Rwanda (catch all)

[Tom Odom]

MAJ Powell,

I wouild agree that you contacted me once to say that your wife liked my book. And yes I sent you a brief that I had given on Rwanda. Beyond that I recall no contact and certainly none on the meat of your paper, whether we are talking monograph or Mil Review article. Ambassador Robert Gribbin and Ambassador Dave Rawson both joined SWJ for the Rwandan part of the AR2 project at my invitation to assist. We also had on board the former G2 of UNAMIR 2. They are the "we" I referred to when I said we had not been contacted. I should have said beyond initial contact with me.

My comments above regarding depth of research are about the Mil Review article. As for the monograph, I will read it. But when it comes to publishing in Mil Review, we are talking a wider forum than your monograph and more limited space. That means you cannot make errors regarding the location of Dar es-Salaam, the date of Rwandan independence, or whether France was a colonial power in Rwanda. The same applies to leaps of connnection regarding the identity of President's Habyarimana's killers.

Two other Rwandan hands have looked at the Mil Review article. One was retired Ambassador Gribbin. Ambassador Gribbin was my second ambassador and was on the ground from January 1996 through 1998. COL (ret) Rick Orth has also looked at the Mil Review piece. Rick as a major was the DIA analyst on the war and genocide. He spent 60 days with me in the fall of 1994 and after my 18-month battle with DIA to make it happen, replaced me in Kigali as the Defense Attache in 1996. Rick stayed in Rwandan through 1998. He too has serious issues with the Mil Review article.

Genocide is not driven by frenzy

My issues beyond errors of fact already discussed lay in logic and tenor. For example, using the metaphor of a US city of 780,000 that is wiped out in a frenzy of killing. First of all, the metaphor is incorrect mathematically. Roughly one million of 7 million Rwandans living in the country died in the genocide. Still using a 781,000 figure as .78 million, that loss represented 11 percent of the population. To put that in parallel to a US population of 305 million, 34 million Americans would have to die in that same 100 day span. Loss of a city of 780,000 sounds horrific. How does one describe loss of 34 million? How would you kill 34 million people in 100 days without using a weapon of mass destruction?

One thing is sure: you don't kill 11 percent of a population of 7 million in 100 days using small arms and machetes in a "frenzy". This seems to be the easiest way to put the Rwandan genocide in a box--portray it as a frenzy of genocidal killers--by inference African genocidal killers who are by assumed definition lesser beings capable of the horrors visited on the victims of Rwanda. That portrayal is certainly convenient and it does vividly set the stage for describing Rwanda in 1994. It is also convenient when the suggesting some form of post-genocide amnesty is the only way forward.

The Rwandan genocide was a coldly calculated act of political murder, applied on a massive scale. That is critical when considering the amnesty, reconciliation, and reintegration process. The premeditated nature and cold blooded nature of the gencoide was the central thesis of Linda Melvern's work, Conspiracy to Murder, the Rwandan Genocide.

Understanding history when it is mythology that counts

Like many Westerners and most Rwandans, you got twisted up in Rwandan history, legend, and European manipulation. The country was not born of European colonialism and the calculated policies of Belgium, Germany, and France in the 19th Century. The Rwandese existed long before the Europeans came and that longevity is central to the discussion of their origins. The modern nation-states of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (or Zaire) were colonial creations. First Germany in the 19th Century and later Belgium in the 20th Century distorted extant ethnic lines and mores to ease their conquest and control of the Kinyarwandan-speaking peoples. France was not a colonial power in what became Rwanda. France's role in Rwanda evolved as a part of its post-colonial policies toward francophone Africa, policies still in effect in the 21st Century.

When it comes to understanding Hutus and Tutsis, myth, legend, and facts become interchangeable. You took the position that Hutus and Tutsis are " ethnically and anthropologically the same." In doing you have vaulted into the realm of myth. In the interest of building unity, the RPF has made that myth a central tenet of its accepted dogma, which places the blame for the war and genocide on the Belgians. In contrast, the central tenet of Hutu Powa was and still is that the Tutsis are alien invaders who entered Rwanda in ages past and conquered the area. Somewhere in between those two polar positions, there is a balanced truth that has yet to be agreed upon. Most scholars on the subject remain ambivalent and frankly unsure about the divisions between the Tutsis and the Hutus. To describe it as ancient as Cain and Abel is pure hyperbole. Physical differences do exist between the classic stereotypes; Paul Kagame certainly fits the classic Tutsi model. Yet those divisions are not absolute. For that matter two of my closest contacts in the RPA were the G2 then LTC Karake Karenzi and the G3 Colonel Charles Muheri. Both were short and hardly fit the common "Tutsi" model. The same was true of Colonel Sam Kaka then Chief of Staff of the RPA. Although customary divisions are Tutsis as herders and Hutus as farmers, more scholarly analyses suggest that the real divide was more a served and servant split along feudal lines.

If there is no basis of an ethnic divide, then how did it emerge? You state rightly that the Germans and the Belgians exploited said divide, implying that it existed before they arrived. And later you state that resentment from the societal divide has been a constant threat to Rwandan security. I question to which Rwanda you refer because post-genocide Rwanda under the new government is very different from the former Rwanda under the Revolutionary National Development Movement (MRND), the party of the former regime. Internal unrest between the ascension of the Habyarimana regime in 1973 and the RPF invasion in 1990 was minor. These were referred to as the "good years" when posed against the earlier pogroms of the Kayibanda regime 1962-1973 and the post-RPF invasion Habyarimana regime.

Regardless of period, violence did occur and most of it was anti-Tutsi. It was always government sanctioned if not openly directed. It was not a case of separate ethnic neighborhoods warring against each other. Hutus and Tutsis live intermixed on the same hillsides. Since such violence drew support from the communal structure, a call to local Hutus to massacre their neighbor Tutsis was a well-practiced drill by the early 1990s.

It was also always political in nature; I am not sure why you even mentioned tribe in discussing the issue. The Hutus and Tutsis never lived apart in tribes. They lived and still live interspersed on the same hills. There was a single-party state until the post 1990 liberalization allowed other parties to emerge. In any case, there was no "perception" that nepotism played a role in government and justice; nepotism--especially that practiced by the Clan Madame (the President's hardliner Hutu wife) was an open book.

[Tom Odom]

I will continue my concerns on the Mil Review article:

Understanding the war, Arusha, and the genocide

Although it maybe convenient to essentially call this a squabble between Hutu and Tutsi, the crisis and was anything but simple. It was not a failure" to form a mutually nurturing society'" between Tutsis and Hutus that led to war and then genocide. In many ways the war began in 1960 with the move to independence. From the Hutu hardliner perspective, the aim was simple: dominate and if necessary exterminate the Tutsis and ultimately any Hutu who challenged them. The hardliner reasons for that policy were complex. Certainly there was a solid ethnic core of resentment and hatred of the Tutsis within the hardliner agenda. But the hardliner agenda was as much as against any Hutu challenge to the MRND grasp on power as it was against the Tutsis. With the opening of the political system in the early 1990s in tandem with the RPF invasion, much of the hardliner political violence was against the moderate Hutus. I use the term hardliner because even the most moderate of Hutu political parties had a hardliner element that split into a separate wing of the party. The National Defense Committee (CND) emerged from hardliner elements in the MRND, shepherded by Madame Habyarimana clique. That clique orchestrated much of the pre-genocide anti-moderate violence in a effort to hold onto their privileged status. For them, the war was an all or nothing struggle, a stance given to final solutions such as genocide.

For the RPF, especially with Paul Kagame in command of the army, the war was won when discussions began at Arusha. From then on, the RPF used military force as a means to move those discussions forward. When the former regime began to stall and also sent its gangs to kill Tutsis in government-controlled territory, Kagame unleashed an RPF offensive in early 1993, halting some 15 miles from Kigali and withdrawing as part of an agreement to resume the talks. Only with the resumption of the war in April 1994 and the genocide, did the RPF objective change to military victory, as in miltary domination of Rwanda.

The same absolutists versus incremental dichotomy prevailed in the Arusha talks. The government delegation and its associated Hutu political parties approached the talks like the President; a stall tactic and an opportunity to wear down their enemies internal (other Hutu challengers) and external (the RPF). In contrast, the RPF delegation took the talks seriously and they came prepared. They "won" the negotiations process as handily as Kagame's army won on the battlefield. Where both sides at Arusha failed was in the exclusion of the hardliner CND. The RPF said the CND members had too much blood on their hands and would not accept them. The Hutus at the negotiations were content to allow that exclusion. In retrospect, if there was any opportunity for amnesty as proposed under the AR2 model to work, it was during Arusha and would have required accommodating the CND. Arusha was a form of amnesty--its central flaw was that it exluded those who were most likely to unhinge it, the hardliners of the CND. The opportunity for such an amnsety was therefore slim, and one not fully taken.

The signing of the Arusha accords on August 1993 began an eight-month long interim where by the UN deployed UNAMIR to monitor and assist in the implementation of the agreement and assist in the security of Kigali. UNAMIR hand neither the mandate nor the manpower to "enforce" the Arusha accords. The RPF moved a battalion into Kigali and took up an aggressive defensive posture while waiting developments. The government under Habyarimana stalled and the hardliners probed for triggers to set of a holocaust, preferably one that would prompt the withdrawal of UNAMIR. Of course that came with the shoot down of the President's plane as it returned from Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Although I have always felt that logic and motivation to assassinate the President pointed to the Hutu hardliners, no source allows the absolute surety necessary to say that it was the Presidential Guard. The shoot down triggered the genocide; it did not spark it. The genocide was set for execution and the shoot down set it in motion.

Genocide was an absolute last throw of the dice for the hardliners. Colonel Bagasora was a key player in forming a new government willing to put genocide into play. He was not, however, a solitary actor and he could not have single handedly put a new government in place. The trials of the International Criminal Tribunal at Arusha have proved that beyond doubt. Genocide began slow and spread outward; the government used the communal government system, the militias established by the MRND and CND, and all elements of the security forces to carry out its plans. Where frenzy entered into the equation was when the government frantically tried to get the "work" done before they lost the war militarily. Like the Nazis of WWI who kept the trains and extermination camps running as long as possible, the hardliners kept the genocide going until they finally withdrew into Goma and Bukavu. The French Operation Turquoise to a large degree made it safer for the hardliners to continue killing their victims inside the protected zone. For discussions of the French role, I would recommend Andrew Wallis, Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of France's Role in the Rwandan Genocide as well as the books by Linda Melvern and Stephen Kinzer. See also Gerard Prunier The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide; Prunier was with the French headquarters.

[Tom Odom]

I continue:

Post-genocide but still war

Rwanda's civil war did not as you state end in 1993 with the Arusha ceasefire. More importantly, the same war did not end with the retreat of the hardliner government, military, and militias with much of the Hutu population into Zaire, Tanzania, Burundi, or behind the French lines drawn for Operation Turquoise. Rather the Rwandan civil war morphed into two separate but linked conflicts. The internal war left the RPF dominant on the Rwandan battlefields but politically on the defensive with a staggering array of challenges to face. It is important to note that the RPF unilaterally declared a ceasefire after the former regime forces (ex-FAR) crossed into Goma. The external war moved into the refugee camps outside Rwanda and for the moment inside the internally displaced camps established under French protection. The former government and its forces were utterly defeated inside Rwanda; they began rebuilding for the next fight as soon as I saw them marching through Goma in July 1994. Politically, the desperate act of genocide had welded the Hutus to hardliner cause. They had won the initial phase of the Rwandan civil war politically.

Despite the doubts of a large cast of doubters and naysayers, Paul Kagame recognized that fact in 1994. The RPFs adherence to Arusha was not a smoke screen to legitimize the new government of Rwanda. Kagame and nearly all of my RPF contacts--all inner circle--told me that they had to get the refugees and IDPs back on the hills. They -- the RPF--could not hold Rwanda militarily with a large part of the population in exile. They themselves had been in exile. The RPF put in to effect the provisions for reconciliation and reintegration established under the Arusha accords. In October 1994, I had the opportunity to visit the Gako military reintegration center established to bring in ex-FAR officers, NCOs, and soldiers into the ranks of the Rwandan Patriotic Army. It was a reltively small effort, some 100 "students" in attendance. But there were two remarkable aspects to the effort. First was that it was taking place, in earnest on the heels of a genocide. Second was that the students were split evenly between ex-FAR and RPA; ex-FAR students could and did in some cases fail. So did some RPA students. Parallel to the military reintegration effort, the RPF moved to establish a new government in accordance with the Arusha accords. That government included a Hutu president. Kagame became the Vice President and Defense Minister and remained the only general officer in the RPA for the next 18 months while I was there.

Of course, it was not smooth sailing given the problems facing the new government. Nearly a million dead were scattered across the country side. Survivors were emerging and a million formerly exiled Tutsis returned over the next year. Some 750,000 Rwandan Hutus remained in the IDP camps first established under Operation Turquoise and 1.5 million remained outside the country. Cross border attacks began sporadically as did attacks from the IDP camps.

There were two central issues relevant to a discussion of AR2. Killing a million people in 100 days with small arms and machetes is manpower intensive. If each killer accounted for victims, that meant there were 250,000 murders out there either inside Rwanda or in the refugee camps. The survivors know who those people were. The killers could and did continue to kill survivors and many of the latter sought revenge. Even the RPA which had shown remarkable discipline in the war for far had taken in many survivors into its ranks. Revenge killings were not uncommon.

If ever there was a possibility of killing driven by frenzy in Rwanda, it was the fall of 1994 and the initial part of 1995. The new government under the watchful eye of the RPF moved to reduce tensions through arrests and reduction of the IDP camps. In a country with prison space for about 10,000 and no police, lawyers, or judges, the arrests reduced one problem--continued killings and revenge killings--and created another--horrific overcrowding in the prisons. As for reduction of the IDP camps that began slowly with the assistance of UNAMIR. It culminated in the clearing of the camp at Kibeho, a last holdout for hardliners. There under the eyes of UNAMIR, frenzied killing on the part of the hardliners and then the RPA did take place, killing by my own estimation some 2,000 in one horrific bloodletting. Despite the tragedy, Kibeho ended the IDP camp issue inside Rwanda and it provided key lessons for the issue of clearing the refugee camps the next year.

Meanwhile the hardliners in those refugee camps grew stronger. In November 1995, the RPA cleared Iwawa Island of a forward operating base the extremists had established just inside Rwandan waters on Lake Kivu. When no solution came forward for the main refugee camps, the RPA launched a brilliant envelopment that separated the Hutu extremist forces from the Hutu refugees and the latter picked up in mass and walked home.

Like other problems, this solution created new ones. While most of the extremists were drawn off by the RPA attacks into Zaire, many were in the refugee stream. The new government did not allow the international community to establish intermediate camps; wanting no repeats of the Kibeho tragedy, the refugees were escorted to their homes without screening. That decision saved lives but also allowed an insurgency to transplant itself with the returning refugees. By 1997 western Rwanda was the scene of a vicious insurgency and counterinsurgency with the insurgents receiving continued support from the reassemble extremist forces in eastern Zaire, support countenanced and added to by Mobutu.

In 1997, the RPA working covertly with the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL) launched an attack into Zaire with the central objective of removing Mobutu and his cronies from power. The attack brushed aside extremist Hutu forces and after months of marching through dense tropical jungle took Kinshasa virtually unopposed. When the new government in Kinshasa switched support to the extremists Hutu forces still in the eastern DRC (Zaire), Rwanda launched another covert attack in 1998 that failed and sparked the larger central African War. That war officially ended in 2002 with the Pretoria Agreement; in reality it became its own self-sustaining tragedy despite the deployment of the largest UN peacekeeping force to date. As of 2008 some 4 to 5 million Congolese, Rwandans, and other Africans have died as a result, most from disease and starvation. It continues.

Nonetheless the 1997 invasion and 1998 resumption of the war in the DRC had a stellar effect of removing a sustainment base for the insurgents fighting inside Rwanda. From then on, the insurgents' sole support was the Hutu population now back on Rwanda's hillsides. Two measures taken by the RPA high command effectively ended the insurgency. The first I had witnessed in October 1994; ex-FAR Hutu graduates of the Gako reintegration camp commanding integrated Hutu and Tutsi units of the RPA took the fight to the insurgents. Second and as parallel to the first, the RPA high command gave command of the most troublesome areas to its best commanders. One was the former G2 of the RPA, Colonel Karake Karenzi. With the orders to change tactics and restore discipline to units that had on occasion turned on civilians, Karenzi took command. By years end, the insurgency was on its final legs. Militarily it lost a series of pitched battles. More importantly, it lost the confidence of its soldiers who defected joining large numbers of civilians who had fled to communal camps to avoid being forced to join it. Why? Because they and the defecting soldiers recognized that the Big Promise offered by Hutu Powa to reclaim Rwanda was no more than another Big Lie.

As highlighted in one of my former ambassadors, the honorable Robert Gribbin in his book, In the Aftermath of Genocide: the U.S. role in Rwanda, April 25th, 1998 was a watershed event in Rwandan post-colonial history. On that day, the new government of Rwanda after establishing and using a due process of law, executed 22 men and one woman for their roles in planning and executing the genocide. As Ambassador Gribbin puts it, those executions marked the end of impunity in Rwanda for those who killed and it jump started the criminal processes while setting the stage for gacaca in the next decade. The execution was the only one in post-genocide Rwanda. Arusha and the ICTR could not impose a death sentence for even the worst of the offenders. In 2007, Rwanda formally ended capital punishment.

[Tom Odom]

Wrapping up:

Political reconciliation: cloaking reality in hyperbole and theory
In finishing this essay, I would summarize by offering my own questions to resurface reality cloaked by hyperbole and dogged application of AR2 theory. Before doing so let me just say that while AR2 may have utility as a mental framework its application in causal format is naive if not sophomoric.

Only a “victor’s justice? First in a case of civil war-genocide-and more war like Rwanda, exactly how and when should the new government offer amnesty? Understand also that Arusha was already a failed amnesty, one killed by genocide. When neighbors slaughter neighbors under government orders who is deserved of amnesty and who is not? Understand that in establishing the ICTR in Arusha and arm twisting the new government in Rwanda to accept that decision, the international community removed the most culpable from Rwandan justice altogether.

Like the former Hutu regimes, the RPF killed or exiled its adversaries? A one to one equation that states the current government is no different than the previous regime is morally bankrupt. Has the RPF reacted against its enemies? Yes. Has the RPF stacked one million bodies? No. As one who has personally had to nudge childrens' skulls aside to keep from stepping on them, I would caution that dismissing the GOR's concerns about genocidal ideology as Tutsi political and ideological beliefs is naive at best. Forgive me but I would ask how you came up with the phrase "Tutsi ideology" in the first place?


The failure to grant amnesty has mired the reconciliation process? Nearly one million dead and we somehow expect them to forgive and move on? I heard "they need to move on" repeatedly in 1994-1996 from DC visitors. I always asked would they propose that Jerusalem forgive the Nazis--then in 1994 (95 or 96)? So why would they expect the Rwandans to simply move on as if they were changing a shirt. Frankly I was amazed at the restraint shown and my amazement grew over time. That the RPF went ahead with the Arusha Accords, put a Hutu in as President, and begin active integration of former FAR officers by October 1994 was incredible.

The policies of the current regime neither include nor forgive Hutus. They do not recognize that throughout the civil war both sides committed atrocities against each other? The first statement is flat wrong. There have been and still are Hutus in the government and in the military, Paul Kagame has told me personally and I have written about his acknowledgement that revenge killings have taken place. There is simply no basis of comparison between the genocide of nearly 1 million people and revenge killings afterward. Frankly I see this statement as Human Rights Watch pabulum in response to Kagame's refusal kowtow to their demands. For discussions on that I would recommend Stephen Kinzer.

In contrast to the key judgment offered in the article, I would say that Rwanda is truly remarkable for the progress it has made since the genocide ended. Yes, there many reasons to doubt its future. That unfortunately is true for many countries, especially in Africa. One thing to me is relatively certain: for better or for worse, no one man is more important to Rwanda than Paul Kagame. Mired is simply not a word I would apply to him or his leadership

Regards,
Tom

[jhpowell2]

Thanks for your comments.

I am disappointed that you feel the work was so inadequate, but your feelings coincide with mine when I read books about our current conflict.

It is good to see you have a forum to post your "essay" for others to glean your perspective.

Major Powell

[Tom Odom]

COL Rick Orth (Ret) and I got our shortened letters to the editior in the issue of Mil Review

Amnesty, Reintegration, and Reconciliation in Rwanda,

LTC Thomas P. Odom, USA, Retired, author of Journey into Darkness: Genocide in Rwanda—I certainly support study of the Rwandan civil war and genocide as a case of post-conflict resolution, reintegration, and reconciliation. As the U.S. Defense Attaché in Zaire from 1993-1994, and then Rwanda 1994 to 1996, I lived through the initial stages of that process. But the recent article in Military Review, “Amnesty, Reintegration, and Reconciliation in Rwanda” (AR2) by Major Jeffrey H. Powell (September-October 2008), suffers from errors of fact, superficial research, and poor analysis.

Errors of fact

“The calculated policies of Belgium,
Germany, and France divided Rwanda against itself for easier colonial rule. These policies of 19th century rule had a lasting effect…”
● Germany and Belgium were the colonial powers in Rwanda, not France.
● Belgium did not become a colonial power in Rwanda until the 20th century.

“After independence in 1959…” Rwanda achieved independence in 1962.“In August 1993, when regional and international actors arranged detailed peace negotiations to be enforced by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), a brokered reconciliation effort began.”
● The Arusha Accords were signed in August 1993; the negotiations
began in July 1992.
● “UNAMIR’s mandate was: to assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali; monitor the ceasefire agreement, including establishment of an expanded demilitarized zone and demobilization procedures; monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government’s
mandate leading up to elections;assist with mine-clearance; and assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations.”* UNAMIR did not have an enforcement mandate and was not equipped or manned for such a mission.

“…Rwanda’s President Habyarimana flew to Dar-es-Salaam, Burundi, to meet with other signatories of the accords. On his return flight, Hutu extremists in the Presidential Guard shot down his plane….”
● Dares-Salaam is in Tanzania, not Burundi.
● To date, there has been no definitive resolution as to who shot the plane down.

Depth of research

As a long time Rwanda watcher and author, I would recommend but one book as a must have for such a paper: Human Rights Watch, Leave None to Tell the Story.

Cloaking reality in hyperbole and doubtful analysis

The article is a classic case of making reality fit academic theory by cloaking reality in hyperbole and doubtful analysis. I would summarize by offering my own questions to resurface the reality of Rwanda.

● Genocide as an act of “frenzy”? You don’t kill 11 percent of a population of 7 million in 100 days using small arms and machetes in a “frenzy.” The Rwandan genocide was a coldly calculated act of political murder applied on a massive scale.

● Only a “victor’s justice”? In the case of genocide committed during a civil war, as in Rwanda, exactly how and when should the post-genocide government offer amnesty? The signed Arusha Accords provided defacto and dejure amnesty for the new government that was to be formed under them.

● “Like the former Hutu regimes, the RPF killed or exiled its adversaries?”
A statement that the current government is no different than the previous regime is morally bankrupt. Has the RPF reacted against its enemies? Yes. Has the RPF stacked one million bodies? No.

●“The policies of the current regime neither include nor forgive Hutus. They do not recognize that throughout the civil war both sides committed atrocities against each other”? There have been and still are Hutus in the government and in the military. Paul Kagame told me personally that revenge killingshad taken place. I knew RPA officers who went to prison for such events.

● “The failure to grant amnesty has mired the reconciliation process”? Frankly I was amazed at the restraint shown and my amazement grew over time. I would say that Rwanda is truly remarkable for the progress it has made since the genocide ended. One thing is relatively certain: for better or for worse no one man is more important to Rwanda than Paul Kagame. “Mired” is simply not a word I would apply to him or his leadership.

*Rwanda, UNAMIR Mandate, United Nations.

[Tom Odom]

And Rick Orth's:

Rwanda COL Rick Orth, USA, Retired, (Sub Saharan Africa Foreign Area Officer)—The study of Rwanda has much to offer professional military officers, especially about civil war, genocide, difficulties of peace support operations, insurgency, counter-insurgency, and lastly how a post-conflict country rebuilt itself despite the good intentions of the international community. I have over 14 years working Rwandan issues, either directly or indirectly, first as an intelligence analyst covering Central Africa (1994-1996), then as the Defense Attaché to Rwanda (August 1996-October 1998), culminating as the military advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (August 2006-May 2008). I wrote three articles concerning
Rwanda: “Four Variables in Preventive Diplomacy: Their Application in the Rwanda Case,” Journal of Conflict Studies, Spring 1997; “African Operational Experiences

in Peacekeeping,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Winter 1996; and “Rwanda’s Hutu Extremist Genocidal Insurgency: An Eyewitness Perspective.” Major Jeffery H. Powell’s recent Military Review article, Amnesty, Reintegration, and Reconciliation,”unfortunately distorts the valuable lessons Rwanda has to offer due to factual errors and flawed analysis. Detailed research might have alleviated these problems.

Factual Errors. The Rwandan case is complex and nuanced just as Rwandan society; therefore, any study requires in-depth research, which was apparently not done when writing this article: “a genocidal frenzy” the Rwandan genocide was not. Rather the Rwandan government used genocide as an instrument of counterinsurgency against the Rwandan Patriotic Front/Army. The Habyarimana government trained the militia (INTERAHAMWE) of the MRND party in insurgency and terrorist techniques. It planned on launching an insurgency/terrorist campaign against the Broad Based Government that would come to power as a result of the Arusha Accords signed in August 1993. Additionally, the government sponsored a sophisticated propaganda campaign targeting the peasant population. Furthermore, Rwanda historically is an ordered society respecting authority. The Hutu extremists who planned, then commanded, the genocide used these tools in a methodical manner.

“The Belgians, for instance, designated Tutsis as the administrators and Hutus as the workers under their rule.” The Germans and Belgians initially relied on the ruling elite in Rwanda; they did not designate, but reinforced, the Tutsi already in power. Incidentally, The Rwandan Kingdom existed centuries before the Germans colonized Rwanda in the late 1890s. In fact, the areas of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri (later to become bastions of Hutu extremism) remained Hutu controlled and the Mwami (Rwandan king), only exerted control of these areas with the aid of German colonial troops.

“The genocide law passed in 1996 determined four levels of interahamwe.” The 1996 Genocide Law determined four levels of genocidaire, not INTERAHAMWE. The author failed to mention the 100,000s in Rwanda jails accused of genocide and the huge burden this had on the Rwanda justice system, the government’s use of Gacaca to ease the case back log.

Flawed Analysis. Using a model “amnesty, reintegration, and reconciliation AR2,” and then trying to make the Rwandan case fit, distorted the reality of the Rwandan case presented in this article.

“The RPF also has not acknowledged facts pointing to the illegal actions of some members of the RPA during the conflict and the possible need to grant amnesty to them as well.” This sounds much like the criticism of human rights activists and does not take into account the hundreds of RPA/RDF officers and soldiers sitting in military jails or since released having served their sentences for crimes against the Rwandan people. Then there are those who were executed under the RPA Code of Military of Justice, again criticized by the International Community, for criminal acts against the population. The system is not perfect but it is not one of impunity either.

“And without amnesty, reintegration, and reconciliation, Rwanda will face bleak prospects in the future, which could include another civil war. . . . The policies of the current regime neither include nor forgive Hutus.” Rwanda has had a policy of reintegration. While the policy does not fit the AR2 model and is not perfect, the Rwanda experience has proven successful. Concerning Ingando camps, in early 1998 over 1,700 EX-FAR completed reorientation
training. From this group over 400 were screened and immediately joined the RPA to fight the EX-FAR and INTERHAMWE. These new counterinsurgents knew the physical geographic and social terrain and, thus, defeated the insurgents. More recently, one of the biggest acts of forgiveness was the incorporation of a key EX-FAR Brigadier General into the Rwandan Defense Forces (the Government changed the name of the Rwandan Patriotic Army). If this is not amnesty, then what is?

[Stan]

Thanks for your comments.

I am disappointed that you feel the work was so inadequate, but your feelings coincide with mine when I read books about our current conflict.

It is good to see you have a forum to post your "essay" for others to glean your perspective.

Major Powell

MAJ, Not quite sure where to go with this as I intentionally kept out of it for some time. Having worked in that region for more than a decade, I went away feeling politicians both at home and at post spent little time concerning themselves with real evidence based not only on factual history, but ground zero reporting. In sum, they were content with current politics and spent little time with reality.

I can only help but now wonder what a junior politician would conclude having never visited the dark continent, and thus rely on reading material to fill the intellectual void.

I read your monograph and must echo the comments herein.

[J Wolfsberger]

I didn't comment when this first came up, and didn't follow the thread, since I thought 800,000 murdered Tutsis was necessary and sufficient to account for the mired "reconciliation process."

A couple of points in the interim while I read the original article and Tom's postings:

1. At the time, the Belgian government and Pope John Paul II were asking the international community to intervene and stop the killing.

2. The Clinton administration - my recollection is Bill Clinton during a press conference, but it could have been Albright - said that no action was planned since "we" didn't have any "reliable information" about what was happening.

3. A senior UN official, whose name I can't recall, stated in an interview that the subject of whether to label events in Rwanda a "genocide" was a matter of serious debate. If they decided to use they label, then articles in the UN charter would trigger and the UN would be forced to push for a military response.

The source of this information was NPR at the time - both All Things Considered and The Morning Edition.

I'm pretty confident in the accuracy of my recollection. My outrage hasn't diminished one bit in the years since.

[Tom Odom]

I'm pretty confident in the accuracy of my recollection. My outrage hasn't diminished one bit in the years since.

You are correct. I still get angry when one of them says, "we didn't know" or something similar. We did a panel (Amb David Rawson, me and a panel of 3 reporters who were on the ground) for the genocide and post genocide. Dave rawson handled during genocide and he was clear in stating he felt he gave accurate reports. The reporters said the same. I said that not only was the USG and world remiss during the genocide--that the same floks ignored or downplayed reporting in the post genocide period that the war was not over. That is why we have the Congo mess today.

The same folks would come through the embassy in Kigali and say, "they have to get over it" like a it was a cold or a bout with the flu. One even said he was there to slap Kagame over human rights--in Sep 1994 when bodies were still rotting everywhere--because soldiers from RPA might be doing revenge killings.

Then look at our response to 9-11 and tell me how we suggest that 800K--that number is now actually 1.1 million by GOR census--is something you declare amnesty for or get over.

That is why I was amazed when the RPA started integrating ex_FAR soldiers in October 1994.

Best

Tom

[Tom Odom]

Nearly 15 years but at last this walking, talking piece of excrement was found guilty.

Rwandan Officer Found Guilty of 1994 Genocide
ACCRA, Ghana — A senior Rwandan military officer charged with being one of the masterminds of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda was convicted on Thursday by a United Nations court in Tanzania of genocide and sentenced to life in prison.

Col. Theoneste Bagosora, 67, is the most senior military official to have been convicted in connection with the genocide, in which bands of Hutu massacred 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu. He was a leading Hutu extremist and the cabinet director for Rwanda’s Defense Ministry at the start of the slaughter. He and three other senior army officers had been on trial since 2002 at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which is based in Arusha, Tanzania.

Incredibly the court said there was no conspiracy:

However, the court cleared Colonel Bagosora and the others on trial of conspiring to commit genocide before April 7, 1994. The trial lasted six years, during which 242 witnesses were heard.

Ms Desforge is equally out to lunch yet again.

The exclusion of the conspiracy charge against the men is a blow to Rwandan officials, said Alison Desforges of Human Rights Watch, because it undercuts their argument that the genocide was not a one-time event but the inevitable product of an anti-Tutsi atmosphere dating from the colonial era.

“It brings us back to reality and says this genocide was a discrete historical event related to a specific set of circumstances,” Ms. Desforges said.

So the genocide was a spontaneous expression of hatred that just happened?

Linda Melvern's work disproves that line of thinking. Romeo Dallaire would also (I think disagree).

Good on the conviction. But the court blew it on the conspiracy. This will heighten conflict in the Congo, not reduce it.

Tom

[Stan]

Tom,
Sadly, we saw this coming when former PM Kambanda shocked everyone by pleading guilty (early 98 ?). That relatively short trial kept most like Bagosora out of the lime light with Rwanda desperately trying to put someone behind bars.

“The conviction should send a signal to all people with ongoing responsibility for atrocities in Congo,” he said. “If they are in effective control of armed forces, whether they are state troops, a rebel group or guerrillas, they are potentially criminally liable.”

Jeez, now that's a threat

[Tom Odom]

I will let President Kagame's words speak for him. They make it clear why I and many others hold him in high regard.

Why the U.S. Needs AfricaAfrica and the United States may be on the verge of a new partnership, not one of dependency and aid but one of shared ideas, vision and investments that increase our mutual prosperities. To begin this improved relationship, both must accept urgent and substantial changes in the nature of our bond....

Rwanda has moved from instability to reconciliation and sustainable development largely through our Vision 2020 strategy. The primary principles of this strategy include macroeconomic stability; wealth creation to reduce dependence; and a shift from an agriculture-based economy toward a knowledge-based economy, with a vibrant service sector. We have enacted and consistently enforce a rule of law that counters corruption and supports our ambitious reform agenda. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton acknowledged our progress, and the importance of "policies based on evidence and measurable results," during an Aug. 5 speech in Kenya. Rwanda's ranking as the top global reformer in the World Bank Doing Business 2010 report illustrates what can be achieved with vision and engagement.

[M-A Lagrange]

Tom,

With all due respect, I disagree, this is pure rethoric. Especially coming from Kagame.
The guy did not develop his country by being a good boy but by making war in DRC. We both have visited the same places cope with never ending mess of a collective fault from the west.
Today I have to deal with a former officer from RFP who explained me in detail how it was cool to smuggle diamonds and coltan in 98 and 2002.
Kagame did not and never had development vision. He has needs and military-political vision. That's all. All what he did he could do it because of DRC weakness.
and it's the same problem in bordering countries. None of the guys has a vision. In the best case they have the willingness to become rich.
Saying so, I must admit that Kagame is extremely good politician and he did what we did not in 94.

[J Wolfsberger]

The guy [Kagame] did not develop his country by being a good boy but by making war in DRC.

That's a very large assertion. Could you elaborate, please?

We both have visited the same places cope with never ending mess of a collective fault from the west.

What, exactly, are you trying to say here?

Today I have to deal with a former officer from RFP who explained me in detail how it was cool to smuggle diamonds and coltan in 98 and 2002.

Clearly, a corrupt officer to some greater or lesser degree. Can you demonstrate that he was/is representative of the entire RPF? And further, how this reflects on Kagame's sincerity or effectiveness?

Kagame did not and never had development vision. He has needs and military-political vision. That's all. All what he did he could do it because of DRC weakness...In the best case they have the willingness to become rich.

Again, that's a very large assertion. Could you demonstrate, please, that he has no plans/vision/intentions of developing Rwanda? That he's only using the rhetoric to conceal military adventurism for personal gain?

[M-A Lagrange]

Dear Wolfsberger

To make the answer short, I will recommend you to have a look to the report on illegal exploitation of natural resources in DRC by the UN. What ever you and I may think about that big non functional administration, they issued there one of their most accurate work on economical and human right abuses by all countries from the regions.

On an more recent development/economical point, Rwanda has pass a legislation on environment that is viable for the country only by using DRC natural resources, especially for energy. Charcoal access is one of the very much underestimated causes of war in the Kivu, just as cattles.
On a belgian news paper (sorry, I will look for the link later on please), the financial volume of charcoal smuggling between Rwanda and DRC was estimated to 15 millions US$ a year. And we are talking about fire charcoal for daily use. This illegal trade was in 2008/09 and previously in the hands of corrupted (?) FARDC, RPF, CNDP, FDLR... But reality shows that in the bordering regions of Rwanda, it is the main source of domestic energy for households. May point is that environment policy made by Kagame (or its councelors) was pureposely made with the knowledge that it was non viable for Rwanda without access one way or another the natural resources of DRC.

The same with cattles. The agriculture regulation and environment policy in Rwanda makes pastoralism difficult. But pastoralism is the base of rwandan culture and is an important part of their agriculture (sorry, once again, I do not have access to my data, will try to give figures later). This, as domestic energy was based on the rational of externalisation of pastoralism to DRC.
The financial volumes of illegal taxes collected by CNDP from cattle transumance from rwanda to DRC and back has been evaluated to several million $/years. (An estimated average price of 1$/cattle heads gives incredible figures).

Laurent Nkunda CNDP was not, far from it, defending Tutsi in North Kivu. He was controling the roads of cattle and charcoal between DRC and Rwanda. To please new US administration, Rwanda did arrest Nkunda. But now a new former CNDP pro rwanda guy is settled exactly at the same place than Nkunda. Well, not exactly but few kilometres east long the border as Nkunda was a bite too far inside DRC.
The vision of Kagame is not Rwanda development, it is the expension of Rwanda by illegal occupation of DRC through millitias and supported armed groups (there again, please go to the UN report, for once they did good job).

Rwanda is facing a reallity: it is a too small country with a too big population. The theory and vision of "vital space" of rwandese authorities is close to the fascist one. But saying this, it is necessary to admit that Rwanda is a non viable place as its economy and political system is.

Just a last remark: as most of the people who worked in East DRC and Great Lakes, I have been shocked by the genocide. And face it: we all watched it start and grow without doing anything.
But saying that 98 war was not decided by rwanda and that illegal exploitation of coltan, diamons... by rwandan officers is just not knowing the background of the guys and history. That war started the day J. Kabila send his rwandese councerlors back home. (he wanted to be independant).
Except if Kagame is an angel being abused by even his close family and top ranked officers (once again, all is in UN report), you cannot say he has no responsabilities.

But may be that is the vision? But once again, does rwanda development worse 3.5 million peoples life in addition of the 800 000 once from the genocide?
Or once again, do we look at africa saying it is a dark hole full of savages, "one massacre there is nothing" ?
It is not because they do not have malls or silicon valley that the guys are not articulated politicians and more we consider that it is a savage place, more they will just go for killing in the name of good governance and development.

We should be practical sometime, because they are. The old trick of look what my right hand is doing while you do not see what the left one is doing is not only our monopole.

[Tom Odom]

The guy did not develop his country by being a good boy but by making war in DRC. We both have visited the same places cope with never ending mess of a collective fault from the west.

MA

We will have to disagree on Kagame.

Is Paul hardnosed and calculating? Yes. You would have to be to do what he has done since 1990.

Is he the typical corrupt figure we both know? I don't think so; to the contrary he was brutally direct in dealing with corruption when I knew him and when people I am close to knew him.

Did Rwanda exploit its military successes in the DRC? No doubt. With the West's record in Africa, I find it curious that we would even consider stepping up on that soap box.

The blame for the fiasco in the DRC goes across international boundaries. The overall situation is abhorrent. It was in the making over decades, not just since 1998.

Rwanda however has changed dramatically.

Lastly let me add that I have long said that Paul Kagame ultimately is perhaps Paul Kagame's greatest threat. That to me will be the true test of his leadership: whether he will be able to pass on a stable government and become that most rare of African leaders, a former president.

Regards
Tom

[Michael F]

MA

We will have to disagree on Kagame.

Is Paul hardnosed and calculating? Yes. You would have to be to do what he has done since 1990.

Is he the typical corrupt figure we both know? I don't think so; to the contrary he was brutally direct in dealing with corruption when I knew him and when people I am close to knew him.

Did Rwanda exploit its military successes in the DRC? No doubt. With the West's record in Africa, I find it curious that we would even consider stepping up on that soap box.

The blame for the fiasco in the DRC goes across international boundaries. The overall situation is abhorrent. It was in the making over decades, not just since 1998.

Rwanda however has changed dramatically.

Lastly let me add that I have long said that Paul Kagame ultimately is perhaps Paul Kagame's greatest threat. That to me will be the true test of his leadership: whether he will be able to pass on a stable government and become that most rare of African leaders, a former president.

Regards
Tom

My own impressions are mixed.

Economy: Paul Kagame is surely a hard nosed politician and an excellent salesman (His country depends for 50% on budget aid coming from abroad).

The Rwandan economy due to the genocide and structural problems (demography, lack of land,...) was in ruins when he came to power. Now ???? It still depends a lot on Foreign aid (still around 50%) but macro figures have been stabilized and GDP growth exceeds the population growth. Is he interested in development ? SURE. He needs it to keep control of the country (like most presidents).

Corruption: Kagame's allergy to corruption is well known, but does it really cover the whole span ? UN reports have shown in the past that people close to Kagame have made a lot of money in DRC. Did Kagame benefit of this money ? Possibly but not sure. Did he benefit from their support to his DRC policy because it brought them so money ? Sure. In conclusion, high level corruption during the wars in DRC and until very recently was tolerated as it reinforced Kagame's control over these guys and ensured they will support his policy. One bad point.

BTW: Sorry Tom but your historic argument about "With the West's record in Africa" is a bit empty. It just would justify anything (from "let's kill Christians because they killed Muslims during the crusades" to "you Germans have nothing to say because of AH") and would certainly be direguarded by Kagame himself as an excuse to repeat the errors of the past.

The DRC fiasco has multiple sources, but surely the Rwandan intervention of 1998 did not help DRC (and did help some in Rwanda). Let's be realistic now, since then Kagame understood he had more to gain by transforming Rwanda into an African Singapore with a veneer of democracy than by continuing to play the interventionist policy (entering DRC to hunt down the FDLR and staying). Why ? First, he needs the international community (aid donors) to like him (50% of the budget, international recognition,...). With RDF in DRC, everyday this image was tarnished. Second, internally, the risks was great to so some men of power use DRC as a training ground for their future ambitions inside Rwanda (making money, prestige,...that one day could lead to them challenging Kagame). Third, to control the population he needs to give them jobs, health,... DRC only enriched a few and did not benefit the average Rwandan "Joe", but further fuelled the impression of a regime orientated towards the defense of its own interests and those of the Tutsi community.

In conclusion, Kagame is not a clear cut mix between a successfull entrepreneur - Elliot Ness and Ghandi. No way. He is a very realistic politician who needs a good international reputation, development and support from inside his regime to stay in power. Hey...he is no superhero, nor a villain.

[M-A Lagrange]

Tom,

We do actually agree on many things. You and I recognise that he is a brutal leader and that is fine for me. The reasons behind it can be argued in many ways and for ever. We probably will disagree, fine. Lets not be kids.

Paul Kagame had a vision of what he wanted Rwanda to be. Alright, that is true. But are you saying that what is needed is an enlighten dictator to bring a country at take off point? (if such rostrow old fashion view is still realistic). This solution was the one in West Africa for nearly half a century. The result is Ivory Coast.

Well, I have to admit that South Sudan failure to be is also due to the too early death of John Garang. (See the situation and black hole we are in my thread on Sudan)

The question of the vision of Rwanda development you are addressing is important as what is happening in the Kivu actually seems to be an endless repetition of a vision that comes to its limits.

I fully agree that Rwanda did change (but at what cost!). But now it is time to change the vision and the strategy. Relying on DRC weakness and building up ethnical conflicts time is over, or should be over.

I believe that Kabila and Kagame did the first move, one by arresting Nkunda, the other by putting efforts to arrest genocide criminals. It is time now to have partnership, agreements, negotiations based on other tricks than a militia colonel on a hill. Rwanda and DRC cannot live one without the other.

My point on the environmental policy of Rwanda is at the heart of the problem, just as the question of population. Rwanda is a well regarded by the World Bank and is trying hard to stay a good pupil. This is normal; they do not have much to offer to China. So it is difficult for them to attract the new, biggest donor in Africa.

Unlike Angola or DRC, Rwanda has very little to offer. So they play on their capacity to provide insecurity. This option is also the starting point of the economic boom. The question is now to not let down Rwanda and support it to turn its economy into a stable machine that cannot use the violenct 'Plan B' to reproduce itself. Apart from being a hub for regional transaction and/or transformation what do they have to offer?

Like other places, the USA cannot back up Rwanda economic stability for ever. And all the point of “neo-conservative-colonialism”, even for military purposes, is to have it in the other way.

As insane it might be, achieving DRC stability passes through Rwandan stability and the reverse. By placing Rwandese counsellors in Kinshasa might be just be the looks good really bad idea. Unlike DRC, Rwanda has limited natural resources but strong governance. Exporting governance is much more difficult than legally exporting Congolese resources to be transformed in Rwanda and then to counter Chinese easy money attractiveness.

Not being a fan of the French President, his plan for Kivu, which is a close copy of the US one, is not that bad. But still, we end up in the problem of the Kivu and Rwanda political space.

[Tom Odom]

BTW: Sorry Tom but your historic argument about "With the West's record in Africa" is a bit empty. It just would justify anything (from "let's kill Christians because they killed Muslims during the crusades" to "you Germans have nothing to say because of AH") and would certainly be direguarded by Kagame himself as an excuse to repeat the errors of the past.

Michael,

Hardly. The Crusades were a matter of centuries ago. Western exploitation of the Congo is still on going. When you see missionary NGOs involved in gold and diamond smuggling in the middle of the 1994 refugee crisis, that is not a matter of centuries.

As what Kagame thinks and does, I have talked to the man, many times He has little time for those who want to apply different standards to what Rwanda does versus what the US, France, Belgium, or any other country does on the continent.

Again you can believe what you want to. Development measures abound and not all for Rwanda are good. But across the board, they are far better than they were in 1994. I said that I respect the man and that he has shown a vision for the future that goes beyond his personal fortune.

MA

Yes we can agree on much. In particular a vision that incorporates security in the Kivus as well as development.

But neo-conservative-colonialism is just another label that adds nothing to the discussion.

Regards
Tom