I do not think the article addresses whatsoever war as an abstract idea. Yeah, it pays tribute to Clausewitz, but it never really gets to talking about his ideas; so it's really just a different way in which Clausewitz's ideas may be 'expressed' in a particular circumstance.
Certainly, there are obvious cosmetic changes in the how, but I haven't read much convincing evidence in the why. So I'm not sure if I agree with the idea of "amplifiers" as defined by the MG and Beyerchen because they seem to rework the ways in which wars are defined. I think its a mistaken assumption to define wars in the first place by the perceived dominant factor of influence because that introduces a kind of "heirarchy" of eras in which we can say such and such war was different from this other war when it might not really be the case based on the political conditions of the conflict. It also suggests some kind of progression which also might not exist. I further dislike the idea of supposing some kind of "world war" as if any other (or every other) war which could take place at the same time would somehow have the same shape (how much of the proposals would be relevant in a war with North Korea, or a culturally homogeneous society in general? Even in WW2, the Nazis pursued different strategies in the West and East based on political conditions in the same world war). So, for example, while we can find comparison between "WWIV" and Caesar's conquest of Gaul based on the shrewd manipulation of the enemy's culture and identity politics, there's really no political comparison whatsoever and so it's very much difficult to assert at all that the "psycho-cultural war" actually exists as a type of war rather than a specific strategy suitable for specific conditions (which might not always exist). Was there actually any "evolution" between Caesar's day and now in war itself, or are the (perceived) changes simply reflective of the sophistication of warfighting? I think wars should be defined by their political causes, not the strategies employed in them; to do the latter turns the entire equation upside down. Otherwise, we're left with apparently absurd contradictions as to why the Germans, for example, did not capitulate under years of strategic bombing in WW2 but Zanzibar surrendered to the British in 30 minutes of off-shore bombardment some 40 years earlier. How does that fit into the neatly defined so-called phases, progressions, evolutions, and what-have-you of war?
So, I do agree that the MG's conclusions are excellent and thoughtful, but that's only in the context of the present conditions of war and he provided no reason to think that any other war, now or in the future, will take on that same shape.
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