Not sure if I agree with the underlying premise of the comparability of insurgencies and criminal factions. The article cites the similarities as "the fragmentation of these states, the urbanized nature of the current conflict, networking, mobilization, and patterns of violence". Summed up, the "center of gravity is not with the enemy, but with the people." But these are simply general causes or tactics, which may be applicable in different or similar situations according to intention -- which is what I think the article misses entirely.

Insurgencies (which for clarity's sake I'll define as irregular armed factions) aim to accomplish some political object. Illicit economic activity is purposeful only to the extent that it finances the campaign. In contrast, criminal factions, at whatever level, aim to profit. If a criminal faction seeks political power, such as the case with Pablo Escobar, it's in order to protect its economic interest. I would venture to suggest that insurgencies are active and criminal factions passive or reactionary in the context of politics and subsequently conflict. Because the intentions are different, the incentives are different, and consequently effective counter-strategies must be different (assuming, of course, that the intent is to defeat the opposing organization). So even if both kinds of organizations use similar tactics, or may be empowered by similar conditions, it by no means suggests that a counter-strategy to one is applicable to the other. So -- yes -- a police officer in LA is effective by having a positive impact on the community (but I would dispute that effectiveness is applicable only to street gangs, not particularly organized crime). But that's because the relationship between the object and the risk (read: death) is different for a criminal than an insurgent. No successful criminal ever reached his goal by dying.

On that basis I dispute the idea that "the people" (a term that is made irrelevant by its vagueness) constitute the center of gravity. If they did, the obvious strategy would be to break the will of the people by reducing them to submission. But that already contradicts the original premise because it demands the use of force against the people, not to preserve them as the author(s?) suggest. So -- no -- "the people" are not some magic bullet insurgency-killer. The British supposedly had the support of a full third of the American population in the Revolution, and another third were not particularly concered with the conflict at all. Two-thirds of "the people" is not enough? And if the counter-argument is to be "The British didn't talk to the right people", then I would suggest the British would never have won because the "right people" are the ones taking up arms against them in the first place.

So my greatest criticism of the article is that the fundamental object in war is to destroy the will and capabilities of the enemy. That's because the enemy seeks a positive political object which it will continue to pursue. "The people", and therefore the article's suggestions, may or may not be relevant depending on how the political object defines the circumstances. Not sure how much popular support the British had in the last phase of the Second Boer War, or Sherman had in his burning of Georgia, but they certainly succeeded using tactics which negatively impacted "the people".

Perhaps the lesson then is that a counter-strategy aimed at capabilities rather than the will is generally more effective.