CSIS, 2 Nov 06: Options for Expanding Iraqi Forces: Goals and Realities
...The basic problem with all Iraqi forces is that while over 300,000 have been trained and equipped, many have since left and deserted, substantial numbers have been killed and wounded, and some 10-20% of those who remain are absent at any given time because they leave to take care of their families and transfer their pay in a country where there is no meaningful banking system. The Iraqi regular forces and National Police are probably only about 20-25% short of the totals reported for trained and equipped manpower. The figures for the regular police and Facilities Protection Force are much larger, probably well in excess of 30% of the total of men reported as trained and equipped, but there is no accurate way to track the total.

The problem is further complicated by the fact that all Iraqi forces, including the army, were recruited and equipped to serve locally in limited defensive roles, not act as mobile forces trained and equipped to act as active combat units deployable throughout the country to deal with insurgency and civil conflict. This means the recruiting base must now be changed, new pay and arrangements are needed to create a nationally deployable force, and new equipment and facilities will be need for the deployable units thrust into more serious combat...