Debate over The Generations of War.

[Cavguy]

I'd like to add a few comments to those of Col. Walters.


There's a difference between using correct historical methodology - something I was trained to do - where you seek to explain causation of events and engaging in strategic sudies or some other social science. In history, you do not begin with a conclusion and use that as a prism with which to interpret events or attempt to justify it by gathering evidence that suits the model. Or rather you are not supposed to do that.

Strategic theories, like 4GW or IR theories in Poli Sci or economic models are useful only to the extent that they are explanatory and almost always that means that successful theories will fit a few scenarios very well, fit many adequately or partially and others not at all. Expressing the theory in quantitative terms instead of qualitative terms does not change that limitation, it just tells you with greater specifity how well your theory is matching or missing reality.

Is 4GW a useful theory? The best test of that would be how predictive it proves to be in "the real world".

The Small Wars Council could run an informal test pretty easily. At the next outbreak of serious conflict - the next Georgia or Somalia or whatever scenario we find agreeable we could have CavGuy, Wilf Owen, WM or whomever offer their analytical predictions of the outcome based upon whatever yardstick they think serves best and then a 4GW "Red Team" offering their set of predictions - say myself, Ski, Selil, Eric Walters. Then we can see where the chips fall and evaluate accordingly. Dave Dilegge can be our referee.

Any interest gentlemen ?

Zen, I don't see how it's a "challenge", because you can't use 4GW to predict anything, only describe and environment. I'm confused. How is 4GW or whatever construct I use "predictive"? It's a descriptor of a condition, not a theory.

That theory, at its root, exists to support the notion that "maneuver warfare" (3GW) is automatically superior to "attritional warfare" (2GW) in most every situation. Note I used quotes. And 4GW exists to make people think this is something "new" rather than old. In other words - the whole construct simply exists to reinforce a dogmatic notion that (as the creators define it) 2GW<3GW<4GW. Which means you have to accept that there even is a "attrition" school and a "maneuver" school - which is also a fraud. This is as dogmatic as the "2GW" construct the authors were trying to get the USMC out of. Having had some success in the USMC, their followers are now applying it beyond where it should be, IMO.

My beef with 4GW is that I don't think it's in all forms superior to 3GW and 2GW, and I don't necessarily think in all cases 3GW is "superior". I feel even bankrupt making these arguments because I don't agree with the premise of the construct in the first place.

I've seen Eric argue in every thread that it was a strawman to shake off complacency. Well that strawman is still around, and wreaking some bad history and knowledge among the less-thinking. What bothers me, at its core the GW construct exists only to advance the theories and ego of its authors, which they view as "necessary" even while acknowledging its bankruptcy. What happens when their bankrupt construct is carried too far? That is my concern.

Why the need to break down warfare in such a way against time?

[Bill Moore]

Is 4GW a useful theory? The best test of that would be how predictive it proves to be in "the real world".

I must admit this post seems a little out in left field. As Cavguy stated, 4GW is not a theory, so how would you use it in a predictive manner?

I can see using it in some measure to describe the irregulars overall strategy, or if they don't have one, you can still capture the impact of their actions and the challenges their methods pose to States, but predict, in as predict the outcome?

There are a few models that attempt to be predictive, such as the SWORD model, which according to its advocates has been accurate in the vast majority cases.

Let us how you plan to use it in a predictive manner, and you may get a few of us to join in on this one, although openly publishing suspected pro's and con's of two belligerent's strategies while they're fighting could very well shape the outcome if they browse this site. To keep it objective it would have to be done via e-mails to the referee.

[William F. Owen]

My reading of Lind would be that, among other points, he's making an argument regarding the political and moral effect of using military force in the context of the late nation-state period. I'm not sure if Lind being Lind is engaging in a pure critical thinking exercise.

Bill Lind makes so many points it's hard to keep track, but I submit that he is always trying to alter peoples ideas and opinions.

I think he's wrong regarding the absolutist nature of the position he takes ( "everywhere the state is in decline") but he's making a substantive argument, not offering up hypotheticals or red herrings.

Concur. We now have more nation states, not fewer, and the vast majority of conflict is concerned about who lives where and with what systems of government.

Secondly, what evidence is there that there is much of a culture of empiricism operating on the "other side" of the non-theoretical, operational, pragmatists?

There is no evidence of what you suggest. My position is, that this is the area that holds the most promise for progressing military thought - and the one that most (not all) the "new concepts of war" folks seem to ignore.

We all watched an American military and political leadership proceed for years with an occupation in Iraq that was clearly not working until a political crisis at home forced a change of strategy. Absent 2006 election results, would anything have changed ?

The American ppl may have been empiricists but their leaders sure weren't.

Above my pay grade. I don't get or even pretend to understand US Foreign Policy. - what is more, none of my business so I can't comment.

[William F. Owen]

The Small Wars Council could run an informal test pretty easily. At the next outbreak of serious conflict - the next Georgia or Somalia or whatever scenario we find agreeable we could have CavGuy, Wilf Owen, WM or whomever offer their analytical predictions of the outcome based upon whatever yardstick they think serves best and then a 4GW "Red Team" offering their set of predictions - say myself, Ski, Selil, Eric Walters. Then we can see where the chips fall and evaluate accordingly. Dave Dilegge can be our referee.

Any interest gentlemen ?

Very happy to participate, except I agree with a lot of the 4GW positions, and CAVGUY has got it right, with his reservations about the idea. My "beef" with 4GW is the overall concept, not the detail of its parts. I have the same beef with MW.

4GW is a bag of ideas, some of which are useful, but that to assume relationships between them, is not. WM's list is instructive

One of my "Rules" for modern operations is DO NOT KILL CIVILIANS. If you simply aim for that, then a lot/some of the 4GW constructs evaporate as a concern. Why doesn't 4GW just say that?

BUT - if you are fighting for your national survival, who cares how many of the other guys civilians die and your people are always more important that the enemies people.

[max161]

These quotes in my opinion illustrate the problem with Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. They are philosophical comments, sometimes so obvious in their truth that they are of little value. These quotes in my opinion illustrate the problem with Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. They are philosophical comments, sometimes so obvious in their truth that they are of little value.

The issue of strategy is more than philosophy (which I think we confuse with principles in the case of Sun Tzu), it is the art of providing direction to accomplish objectives. All the Clausewitz and Sun Tzu quotes in the world won't help Officers conceive a strategy for defeating Al Qaeda and other irregular threats.

The so called theories of asymmetrical warafare, 4GW, etc., are an attempt to fill an identified gap in our doctrinal knowledge. They fall way short, but the fact remains there is a gap, and all the answers to today's problems are NOT in the classic texts. .

Actually Bill, I think you have described the problem perfectly. All most people do is look at the quotes and do not study the theory. As we talk about 4GW and asymmetric warfare and all the other buzzwords we are using today to try to describe the nature of warfare, we can find explanations for all of it in Sun Tzu and Clausewitz. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz take study, not just regurgitating famous quotes and misapplying like, for example, the paradoxical trinity. Clausewitz did not only say the trinity was the people, the military, and the government like we so often hear (or as Summers said in his book On Strategy).

What Clausewitz really said was that:

"...war is a paradoxical trinity - composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are regarded as blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.

The first of these three aspects concerns mainly the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope of which he play of tcourage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of government alone."

I think that explanation of war cuts across the spectrum from insurgency to Major combat operations and is still relevant today.

But Bill, you are correct. Only looking at select quotes from the great masters does not bring understanding of war either historically or in today's world. It takes thorough study and that is what Clausewitz was trying to foster among his students and readers.

And lastly, Bill, as I argued in my paper, the answers are NOT found in the classic texts. They are found by studying them. Everyone wants to loko to a book to find the silver bullet or the holy grail. But there are no answers that can be pulled of books -0 not in FM 3-24, not in the Maneuver Warfare Handbook, not in the Sling and the Stone, not in the Pentagon's New Map and not in On War or the Art of War. You have to read and study and figure out the answers for the situation in which you find yourself. The answers are inside us but the study of the classics and an understanding of the nature of war (from insurgency to major combat operations) is what it takes to develop strategy and practice operational art.

[Ski]

I'm up for a wargaming scenario with a 4GW lens. Will be enjoyable, especially if Herr Oberst Walters and Zen are on my side...

[Ski]

There is a trend here with Lind's work within the field of military theory.

The guy is brilliant, but he comes up with poor naming conventions for his theories. It happened with MW and now 4GW. I understand why he named them this, but only after hours of sitting down with him and eating copius amounts of food. That's the rub.

I disagree with Cavguy to an extent - I think 4GW can be used as a framework for prediction, and it starts with recogizing that the nation-state is failing. Just because there are more nations in the world doesn't mean anything if they are weak, illigitimate and broken.

I spoke to a Naval Academy history class in 06 about 4GW and Afghanistan as I had just returned from that Mecca of Central Asia culture. When doing some research for my brief, I found the Foreign Policy "Failed State" index. I then started scanning it, and looked at the countries we had troop committments to, and it reinforced my beliefs on 4GW.

Now I'm at CGSC, and we get to read theorists like Kaplan and Huntington, who describe a world very similar to what Lind and Co. wrote in 1989, 1994 and for the last 7 years. They have acceptable frameworks - even though Lind is quoted by Huntington, and Van Creveld (who wrote The Transformation of War in 91) is quoted throughout Kaplan's work.

To me, there is great overlap with 4GW. The 1989 article is the base for an intellectual discussion drawing in people such as Col Hammes (4/5GW), Frank Hoffman (Hybrid War), Kalev Sepp (Mosiac War), Echeverra (4GW doesn't exist), Barnett (Agrees with Lind but hates him because of hit piece Lind wrote), and many others trying to describe a condition/framework of warfare that is beyond simple counterinsurgency.

And on we go.

[wm]

Is 4GW a useful theory? The best test of that would be how predictive it proves to be in "the real world".

The Small Wars Council could run an informal test pretty easily. At the next outbreak of serious conflict - the next Georgia or Somalia or whatever scenario we find agreeable we could have CavGuy, Wilf Owen, WM or whomever offer their analytical predictions of the outcome based upon whatever yardstick they think serves best and then a 4GW "Red Team" offering their set of predictions - say myself, Ski, Selil, Eric Walters. Then we can see where the chips fall and evaluate accordingly. Dave Dilegge can be our referee.

Any interest gentlemen ?

I'd be more than happy to play but I suspect that the predictive power of 4GW theory (if it has any, which I doubt for the same kinds of reasons given by CavGuy and Bill Moore) is not where Zenpundit proposes the contest. I submit that it may lie in assessing where and how the next outbreak of violence will occur, not in deciding how it will end up.
Do the 4GW advocates want to take on this challenge instead?

BTW, I note that Zen proposed a one against many effort--the "traditionalists" nominate a prognosticator "champion" to be subjected to a riposte from a 4GW "Red Team"--certainly sounds like a traditional (dare I say attrition-based warfare) approach--use mass to ensure you trounce your opponent.

[slapout9]

SBW Slapout Based Warfare has 3 principles.
1-use people as soldiers that don't look like soldiers.
2-use things as weapons that don't look like weapons.
3-use places as battlefields that don't look like battlefileds.
Try that out on 4GW and so who can predict who

[William F. Owen]

There is a trend here with Lind's work within the field of military theory.

The guy is brilliant, but he comes up with poor naming conventions for his theories. It happened with MW and now 4GW. I understand why he named them this, but only after hours of sitting down with him and eating copius amounts of food. That's the rub.

Yep! It's a trend, and not a useful one. I'm very much less interested in the names, than I am the confusion they generate. He could have chosen to call them "X1A" and "Camel Theory." Names don't matter unless they have meaning!

MW and 4GW take a collection of ideas and observations and throw them into the same bucket. These do not generate something greater than the sum of the parts - thus peoples confusion and dissatisfaction - and a lot of the assertions that form the core of the ideas and not as valid as some believe.

For 4GW, I always as which observations are true, and which are not? Do the answers usefully progress my understanding?

[wm]

[C]all them "X1A" and "Camel Theory." Names don't matter unless they have meaning!

MW and 4GW take a collection of ideas and observations and throw them into the same bucket. These do not generate something greater than the sum of the parts - thus peoples confusion and dissatisfaction - and a lot of the assertions that form the core of the ideas and not as valid as some believe.

For 4GW, I always as which observations are true, and which are not? Do the answers usefully progress my understanding?

Names do matter as long as the meaning they take is held constant or agreed upon by those using the names (I think Wilf has argued for this in other threads). And the failure to do this is part of my beef with 4GW guys. Depending on who does the writing, differnt pieces of chum are taken from the bucket that Wilf describes above and are then presented as 4GW.

Before someone flames, please note that I use the word "chum" based on Eric Walters' claim that the whole 4GW/MW construct was a way of baiting Marine to break out of their "business as usual" lethargy and think about how they plan and fight battles/war.

[Ken White]

...Before someone flames, please note that I use the word "chum" based on Eric Walters' claim that the whole 4GW/MW construct was a way of baiting Marine to break out of their "business as usual" lethargy and think about how they plan and fight battles/war.

would comment on how successful -- or not -- that effort to change planning and fighting has been?

[ericmwalters]

Question from Ken is how successful the 4GW concept has been in changing planning and fighting. Very good question and cuts to the heart of a problem the concept so far is dodging.

If you buy into the idea of the state losing its monopoly on organized violence (a return to conditions that existed prior to 1648, according to 4GW wisdom)--regardless of whether you term this phenomenon 4GW or not--what does this mean for standing professional militaries maintained by the nation state? 4GW does a great job at stating emerging social conditions and reasons behind this trend, as well as effects on organized violence which confounds traditional nation-state reponses. But this begs the question of how relevant nation-state standing professional militaries are in coping with 4GW opponents. Even FMFM 1A in its current draft provides little way forward beyond some of the usual COIN imperatives.

So what we've got is a label and an explanation that serves as a warning to those who would seek to apply nation-state military force with the expectation that this is the key to victory. Do the Marines "get" this? Yes. Did we get it before 4GW? Possibly I could make that argument, but the benefits of 4GW are really the terminology/labels/shorthand.

Has it changed planning and warfighting? Jury is out on that. We see the problem now. We just don't know what to do about it, how we fit in, how we are relevant. We're all over the map on that.

As an interesting case study, just look at Marine operations and tactics in Al Anbar. Prior to the so-called "Awakening" in 2006, Al Anbar was the Wild West and we were fighting a patchwork of insurgencies, bandits, violent opportunists, terrorists (and Al Quaida was only one of several), etc. A lot of these folks could have (and were) understood as 4GW-style opponents. We labeled them, but we didn't know how to solve the problem ourselves. Fortunately, Al Quaida overstepped itself and some of the Sheiks realized they had better get their act together before the province disintegrated further. Interestingly, the tribal approach would seem to contradict/counteract the extension of Baghdad's centralized authority. The U.S. military in Al Anbar made local accommodations to get the tactical security situation under control. These were deals made in the political, informational, and economic front just as much (and often more) than in the military realm. Was this a good thing? Well, the Marines point to the lowering of violence in the past couple of years. But one does have an Arsenio Hall moment when some of the Anbaris ask, "When the war with Baghdad comes, whose side will you be on?" Hmmmmm.....

The above illustrates primarily a 4GW problem--and I'm not talking about the Hammes definition, but the Lind/Schmitt/Wilson/Nightengale one. This is a problem I don't think we've got a real answer for. One that my friends in the State Department would say we can't possibly be expected to have an answer for. Ouch. Marines like General Tony Zinni well understand it and articulate it.

Bottom line: 4GW "theory" in the USMC provides a usable diagnosis...but unlike 3GW/MW, there is no prescription!

[slapout9]

If you buy into the idea of the state losing its monopoly on organized violence (a return to conditions that existed prior to 1648, according to 4GW wisdom)--regardless of whether you term this phenomenon 4GW or not--what does this mean for standing professional militaries maintained by the nation state? 4GW does a great job at stating emerging social conditions and reasons behind this trend, as well as effects on organized violence which confounds traditional nation-state reponses. But this begs the question of how relevant nation-state standing professional militaries are in coping with 4GW opponents. Even FMFM 1A in its current draft provides little way forward beyond some of the usual COIN imperatives.

Eric, that is the problem and the solution. military forces look military, they have got to change that or they just end up being easily identified targets. Just like LE the most successfull operations are always undercover and or plane clothes type operations. Marines need to take off their uniforms and grow some hair then penetrate the enemy

[wm]

Eric, that is the problem and the solution. military forces look military, they have got to change that or they just end up being easily identified targets. Just like LE the most successfull operations are always undercover and or plane clothes type operations. Marines need to take off their uniforms and grow some hair then penetrate the enemy

Slap,
If this the answer, then I think we end up with things that look more like the Earps vs. the Clantons at the OK Corral in Tombstone in 1881 or the Ranchers vs. Store Owners in the 1878 Lincoln County War.

Eric's point that Anbar was like the Wild West is, I think, worth exploring more fully. It supports your LE view and seems more useful than applying the 4GW model IMO. Viewing our involvement as more like that of the French in Mexico in the 1860s might be fruitful. I just hope we have gotten past the possibility of an event like Capt Danjou at Camerone. I suspect that we have in Iraq. I'm not so sure about Afghanistan.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Max161,

And lastly, Bill, as I argued in my paper, the answers are NOT found in the classic texts. They are found by studying them. Everyone wants to look to a book to find the silver bullet or the holy grail. But there are no answers that can be pulled of books -0 not in FM 3-24, not in the Maneuver Warfare Handbook, not in the Sling and the Stone, not in the Pentagon's New Map and not in On War or the Art of War. You have to read and study and figure out the answers for the situation in which you find yourself. The answers are inside us but the study of the classics and an understanding of the nature of war (from insurgency to major combat operations) is what it takes to develop strategy and practice operational art.

Very well put and I'm in 95% agreement, 100% agreement if you are also implying that the nature of war (and perhaps more accurately conflict or armed competition in some cases) has evolved based on a number of variables ranging from globalism, international laws, technology, individual/small group empowerment with information/weapons of mass effect, etc. Many of the concepts addressed by various 4GW idealists have merit, but their writings should be vigorously debated to determine what is germaine to the so-what of it all. The so-what is what we we need to change doctrinally, force structure wise, over all government approach, ROE, etc. If it 4GW doesn't drive some change in our approach to fighting (or fighting without fighting), then its authors have failed. That doesn't mean they're entirely wrong, just that their writings were unconvincing. Eric and Ken did a good job of addressing this below. As for Slapout's approach, I have a closet full of man jami's.

[ericmwalters]

Hey Slap--I'm also won over by your SBW model. A lot. You also wrote:

Eric, that is the problem and the solution. military forces look military, they have got to change that or they just end up being easily identified targets. Just like LE the most successfull operations are always undercover and or plane clothes type operations. Marines need to take off their uniforms and grow some hair then penetrate the enemy.

As an aside, it's worthwhile to relate a quick tale about how a couple Marine sergeants were able to execute a tactical strike that has disproportionately successful operational and strategic level success--this from MCDP 1-2, Campaigning:

For example, consider the killing of Haitian guerilla leader Charlemagne Peralte by two Marine non-commissioned officers in 1919. During this period, U.S. Marines were involved in the occupation of Haiti. Peralte had raised a rebel force of as many as 5,000 in the northern part of the country. From February through October, Marine forces pursued the rebels, known as a ‘cacos,’ fighting 131 engagements but were unable to suppress the rebel activity. So, disguised as cacos, Sgt Herman Hanneken and Cpl. William Button infiltrated Peralte’s camp, where Hanneken shot and killed the caco leader. The rebellion in the north subsided. In this case, a special operation consisting of two Marines accomplished what 7 months of combat could not.

Hanneken retired from the Marine Corps as a Brigadier General.

Sure, that worked then. We proved ourselves relevant in such situations. But given today's threats in today's contexts, this is much more difficult to pull off. Even had we killed Aideed in Somalia back in UNOSOM II days, would that have solved the problems with his Habr Gidr clan? No, it would have been even far worse than it was, "Blackhawk Down" notwithstanding, as a blood debt would have been incurred that surviving clan males would have been obligated to settle.

[slapout9]

Eric, that is true, single leader types ending revolutions are rare. But relative to MW my point is a unifrom creates a surface that can be seen. An insurgent creates a gap by looking like everyone else so he has unrestricted maneuver among the population.

Bill Moore, dosen't surprise me at all about your and your man jamis

Eric, read Killing Pablo also by Mark Bowden to overcome the Somila problem.

Of course SBW beats em all. I have to put some more non understandable stuff in it for it to be considered a Grand Theory, it's to simple right now all the way up to half a page

Sgt. Herman Hanneken of course he was great he was a Sergeant first.

[shloky]

Names do matter as long as the meaning they take is held constant or agreed upon by those using the names (I think Wilf has argued for this in other threads). And the failure to do this is part of my beef with 4GW guys.

Nah.

Depending on who does the writing, differnt pieces of chum are taken from the bucket that Wilf describes above and are then presented as 4GW.

Nature of the 4GW beast. You want as many concurrent loops as possible, generating as much insight as possible.

Were we to all line up under a 4GW banner (which, arguably, we do, once a year) it would be a very varied group of people that simply share some common intellectual grounding:

To me, there is great overlap with 4GW. The 1989 article is the base for an intellectual discussion drawing in people such as Col Hammes (4/5GW), Frank Hoffman (Hybrid War), Kalev Sepp (Mosiac War), Echeverra (4GW doesn't exist), Barnett (Agrees with Lind but hates him because of hit piece Lind wrote), and many others trying to describe a condition/framework of warfare that is beyond simple counterinsurgency.

And on we go.

That's right, and its OK. Which is why:

Many of the concepts addressed by various 4GW idealists have merit, but their writings should be vigorously debated to determine what is germaine to the so-what of it all. The so-what is what we we need to change doctrinally, force structure wise, over all government approach, ROE, etc. If it 4GW doesn't drive some change in our approach to fighting (or fighting without fighting), then its authors have failed. That doesn't mean they're entirely wrong, just that their writings were unconvincing. Eric and Ken did a good job of addressing this below.

[ericmwalters]

My particular take on 4GW is that it is social--and as such is more of the so-called "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) than most of the "Military Technical Revolution" (MTR) stuff -- to use a Soviet phrase -- I typically have seen in the old "Transformation" days.

To quote Trotsky, the essence is 4GW for America is this: "You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you." The best illustration is Flight 93 on 9/11. Classes of society who were kept away from war, not intended to fight war, nevertheless were "liberated" by the circumstances into organized violence--in this instance, against the terrorists who seized the plan. The struggle for the jet--both in the seizure of it by the terrorists and the retaking of it by the passengers--show all the signs of 4GW and, coincidentally enough, SBW (Slapout-Based Warfare). And where was the law enforcement community? Where was the federal government's military in this? Citizens improvised effective organized violence using every day objects. I think we're going to see a lot more of this in the future...in many other realms of human activity where violence can be mounted.

Whither the U.S. military in such circumstances? Maybe we just don't play there--we confine ourselves to state versus state conflicts. But as General Tony Zinni likes to say of Marines, "Oh, we indeed do windows." The question is, how do we do "windows" in this 4GW world?

Haven't quite figured that out yet.