TCP's

[MSG Proctor]

MSG, I am b no means trying to play down the actions of you and your men. But reality is reality. For the fragile months following 3d Bn, 4th Marines' destruction of Saddam's likeness, we were not practising COIN in the classical, current, or any, sense.

jcustis:
I sincerely admire your candor and transparency. I am sure your unit did everything in their power to adapt to the situation with courage and professionalism.


In May 2003 the 2nd BCT 82nd Airborne Division occupied battlespace in the southern districts of Baghdad known collectively as Al Rashid. There was no government, no infrastructure and no manual for setting up a government while fighting FRLs, religious extremists, criminal gangs, and foreign terrorists.

2nd BCT was spread out with 14 combat outposts not including temporary platoon patrol bases. Mind you, we had none of the sexy ISR equipment or digital bandwidth today’s modular BCTs enjoy. We had no RSTA Squadron, no STB, and no CPOF or real-time digital COP.

COL Kurt Fuller tells Karl Zinsmeister in Dawn Over Baghdad that this was the first time in history when US forces have participated in large scale urban fighting while simultaneously rebuilding the area being contested.

In the period of May-Dec 2003, 2nd BCT conducted more than 500 raids, searched more than 25,000 houses, captured more than 2,200 suspected insurgents, set in motion $17 million worth of building projects, repaired 320 schools and 24 medical clinics, and established 15 NACs (neighborhood advisory councils) across the city.

The paratroopers accomplished this while engaging in 130 fire fights, 39 mortar attacks, 25 ambushes, 41 RPG assaults, and 140 IEDs.

Today’s pacification of Baghdad is frequently referred to as the “lowest incidence of SIGACTs since February 2004". That’s the month we left.

2nd BCT’s TTP included dismounted foot patrolling, night Ops, religious leader engagement, combined patrols with the embryonic ISF (then known as the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps), and what is recognized today as the forerunner of clear-hold-build.

Not saying we were all that and a bag of chips, but the TTP and accomplishments I’ve described here are certainly not far from the doctrine described in FM 3-24.

Airborne/Air Assault units had extensive training in this type of warfare for years. What we didn't have was the cultural awareness or experience in governance that was needed. That was all made up on the fly.

Sorry for boasting, I'm just damned lucky to have been a part of such a great bunch leaders and paratroopers.