which again is affected by peacetime manning and personnel management practices...).

[Rifleman]

Having four combat/manuever/line/base elements before adding in the combat support elements seems to make good sense. I know that's the organization of the 2nd Foreign Parachute Regiment: four companies of four platoons of four squads, before adding the combat support/heavy weapons units.

A related question for those in the know: why is it that the pentomic battlegroup proved hard to manage, yet several WWII light infantry/raider type units had six small line companies per battalion and were not unmanagable for their commanders?

Examples: British Commandos, US Ranger Battalions, 2nd Marine Raider Battalon, and the "regiments" of the First Special Service Force all had six smaller line companies.

I'm sure that for starters W. O. Darby, Evans Carlson, Lord Lovat, et al, were way more talented as combat commanders than the average battlegroup commander in the late '50s, but was anything else going on that enabled them to be successful with their seemingly "unwieldy" battalions when the pentomic army experienced control problems?

[Ken White]

...
A related question for those in the know: why is it that the pentomic battlegroup proved hard to manage, yet several WWII light infantry/raider type units had six small line companies per battalion and were not unmanagable for their commanders?
. . .
I'm sure that for starters W. O. Darby, Evans Carlson, Lord Lovat, et al, were way more talented as combat commanders than the average battlegroup commander in the late '50s, but was anything else going on that enabled them to be successful with their seemingly "unwieldy" battalions when the pentomic army experienced control problems?

Well, maybe not -- I was in the first one that formed, the 327th Abn Inf Cbt Gp, later the 1st Abn BG 327th Inf. Was in another in Korea 59-60 and yet another at Bragg later. ROCID and ROTAD would coulda worked but...

They weren't that hard to manage though that was one of the ostensible reasons stated for their disappearance. I was fortunate in having several good BG commanders who had no problems with it at all -- the real problem was that the Cdrs were COLs, many but not all of whom believed that commanding five companies (plus HHC and a Mortar Battery) was just commanding a big Battalion, therefor beneath their dignity. A number of them objected strongly and forced the change. A second problem was that the forerunner of todays personnel problems insisted that any Inf COL could effectively command an organization that was (a) different than their experience set catered for; and (b) required real flexibility and trust of subordinates due to the great dispersal envisioned for the Cos. The old Airborne heads had no problem with that last, the standard Inf types did (most of them were also older and really did have problems keeping up physically).

Two other factors were that the equipment that the BGs were supposed to have did not arrive until about the time they were inactivated and that the log and maintenance systems were not changed to cope with the new requirements.

It was an idea before its time.

An interesting follow on is that initially, the ROAD plan of 1964, doing away with the BGs and returning to Bns with three Bns in a Bde, was initially to have rotating Bns working for the Bdes -- the Colonels also killed that, they did not want to chance being held responsible for failures by Bns for which they had not had training oversight. They insisted on permanently assigned Bns. Progress can be stopped dead if the right people want it to be stopped...

Gonna be interesting to see, in peacetime, how the plug and play BCTs work today. Folks are already complaining about the lack of continuity (read: control; people tread softly when they have OpCom or OpCon of elements from a different Div -- and they don't like that) caused by using the plug and play concept...

[VMI_Marine]

Gonna be interesting to see, in peacetime, how the plug and play BCTs work today. Folks are already complaining about the lack of continuity (read: control; people tread softly when they have OpCom or OpCon of elements from a different Div -- and they don't like that) caused by using the plug and play concept...

Interesting point, Ken. I wonder if the Army can make that change in mindset. On our side of the house, regiments have very little to do with the training of their subordinate battalions, since our battalions are used to working independently or as part of a MEU. Thus, when we went to our OIF arrangement of deploying RCT headquarter and then assigning various battalions from different regiments to those RCTs, it wasn't a big deal. I think it's been good for us, allowing us to better tailor our forces to the needs in each AO; I hope the Army is able to make the modular BCT idea work. It might sacrifice some of our ability to fight as divisions in major "conventional" warfare, but it enhances flexibility for ops like Iraq and A-stan.

[Ken White]

also on the full spectrum capability problem...

The ability to tailor forces is critical and the Army needs to be able to do that; I'd like to see the plug 'n play aspect moved down to BCTs, shuffle Bns around.

The Division needs to go IMO because it's a legacy item and thus an inadvertant, unconscious flexibility inhibitor. We just need to fix the log issues. The US Army has really fought by Division in only two cases; North Africa in WW II and the 1991 gulf War -- that due to the Desert where one could maneuver a Division; all the rest of WW II and all subsequent wars have been RCT or Bde battles due to terrain compartmentalization and other factors. The BCTs need a third (or even a fourth ) maneuver Bn and the RSTA Sqn needs a lot more thought but it's definitely the way to go. They also need to be called Bdes -- because a BCT was a Battalion Combat Team a long time before some smart guy reinvented the wheel.

The objection to a third or fourth maneuver Bn will be centered around "imbalancing" the personnel system and keeping certain rank spaces (by branch ). Gar-bahge; change the system to support the military requirement instead of trying -- foolishly -- to design a TOE to support the personnel system. Bass ackwards...

[Ron Humphrey]

also on the full spectrum capability problem...

The ability to tailor forces is critical and the Army needs to be able to do that; I'd like to see the plug 'n play aspect moved down to BCTs, shuffle Bns around.

..

That was originally the idea but aside from other things the personnel issues both in higher ranking positions and the requirements for what actually needs to be expanded at BN and below would probably have to be agreed on and implemented before it went much of anywhere.

[Ken White]

That was originally the idea but aside from other things the personnel issues both in higher ranking positions and the requirements for what actually needs to be expanded at BN and below would probably have to be agreed on and implemented before it went much of anywhere.

exemplifies what's wrong with the system today...

Why "agreed?" I know that's the way we work today, committees and consensus -- and look where that's gotten us.

IMO, agreement should not be required; an assessment of the combat -- not peace time, combat -- requirements should be made and a decision announced and implemented. We have ceded too much day to day running of the Army to Congress, DoD, POMs, PBACs, branch parochialism, GO steering committees and to Councils of Colonels. Not one of those things is in sight when combat occurs...

Peacetime, ideally, should be the norm for Armies -- but they absolutely should not organize and operate as peacetime entities. You do indeed go to war with the Army you've got -- and if it is totally peacetime oriented, you are going to have problems.

We kill people unnecessarily due to that crass stupidity.

[reed11b]

also on the full spectrum capability problem...

The ability to tailor forces is critical and the Army needs to be able to do that; I'd like to see the plug 'n play aspect moved down to BCTs, shuffle Bns around.

The Division needs to go IMO because it's a legacy item and thus an inadvertant, unconscious flexibility inhibitor. We just need to fix the log issues. The US Army has really fought by Division in only two cases; North Africa in WW II and the 1991 gulf War -- that due to the Desert where one could maneuver a Division; all the rest of WW II and all subsequent wars have been RCT or Bde battles due to terrain compartmentalization and other factors. The BCTs need a third (or even a fourth ) maneuver Bn and the RSTA Sqn needs a lot more thought but it's definitely the way to go. They also need to be called Bdes -- because a BCT was a Battalion Combat Team a long time before some smart guy reinvented the wheel.

The objection to a third or fourth maneuver Bn will be centered around "imbalancing" the personnel system and keeping certain rank spaces (by branch ). Gar-bahge; change the system to support the military requirement instead of trying -- foolishly -- to design a TOE to support the personnel system. Bass ackwards...

This is the third time I have found myself in 100% agreement with you Ken. One of the suggestion that MacGregor made that I did like was to have a BG lead the upsized BCT. DO you feel the RSTA should stay R-S-T-A focused or be more of a Cav unit, as we currently use cav?
Reed

[jkm_101_fso]

This is the third time I have found myself in 100% agreement with you Ken. One of the suggestion that MacGregor made that I did like was to have a BG lead the upsized BCT.

I think the ARNG has BG command "large" Brigades; I've seen that before, but don't know how common it is. When TF Olympia replaced 101st in Mosul in 2004, it was commanded by then-BG Carter Ham. He had one stryker BDE, plus attachments, but the Stryker BDE had their own Commander, as well. As for me, I am nostaligic about the old regimental system...how cool would that be?

DO you feel the RSTA should stay R-S-T-A focused or be more of a Cav unit, as we currently use cav?

I think we've had this discussion in a thread; there are a lot of guys on here with more expertise than me on RSTA, but from what I've seen in Iraq, we generally just use them as Manuever...but the same could be said for FA BNs.

I don't see the RSTA changing, I just wish they had more 11Bs and 19Ds assigned to the organizations. MikeF, Cavguy and RTK could probably lend more to this than I can. RSTA has 2 Cav troops (A&B) and one infantry company (C troop) which is basically task organized as 2 scout platoons, IIRC. The RSTAs are commanded by Infantrymen, from what I've seen. I'll look for the thread we had on this all ready...I think it was titled "Transformation" or something.

[Ken White]

This is the third time I have found myself in 100% agreement with you Ken.

You can get accused of mutiny and sedition for that...

One of the suggestion that MacGregor made that I did like was to have a BG lead the upsized BCT.

I don't agree with Macgregor on a lot of things, including that -- for the current sized and organized Bdes. IF they were at four maneuver Bns plus a Cav Troop AND a Scout / LRS (Jr) Co AND a STA Co (all separate), an ADA By and a full up FA Bn, which they should be, I'd agree.

The one problem with a GO commander is that unless carefully selected, hidebound and excess caution to protect the institution can creep in; COLs will generally be more flexible. With the Bde as large as I think it should be, the Bde Cdr will have to do what the CG of the 1st Bde of the 101st in 1966 did -- in sharp contrast to most of his contemporaries -- and tell the TOC when he sacks out "Wake me if ALL the battalions are in heavy contact."

DO you feel the RSTA should stay R-S-T-A focused or be more of a Cav unit, as we currently use cav?

Since my opinion is that we do not nowadays do the Cav thing well and since you need both mounted and dismounted recon elements -- and never the twain shall meet or work together well -- plus a Svlnc / TA element (also a separate and different thing which doesn't get along well with the other two), all three should be separate Co sized units I think. We need to get Cav back to be being Cav instead of a light and frequently misused maneuver force.

Dismounted Scouts need extra training and time to do their job properly and they need time to do the mission without being rushed (or asked if they're sure when they report something...) and the STA thing is tech heavy. Three very different philosophies and techniques at work that mesh poorly in training and in operation except at the level where the information they produce is collated and analyzed.

I could make a case for a Cav Sqn in a heavy Bde but I think light, medium and heavy Bdes all need all three types of intel gatherers, the light and medium guys only need a Cav Troop IMO (and the heavy can get by with a Scout Platoon which should still be separate). The Cav element should not be considered another maneuver element except in rare cases. In any case, the missions and techniques are so different that to combine them in one Sqn really makes little sense except for peacetime admin purposes -- and that should NOT be the organizational determinant.

Snipers are both a combat and an intel asset, are needed and both the Cav and Scout elements should have some; the Cav probably with .50s and the Scouts with .338 (or .300 Win magnum, a much better anti personnel round).

The fighting organization should be the TOE, the ad-hoc stuff should be for peacetime support. We do that backwards because it makes it easy on the Per folks so instead of the Per system supporting the force, the force is supporting the Per system...

[VMI_Marine]

The Division needs to go IMO because it's a legacy item and thus an inadvertant, unconscious flexibility inhibitor.

But then what would all of the MGs do?

Gar-bahge; change the system to support the military requirement instead of trying -- foolishly -- to design a TOE to support the personnel system. Bass ackwards...

You are obviously lacking in institutional pride. The US military can put the cart before the horse better than anyone else in the world.

I think a lot of the resistance stems from the loss of control. BCT and even battalion commanders sometimes have a difficult time accepting that the decentralized nature of the current fight removes them from the "warfighting", so to speak. Modularity contributes to that.

[Ken White]

But then what would all of the MGs do?

We have the same number of flag officers we had in 1946 for a 12 plus million person force. That high and excess number is retained -- wrongly IMO -- to provide flags in event of a required mobiliztion. I agree with the need, disagree with the method.

Secondly, that number helps the up or out and DOPMA regimens to work. Both of those have their flaws.

Still, unlikely to change, I know. They ought to be able to find something for them to do; we've invented several jobs for three and four stars; how hard can it be to develop other jobs?

You are obviously lacking in institutional pride. The US military can put the cart before the horse better than anyone else in the world.

Roger that -- but one of our many strengths.

I think a lot of the resistance stems from the loss of control. BCT and even battalion commanders sometimes have a difficult time accepting that the decentralized nature of the current fight removes them from the "warfighting", so to speak. Modularity contributes to that.

Absolutely, though I'm not as sure it's so much being removed as it is a fear of loss of control. That and a lack of trust of subordinates which IMO is partly control-freakitis and partly a bona fide lack of trust due to tacit knowledge or at least a gnawing fear that we do not train people as well as we should. Some favorable exceptions, I know -- and more every day; which is one of several good things that's come out of all this

On the training issue, the Corps does a better job with the Basic School but the Army initial entry training, while better than its ever been, is still inadequate due to false time and money pressures. LTs need about a year, peons about six months...

[Tukhachevskii]

Four of every maneuver element is better than three, enables better bounding overwatch and rotation off line. Also allows for mix of 2 Tk Co and 2 Mech Inf Co at Bn. Allows one element for Assault and three for breakthrough and follow up. Four Firing Batteries allow two to be ready to fire no matter how much you move. All sorts of advantages. The triangular setup was a German invention to force unbalanced formations and defense -- same thing can be achieved by better training.
.

Far be it for me to resurrect a thread (I am no necromancer) but it appears E. S. Johnston in his “Field Service Regulations of the Future” published in 1936 would agree with the desirability of four manoeuvre elements. His view and that of others (such as Leslie McNair) is discussed in Major Glenn M. Harned, The Principles of Tactical Organisation and their Impact upon Force Design In the US Army originally published as a monograph for the US Army Command and General Staff College (1985). The monograph is rather good at getting to the nuts and bolts of unit organisation (“force design”) through the analytical lenses of two principles of war (Unity of Effort and Economy of Force) and seems to me at least to be as relevant today as it was in 1985 or, for that matter, in 1936;

(According to E. S. Johnston...) Two subdivisions provide one to fix and one to manoeuvre, while three also provide a reserve. "Four subdivisions provide an organization yet more flexible, there being sufficient elements to manoeuvre around both flanks as well as for fixing and for the reserve. This organization is also useful in penetrations, in which case the entire unit may be used in a deep narrow column, in a square or similar figure, or in a T-shaped formation. A unit of four subdivisions in particularly flexible [because] the "four subunits may be combined into three or two, according to the situation and the ability of the commander." A unit with four subdivisions is also more economical, requiring little more overhead than a unit with only three.(p.6)

The paper also has a rather interesting “take” on the principle of Unity of Command which, according to Johnston, should actually be Unity of Effort or (Co-operation as per The Principles of War in UK JDP 0-01 British Defence Doctrine p.2-6);

According to Johnston, "Organization is the mechanism of control. Its purpose, therefore, is unity of effort". Thus, tactical organization is a mechanism of control, which produces unity of effort, which results in the economic expenditure of combat power. In the 1923 Field Service Regulations, as in FM 100-5 today, the US Army recognized Unity of Command as a principle of war, but Johnston argued that the principle should be Unity of Effort, not Unity of Command. He wrote, “Wellington and Blucher [at Waterloo] succeeded by reason of cooperation; they had no unified command ... Unity of command, then is merely a method of obtaining unity of effort ; cooperation is another method ... The real problem is where to provide for unity of command and where to depend on cooperation”.(p.3)

Furthermore, in terms of Economy of Force the monograph quotes LtGen. Jacob L. Devers (in a letter to Gen. Marshall c.1941) who criticised McNair’s economising/pooling of resources efforts (i.e., attaching CS and CSS units as and where needed rather than having them organic to the subunit in question);

Economy of force is not gained by having a lot of units in a reserve pool where they train individually, knowing little or nothing of the units they are going to fight with. It is much better to make them part of a division or corps, even to the wearing of the same shoulder patch., If they are needed elsewhere in an emergency, they can be withdrawn easily from the division or corps and attached where they are needed. Economy of force and unity of command go together. You get little of either if you get a lot of attached units at the last moment. Team play comes only with practice.(p.9)