This is a fascinating discussion. What it reveals is the difference between realpolitik and idealism.
On the realpolitik side, to misquote Lord Palmerston, nations do not have friends. Nations have interests. For example, nations will uphold mutual defense treaties only if it is in their best interests to do so. France, West Germany, Austria, etc. joined NATO because if the Soviet Army came smashing through the Fulda Gap, the Soviets wouldn't quit until they got to the boot of Spain, so it was in the interests of all members of NATO to stop the Soviets at the Fulda Gap. The U.S. was a member of NATO because Western Europe was an important economic partner and loss of Western Europe would result in significant loss of economic power to the Communist world. So it was in the best interests of all of the original signers of the NATO treaty to abide by its mutual defense obligation.
On the idealism side, when you give your word, your word is your word, and you can't go back on it ever, for any reason. For the idealist, a treaty is not a piece of paper expressing the mutual shared interests of the two (or more) parties to the treaty. For the idealist, a treaty is writ in stone, something permanently binding with the force of law, rather than a temporary expression of the mutual shared interests of two nations subject to revision or rescission if the shared interests which led to the signing of the treaty ever go away.
When it comes to NATO expansion, the problem is that there are few mutual shared interests between potential and current new entrants to NATO and the longstanding NATO members. None of the new entrants provide significant military or economic power to NATO. Without mutual shared interests, a treaty is just a piece of paper with little worth. Realpolitik is about to run into idealism here, and generally when that happens, idealism loses. Small weak nations joining NATO in hopes of being protected by larger more powerful nations need to look at the reality of the situation and decide whether they can really trust the larger more powerful nations to come to their defense. Lacking any significant value to the larger more powerful nations they've signed a treaty with, they may find themselves disappointed in the end. Because in the end, nations have interests, not friends. And starting WWIII over a small nation that provides little value to the alliance may not be something that the remainder of the alliance is willing to do, even if it means the end of NATO...
All of which is just to point out that from a realpolitik perspective, it may not be in the best interests of a small powerless nation right next to a major regional power to do things that irritate said major regional power, no matter how much they believe they are supported by larger powers and no matter how many treaties they have with said larger powers. If they have nothing of their own that makes it vital for the larger powers to come to their assistance... well. That rarely goes the way that the small powerless nation hoped.
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