Its also not just the resources to keep the "horse" boarded that make it a winner, you have to take it out and exercise it. This has been a short fall in many an Army. They might have bought good equipment, but their ability at the individual and crew level to employ it has been limited, their ability at the collective level to maneuver, C2 and synchronize other war fighting functions has also been limited. The more you exercise, the more you have to be able to do the requisite upkeep - on that level it makes no difference what platform we're talking about.
A less well equipped, but better trained and led Army stands a good chance of handing their opposite number their lunch. This is why the FSF institution must consider the range of DOTMLPF implications against their security strategy requirements far enough out in front to make a difference (this is a challenge no matter who you are, but the more policy requirements you have the tougher it is I think)
Such DOTMLPF question include (but are far from limited to):
-What is to be the doctrine which will support your security goals?
-What types of organizations best support that doctrine?
-What types of training must be done to execute the doctrine and build proficiency in the organizations?
-What types of materiel purchases best equip the those organizations to execute the doctrine? What are the requirements encumbered by making a given hardware decision? Are my various pieces interoperable? Are they sustainable for my budget? Do they meet both my current and future needs? What are the pros and cons? etc.
-What types of leaders will I need and what types of experience, development and education will be required to make them competent at all levels?
- What will be my recruiting and retention requirements to fill those organizations? How much am I willing to spend on people and their families? Do I go with a conscript or a all volunteer professional force? Which can I maintain better and which ties in better with other domestic and FP goals?
-What types of facilities from ammunition and hardware production plants ot training ranges, to service colleges, to housing infrastructure, etc.
These are all examples of questions that Iraq's Civ/Mil discussion is going to have to come to grips with. I know we have senior ministerial level advisors assisting them with meeting their goals, as well as tactical level advisors assisting them with giving some bottom up refinement. However, ultimately its a question every state must answer on its own.
A couple of other noteworthy things:
I've crawled around in a T-72 and some other former Soviet equipment. I've also spent a fair ammount of time in most of our own platforms. I've planned against the former, and for the latter. I can tell you that all other things being equal - such as training and leadership, I'll take our stuff hands down. I'll also take our LOG system hands down.
Most of the Iraqis I know have become very impressed with our stuff, our training, our officerss and even our NCO. They've seen what it can do, have rode in allot of it, have fought from some of it, have U.S. advisors who are more familiar with our equipment then much of the Russian stuff - anyone who has had to deal with the Kraz 7.5t will know where I'm coming from on that one. They have seen our trust in our equipment, and have developed some trust in it by extension. One of the biggest changes in our IA BN came when we traded in Toyotas and some of the other stuff for up armored HMMWVs - it increased LOG, but it also increased their capability.
Iraq I believe also wants to buy F-16s. This is a good multi- role platform, used by a number of our allies. Form an ally's perspective - while its nice to know your allies have your back, policies may change, and it may be more acceptable for your ally to continue to sell you stuff vs. act militarily on your behalf. Not all of your allies' friends are going to be yours. And your allies are not always going to have the same feeling of immediacy or resolution to your policy goals and fears - better to have the capability and capacity to stand on your own till you can bring them around. Also, democracies are sometimes fickle and change leaders - having other strong reasons and lobbyist that tie their interests to yours makes sense. Notice others in the ME who buy from a variety of suppliers - their hardware may not match up, but they have financial ties, and thus interests to their suppliers.
RA's comment on the Iranians is worth considering as is anytime we sell to an ally who is not of the closest sort.
Reed's comment about presence is also important - it shows commitment, even if the guy is not wearing a uniform.
Charlie's comment on support to an ally upon who we have invested so much, and who may have a great deal of potential I believe is also spot on.
Once again, few clean, no risk options.
Best, Rob
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