Reconciliation and COIN in Afghanistan

[Rex Brynen]

The analogy breaks down quickly, and so my question stands.

Not quite so quickly--certainly a significant number of those who are now part of the Sons of Iraq were active in the earlier Sunni insurgency and in attacks against US personnel, and a portion were members of the various Islamic State of Iraq militias that were formal allies of AQI.

Moreover, many members of the current Afghan government, parliament, and local government administration were members of the Taliban or Taliban governmental administration at the time of 9/11.

I'm not suggesting that reconciliation with Mullah Omar is possible. I am suggesting that a significant portion of the neo-Taliban rank-and-file may not be primarily motivated by the grand ideological cause of armed jihad against the West, and can be potentially neutralized with some adroit politics. Indeed, one of the problems with the DDR and especially DIAG programmes in Afghanistan appears to be that this group has been rather poorly targeted.

[Danny]

Well, the alliances in Anbar were ad hoc arrangements involving every rogue element across the planet, including AQ, AAS, former Ba'athists, unemployed teenagers, etc. It wasn't an alliance of belief. My own son killed Somalians, Chechens, "men with slanted eyes," and others.

The alliance between the Taliban and AQ is one of world view. The proof is that AQ found safe haven inside Afghanistan prior to 9/11. The ad hoc arrangement in Anbar was forced and quickly broke down.

I'll tell you what. I expect to see a significant uprising of Taliban fighting and killing AQ and Tehrik-i-Taliban when Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute or Cal Tech announces that pigs have learned to fly. Beyond that, if any significant uprising takes hold and drives AQ out of Afghanistan and Pakistan, I'll spread mayonnaise on my hat and take a picture of me eating it and post it on my web site with a caption that links to this discussion thread.

[Rex Brynen]

I'll tell you what. I expect to see a significant uprising of Taliban fighting and killing AQ and Tehrik-i-Taliban when Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute or Cal Tech announces that pigs have learned to fly. Beyond that, if any significant uprising takes hold and drives AQ out of Afghanistan and Pakistan, I'll spread mayonnaise on my hat and take a picture of me eating it and post it on my web site with a caption that links to this discussion thread.

I hope you had fun with that, but it really doesn't pertain to the issue at hand. What is being suggested is that some of the Taliban's support can be peeled away.

It is hardly unusual to find former Taliban having switched sides—it happens literally every day, albeit often for murky reasons.

But that's COIN. Lots of murk.

[Danny]

A sense of humor, my friend. A sense of humor.

I can't believe that you cited Salaam. It is exactly the wrong example and proves my point.

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/...-abdul-salaam/

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/...-of-musa-qala/

[120mm]

So, is the the answer to kill everyone?

In the end, successful insurgency involves sitting down at a table whose guts you hate and you need to include them in the "solution".

I think that there are very few structural (I get to use a new word, yay!!!) insurgents/revolutionaries, that actually need to be made room temperature.

If Galula and others are correct, we should be able to separate the rebels with a cause from the hard-cases and then kill, isolate or make them irrelevant.

[Entropy]

The coalition in Afghanistan has had some success in getting a few Taliban leaders to defect. IMO, such cooption is better than declaring no compromise which forces one to track them all down and kill them - probably impossible and counterproductive in the end. You need the carrot and the stick for success - and reconciliation and rehabilitation of former enemies is an important part of the carrot.

[Danny]

Of course the solution is not killing everyone. Most Afghans are not fighting. The estimation is that there are 8000 - 20000 fighters in the South and East. We might be able to peel away a small percentage of them, but most of these fighters fight for reasons religious and world view, versus the largely indigenous insurgency in Anbar. When you think of Afghanistan, forget the Anbar awakening. It won't happen.

And even the ones that we peel away won't turn their guns on the hard core Taliban and AQ. Won't happen. Simply won't. I'll eat my hat if it does.

[Jedburgh]

The coalition in Afghanistan has had some success in getting a few Taliban leaders to defect. IMO, such cooption is better than declaring no compromise which forces one to track them all down and kill them - probably impossible and counterproductive in the end. You need the carrot and the stick for success - and reconciliation and rehabilitation of former enemies is an important part of the carrot.

Earlier thread on Pulling Taliban Leaders into Government?.