.....In light of the combination of fundamental tactical shortcomings and serious strategic blunders in the Georgian campaign to retake South Ossetia, it seems clear that the flaws in Georgian military planning were based on two key factors: an over-confident assumption of its own combat readiness and capabilities, as well as by a serious underestimation of the scale and scope of the Russian response.
The first of these factors, an over-estimation of Georgian capabilities, is rooted in the US-run $64 million Georgia Train and Equip Program (
GTEP) and the subsequent Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (
SSOP). Yet despite the seemingly impressive US effort, even after several years of training and equipping, the Georgian military essentially remains divided between four light infantry brigades, consisting of US-trained group of comparatively well-paid, professional servicemen, and a much larger, poorly-trained conscript force plagued by low morale and inadequate pay.
Moreover, neither US program was ever aimed at enhancing the combat readiness or offensive capabilities of the Georgian armed forces. Designed as a flexible, time-phased training initiative, GTEP was never aimed at providing the Georgian military with offensive capabilities, but merely provided training and equipment for 2,600 Georgian army and Interior Ministry forces using company infantry tactics with the intended goal of acquiring limited counter-terrorism capabilities. Similarly, the goal of the US-run Sustainment and Stability Operations Program was merely to prepare select Georgian units for deployment to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
While the limited value of the US military assistance did not seem to lower Georgian confidence, the second factor of under-estimating the Russian response was rooted in Georgia's mistaken threat perception. Specifically, Georgia's strategic assessment, reflected in its three guiding plans, the National Security Concept, National Threat Assessment and National Military Strategy, each disregarded any direct threat from Russia, stating that there was "little possibility of open military aggression against Georgia", and defining "the probability of direct aggression" against Georgia as "relatively low".
And perhaps most importantly, the actual state of readiness of the Georgian armed forces suggests that although the Georgian offensive may have been more than adequate against local forces in South Ossetia, they faced insurmountable challenges when confronted by a much more combat-capable and over-powering Russian force.
Thus, Georgian deficiencies from not being able to wage or defend against large-scale combat operations involving a major armed force, lacking any combined-arms experience or training, and from having insufficient logistical support and inadequate air defenses, combined to doom Georgia's operational goals in South Ossetia from the very start.
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