This is at the same time sad, but not surprising. The U.S. has the best training and most motivated troops on earth, and there were clearly enough troops to effect victory given the strategic plan. It was the strategic plan that was flawed. We bypassed large urban areas as we have done in every war in our history, leaving many of the Saddam Fedayeen and Sunni fighters behind (along with elements of the Iraqi military). Of couse, we ended up having to fight them as insurgents later. I agree with the comment above.

If we had blanketed the cities with troops, it seems to me that there would not have been much time or steam for an insurgency to develop and establish itself. Force projection was inadequate. This can be forgiven, since the Small Wars Manual itself says that the strategy must be flexible, adding troops until you no longer need to add troops. Stubornly, we (or rather, the brass) have ignored this advice from the SWM.

I find it a little bit difficult to believe that 400,000 troops still would not have been able to effect stability and security. But in order to pull it off, it would have required fast movement, flexibility, quick addition of troops, and forceful ROE.

Finally, we went to war believing in the healing powers of democracy. Only with this presupposition would the brass believe that the numbers we had were adequate. These healing powers are a phantom, and the goal should not now be democracy, but rather, a stable Iraq and an ally in the GWOT.

These goals might be able to be achieved. Democracy is neither realistic nor even useful at the present. Maliki's coalition prevents him from cracking down on al-Sadr, and so the Parliamentry system of government is now not our ally in stabilizing Iraq. Maliki loses his coalition when he cracks down on the Shi'ite militias.