Assessment of Effects Based Operations

[Ron Humphrey]

Looking at an insurgency as a system, or a system of systems, is dangerously misleading.

Most definately misleading, but not necessarily wrong. Is it the fact that its not a system thats the problem or more that we average folk tend to look at it as more prescriptive rather than enlightening?

William Owen is correct about his comments regarding mechanical systems (closed systems or simple systems) verus open (or complex systems). You can predict the results of a nodal attack on a closed system, but you can only guess what the result will be when you target a node in an open system, because that system will adapt (perhaps in your favor, perhaps not).

Once again that is correct in that if the expectation is to find the silver bullet then yes almost guaranteed failure do to unforseen reactions. However if one uses the systems approach in an attempt to better understand the enemy rather than to define what to do to them is that still a problem? If one thing is certain it should be that critical thinking is required if we are to approach operational environments without being constantly drawn into natural/biased assumptions vs more informed and well thought out approaches.

While targeting important individuals and resources is still an important line of operation, it is a supporting line of effort, it should not be the main effort. The main effort should be focused on changing the environment so the insurgents can't survive there. If you focus on making the environment hostile to them by using good ole COIN doctrine which involves protecting the populace so the insurgents can't coerce support, fixing government problems to undermine whatever cause the insurgents may have, and establishing capable security forces at the local level that can collect and respond to intelligence rapidly (they're the ones who fix and finish the enemy). They don't focus on so called HVI's, but rather all the bad guys to prevent the insurgents from regrouping, thus the goal is to purge an area and put our "systems" in place to prevent their resurgence (functioning gov, security, intelligence, public diplomacy, etc.).

Could not be more in agreement here and I ask you this. Many of us have tried to explain a complex situation to those around us and very often there is confusion of what we say by misperception of those on the recieving end of the discussion(or insufficient ability on our end to adequately explain it).

How often have you found that a commanders intent is one thing to the the commander and by the time it gets two levels down it apparently became something completely different. The thing I guess I'm trying to get at here is that a systems approach can be extremely helpful in the explanation and planning process for ensuring that at least most of the individuals are on the same page as to the overall environmental characteristics. Anything beyond that along the prescriptive lines would seem to be problematic.

As to systems in general perhaps a change in how one looks at that system might represent more of what you mention, Good ol COIN. Although in mapping a system one tends to focus on the nodes much as we usually connect the dots to draw a picture, are the nodes really the important part or rather is it the (what,how,why,where, and whos of what connects them. Those lines represent the true focus of the operation. How do they get around (the people), how do they fund,(the people), what makes them have to move(the people), what is their achilles heel, ETC.

We attempted systems targeting initially during OIF and it largely failed to achieve the desired results, but when we surged and changed the environment to prevent the insurgents from regrouping, that combined with the targeting methodology had a positive impact. Only history will tell how long it will last.

I still support using a systems model on occassion when looking at the insurgency to identify potential vulnerabilities, but the focus must be on the basics, which is changing the environment (it is tough, dangerous, and requires patience). If I can shut down a weapons smuggling ring (system), or a financial support arm (system), that is a bonus, but only a temporary one until they adapt to the disruption. If I can deny the populace to them by setting conditions to get them to actively support the government I can overwhelm the insurgents, vice constantly hitting them with pin pricks. They won't be able to recover from staggering blows.

Slapout if you can find a magic silver bullet for defeating an insurgency please let me know. I have a case of beer saying you can't.

In identifying how difficult it is to take the right approach and how much it requires from those who are leading it haven't you just made the point that more often than not many may not be quite patient enough, or persistent enough, or informed enough to continue the right process without some sort of more basic(said silver bullet) type approaches. Is it not therein that the greatest difficulties are to be found?

[Eden]

Eisenhower once said "In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensible." It is a shame that effects-based thinking - originally formulated as an aid to planners in thinking about what they wanted to accomplish before they decided how they wanted to accomplish it - evolved into effects-based operations. Now we will throw the baby out with the bathwater.

Effects-based thinking became EBO due to that peculiarly American proclivity for intellectual hubris (we can know everything) and reductive thinking (we can eliminate the friction and fog of war through information gathering and analysis). We love tables, graphs, and data. We regard reliance on instinct and professional judgment as evidence of sloppy thinking. When is the last time you saw a briefing end with a slide saying "Trust me"?

Effects-based thinking is an effective tool for thoughtful planners. EBO is a crutch for drones seeking false precision to prop up mediocre plans. Moreover, it became an exercise in onanism as the ends began to overshadow the means. Producing snazzy charts consumed more time and staff energy than any actual thinking about operations.

I saw this in action at my last headquarters, where the long-range planners became more and more separated from reality. They carefully crafted their desired ends, made sure they were nested properly and gauged by Measures of Effectiveness. They thought long and hard about second- and third-order effects. What they didn't do was spend much time on how they were going to bring about their desired effects. The 'action' part was considered secondary, an incidental problem for the current ops guys (like me) to figure out. As a result - and this is the real killer in EBO - ends became increasingly de-linked from ways and means.

Anyway, kudos to General Mattis. As Orwell warned many years ago, "We've reached the point where the first duty of intelligent men is to restate the obvious."

[Steve Blair]

I tend to take a more holistic approach to 'systems' (one that wouldn't pass muster with the more technologically-focused systems analysis). To me, the population support for an insurgency is in its own way a system, but one that you have to pressure and adjust in multiple ways. Much of what I've seen in the EBO/systems stuff is more (to me) grasping for a justification to build more fancy stuff and/or use that fancy stuff in a way that might appear to offer a silver bullet solution.

I do agree with Eden that there is some good nestled in the EBO stuff, but it tends to get lost in the technological shuffle (I tend to pin many of our problems not so much on intellectual hubris as I do an over-reliance on technology...and I do think that 'total knowledge' of any battlefield is a myth).

[Cavguy]

I wonder how much EBO as a process is driven by the USAF seeking to conceptualize how airpower can win wars by itself? The article I linked above says as much. The "thought leadership" of the concept seems to be centered at Maxwell in the 90's.

[Steve Blair]

I wonder how much EBO as a process is driven by the USAF seeking to conceptualize how airpower can win wars by itself? The article I linked above says as much. The "thought leadership" of the concept seems to be centered at Maxwell in the 90's.

I suspect that this is a reasonable assumption. The AF is seriously tech-centric, and EBO is focused almost totally on technology. EBO can also be packaged as conflict on the cheap, which is something the AF has been pushing since the end of World War II. I'd also think that it channels a great deal of Warden's thinking.

Not saying that this was planned, but more a matter of like minds finding like theories and latching on.

[Ron Humphrey]

I suspect that this is a reasonable assumption. The AF is seriously tech-centric, and EBO is focused almost totally on technology. EBO can also be packaged as conflict on the cheap, which is something the AF has been pushing since the end of World War II. I'd also think that it channels a great deal of Warden's thinking.

Not saying that this was planned, but more a matter of like minds finding like theories and latching on.

Why the focus is so often on the nodes vs the paths between them

[Steve Blair]

Why the focus is so often on the nodes vs the paths between them

Because the AF is not especially "into" either close air support or interdiction, at least at the higher policy level. Also, the promise of hitting a node and knocking an opponent out of the conflict is far more attractive from a political standpoint than a prolonged interdiction campaign. One of the odd takeaways that some higher command types got from Vietnam was that interdiction (i.e. Rolling Thunder) failed whereas node strikes (Linebacker II) succeeded. Both these simplistic "conclusions" are flawed, but they did survive for some time and became enshrined in the "lessons learned" from that conflict.

The promise of war on the cheap is based on being able to hit a small number of targets with precision weapons and take out an opponent without ever having to commit ground forces (or at least a very small number of forces).

[William F. Owen]

As a result - and this is the real killer in EBO - ends became increasingly de-linked from ways and means.

That is the central weakness of EBO and thus I have never understood how it got as far as it did. Unless you can issue orders using simple language, that allows folks to draw up simple and achievable plans, then I don't see how anyone is in business.

The number of verbs a mission statement should be allowed to contain are actually pretty limited. I might even have a bash and writing them down sometime!

[slapout9]

Wilf, I stayed up late last night and I found it I also reread the article that Cavguy posted, by then it was bed time. I will try and post the 5 rings later but I had problems doing this last time. Either way I will email it to you if all else fails. But first I will have to respond to all this in sections and some separate posts.

Cavguy, I need to set some background on the article that has a few facts the author either left out or was unaware of. You will read him refer to the Air Campaign Planning process. There was an actual handbook published to do this which was on the INTERNET for a long time but for some reason it was removed, I have a hard copy and so does the Air War College in their library.

First there are 5 steps in the process!!! You don't get to the rings until number 3.
Here are the 5 steps :
1-Operational Environment Research
2-Objective(s) determination
3-COG(s) determination (the rings )
4-COA/Campaign development (parallel attack)
5-Operational plan/order issued

Much of what the author criticize as a lack of understanding of the social processes of war would take place in step one!!! If you can get the handbook the list of experts recommended is comprehensive.

His second argument that it only applies to interstate warfare is again incorrect. Warden showed how to apply his theory to an international drug organization in several of the articles the author sites as references. For some reason the author failed to point this out You must understand the the time frame 1995, this was a radical concept then and it was pre 911 so terrorist groups did not have the spotlight they do today.

Three, the parallel attack or what came to be known as TVA, the time value of action or really recently here at SWC Strategic Compression. Warden has consistently said and written the most important thing to do is to attack in parallel across the rings, not just leadership(again Warden points this out in his articles but this author fails to point them out). The attack may be lethal or non-lethal, it could be a bomb or dropping medical supples, or a combination of both. It depends on the mission.


Bill Moore haven't forgot you but need more coffe

[Steve Blair]

Slap,

If you're talking about the Rand report on air campaign planning, it's still available.

[selil]

I tend to take a more holistic approach to 'systems' (one that wouldn't pass muster with the more technologically-focused systems analysis). To me, the population support for an insurgency is in its own way a system, but one that you have to pressure and adjust in multiple ways. Much of what I've seen in the EBO/systems stuff is more (to me) grasping for a justification to build more fancy stuff and/or use that fancy stuff in a way that might appear to offer a silver bullet solution.

I do agree with Eden that there is some good nestled in the EBO stuff, but it tends to get lost in the technological shuffle (I tend to pin many of our problems not so much on intellectual hubris as I do an over-reliance on technology...and I do think that 'total knowledge' of any battlefield is a myth).

Your point is well taken. Much like Wilf grasping at the closed versus open mechanical system the reality is much broader. Capitalism is an economic system. An HMO is an entity in the health care system. A village will have a social system. Like I said earlier we (collective with mouse in pocket) have a tendency to utilize technological constructs and metaphors and rationalize them regardless of fit or usefulness. Systems theory (even the hyper-technical) is useful for understanding differing entities and relative behavior patterns in the aggregate. Specificity falls off as the relationships devolve towards the individual.

It also seems that EBO was misused as a method to apply scientific method or metric based analysis to a woefully inappropriate task. Much like the meandering discussion on the platoon and fire team the mission changes, the scope is slippery (pun intended), the constitution begs for flexibility, the reality is counter to the evidence. EBO fails in providing leaders ease of understanding in a cognitive effort that is not easy to address. To have the answer to the EBO effort is to in many ways not need the EBO tools.

Awaiting flung stones.

[slapout9]

While I am busy organizing some stuff, I thought what does this thread need? Some Systems Music (Jams) and who better than The Bob Seger System. You young guys will learn that Bob's first band was organized and called a system. If you can find the old LP album he even has a defintion of a system on the back of it The little round thing the guy is holding in his hand at the clip below is called a 45 RPM record...part of a music playing system we used to have. Anyway for your listening pleasure and systems education may I present Lucifer-by The Bob Seger System


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lHP_ba8aaiw

I will be gone a little while but I'll be back. Bill Moore get that beer ready

[slapout9]

Slap,

If you're talking about the Rand report on air campaign planning, it's still available.

Steve, I don't think that is the one. This one was produced at the Air War college by some instructors.

Wilf, check your email for a 5 rings analysis of a Soviet Fuel Depot

Bill Moore wrote:
While targeting important individuals and resources is still an important line of operation, it is a supporting line of effort, it should not be the main effort. The main effort should be focused on changing the environment so the insurgents can't survive there. If you focus on making the environment hostile to them by using good ole COIN doctrine which involves protecting the populace so the insurgents can't coerce support, fixing government problems to undermine whatever cause the insurgents may have, and establishing capable security forces at the local level that can collect and respond to intelligence rapidly (they're the ones who fix and finish the enemy).

Bill,that is systems thinking at it's best. Almost a perfect 5 rings analysis to.

Ring5 is the insurgency and you go Kill or capture or convert them. Ring 4 are the various population groups you want to protect. Ring 3 is the physical infrastructure you want to protect and/or build. Ring 2 is the counter process you use to undermine the insurgency. Ring 1 is the leaders and leadership systems you want in place when you leave. Killcullen has written various papers about using the systems thinking approach to COIN. Some are in the SWC library if I am not mistaken.

Now for my case of beer. I don't drink that much but I do like Corona's very,very cold with a small piece of lime pushed into the bottle. My association with SF when I was in the service allowed me to find out many of you guys cook a mean steak and or hamburger. So a Corona and a steak will work or should we ever meet you get the beer and I will get the steak

Now for the answer..... Che Guevara-Bolivia-1966. The closest thing to a silver bullet theory I have seen. Combination of CIA-SF-Local forces to get him. And there is an important lesson there...the sooner you act against an insurgency the easier they are to deal with. If UBL had been killed when he first started his crap we wouldn't be doing what we are doing now. But as COIN theory points out many Insurgencies are not recognized and or dealt with by Governments until they are well developed. It which case you will have to deal with a whole and much larger system then just a single individual or small group.

Later Slap

[SWJED]

More on EBO - SWJ Blog

Christopher J. Castelli of Inside Defense (subscription required) has more on General Jim Mattis’ Effects Based Operations memo and the “vigorous debate” that followed. Excerpts from the article:

Marine Corps Gen. James Mattis' decision to exorcise the term "effects-based operations" from US Joint Forces Command's vocabulary is sparking passionate debate as the military mulls potentially sweeping implications for doctrine, training and operations.

Over the last decade, the Air Force has promoted effects-based operations (EBO) as a revolution in warfare -- operations aimed at producing certain effects, as opposed to merely damaging or destroying targets. It is supposed to be backed by a framework called operational net assessment (ONA) enabling commanders to capitalize on unprecedented high-tech information about the battlespace as well as an analytical process called system of systems analysis (SoSA) focused on exploiting enemy vulnerabilities.

But somewhere along the way it all stopped making sense, according to Mattis, who writes in an Aug. 14 memo that EBO, ONA and SoSA are "fundamentally flawed" and must be removed from the military's lexicon, training and operations…

There has been a spirited debate about EBO in recent years. Critics such as retired Marine Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper and Naval War College professor Milan Vego have vivisected the concept, while Air Force Lt. Gen. David Deptula, one of EBO's main proponents, and other advocates like Naval War College professor James Ellsworth have repeatedly argued its merits.

Mattis' memo is not the end of the debate, but the start of a new chapter. Deptula is defending EBO while welcoming further discussions that will follow from JFCOM's guidance.

"I stand by the efficacy of EBO as a proven joint planning construct and welcome internal discussions on the topic as different viewpoints in joint doctrine are important in raising dialogues that ultimately result in enhancing joint force operations," Deptula tells Inside the Pentagon…

Not surprisingly, the memo is ruffling feathers in Air Force circles.

Before Deptula provided comments on the missive to ITP, Air Force headquarters referred questions on the topic to retired officers like McInerney (retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Thomas McInerney) , who unloaded heaps of criticism.

"Even though I am no longer on active duty I am embarrassed for a combatant commander to publish such a document," McInerney says. "I am a fan of Mattis but this is too much."

McInerney even encouraged combatant commanders to "ignore" what he sees as a shocking memo.

In an e-mail to ITP, McInerney calls JFCOM's missive the "most parochial, un-joint, biased, one-sided document launched against a concept that was key in the transformation of warfare -- and proven in the most successful U.S. military conflicts of the past 20 years (Desert Storm and Allied Force)."…

McInerney concedes EBO has been twisted and over-hyped, but he blames JFCOM.

Much, much more at ITP – praise, criticism and “between the lines” - this article alone is worth the price of a subscription.

[William F. Owen]

In an e-mail to ITP, McInerney calls JFCOM's missive the "most parochial, un-joint, biased, one-sided document launched against a concept that was key in the transformation of warfare -- and proven in the most successful U.S. military conflicts of the past 20 years (Desert Storm and Allied Force)."…

Is there actually any evidence to support the assertion that EBO is proven in the most successful U.S. military conflicts of the past 20 years

Regardless of the actual lack of military logic, EBO lacks evidence and always has.

[Cavguy]

Is there actually any evidence to support the assertion that EBO is proven in the most successful U.S. military conflicts of the past 20 years

Regardless of the actual lack of military logic, EBO lacks evidence and always has.

I told you the EBO crew would strike back ....

This is more to do about the USAF continuing to justify that it can "win wars" by itself than a honest appraisal of doctrine. EBO justifies a lot of USAF doctrine and programs. Without it, rice bowls are threatened. Therefore, a pushback was expected.

I'm with you, show me where EBO had measurable, verifiable success and I'm ready to be persuaded.

[Ken White]

Plus, this:

"McInerney even encouraged combatant commanders to "ignore" what he sees as a shocking memo."

is living proof of the wisdom of C. Abrams -- "Generals should be noted for their silences."

The shocking thing is that a retired anything would have the gall to presume to encourage those serving to ignore something one of their also serving brethren put out -- disagree, yes. Ignore is way wrong and bad advice.

"They-y-y'r-re ba-a-ack," indeed...

[Cavguy]

Plus, this:is living proof of the wisdom of C. Abrams -- "Generals should be noted for their silences."

The shocking thing is that a retired anything would have the gall to presume to encourage those serving to ignore something one of their also serving brethren put out -- disagree, yes. Ignore is way wrong and bad advice.

"They-y-y'r-re ba-a-ack," indeed...

I can imagine that this isn't going to do much for the USAF's objective of rehabilitiating its image within DoD as a team player who gets the current environment, especially since USAF PAO referred questions to McInerny.

Having a retired general urge disobedience of 4-star guidance is truly shocking - and repulsive.

[Tom Odom]

I can imagine that this isn't going to do much for the USAF's objective of rehabilitiating its image within DoD as a team player who gets the current environment, especially since USAF PAO referred questions to McInerny.

Having a retired general urge disobedience of 4-star guidance is truly shocking - and repulsive.

Billy Mitchell lives....

Retired 3 stars can be recalled...

[slapout9]

Having a retired general urge disobedience of 4-star guidance is truly shocking - and repulsive.

Cavguy, that is putting it mildly. He is promoting the disobedience to a direct order That used to be a crime.