Wilf writes:

I guess I come from the school of thought, where I want my Recon Forces to find the enemy and not the gaps. I want my Recon Forces to begin fixing/reducing the freedom of action of the enemy, so that my teeth arms can destroy him. Recon is just the whiskers for the tooth and claw.
Probably can't articulate a better example of the Soviet School MW perspective than this, although it also applies to the Attrition style of warfare. What betrays Wilf's perspective is the focus on maneuver and recon as a precursor to application of destructive power first and foremost--at least the way this comes across in print. I also find it interesting that recon forces are fixing forces that actively reduce freedom of action. Well, I suppose cavalry units do that. But I'm thinking of a more all-encompassing concept that this. I'm thinking of recon screens/pickets made up of all sorts of units. And there are some dedicated recon units I want to keep stealthy--I don't want them doing "direct action" or other target acquisition efforts. In recon-pull, there's certainly plenty of "tooth and claw," but only to facilitate gap creating and getting people through the gaps (if we're talking about holes in spatial dispositions here).

This is why Soviet School MW does not recognize the utility of reconnaissance-pull; certainly attrition style warfare does not either. Soviet School MW decides where the opportunities are ahead of time, during planning. Exploitation of those opportunities are already programmed into the plan. There is little to no provision for creating the unexpected and taking advantage of it at the scene. This is because of the risk that the operation will lose focus and coherence. That's a real risk. If you don't have the expertise, the self-disciplined forces, the cohesion to execute reconnaissance pull, then you are left with this kind of approach if you are going to do MW.

Additionally, it is implicit that to find gaps you have to have some idea of where the enemy is--otherwise how do you know a gap is a gap? So I'm a bit mystified regarding Wilf's point on that score. He says FIND--find the enemy. I say find the enemy, too. Of course we want to know where the enemy is. I think we agree on that. Where we part ways is what is next. Wilf is after bringing destructive power to bear. I'm not necessarily interested in that right off the bat. If uncertainty is high and the situation is fluid, I'm more interested in where the enemy isn't--where can we go around him? Through him? How can I most quickly get to his critical vulnerability or key weakness? I'm aiming at pre-emption, or dislocation, or disruption first and foremost. If I see an enemy force, one of the first questions I'm thinking is whether the gaps/weaknesses I see in it are worth going after now...or are there other gaps that promise an even bigger payoff later? And when I bring down destructive power, it's only where I want to (1) deceive my enemy where the main effort will be, and (2) suppress those elements of the enemy array that are slowing down my maneuver.

Now, the situation is uncertain and highly fluid--as a higher formation leader, I don't want to have wait for the situation to clarify before these things happen. I want them to happen as automatically as I can make it. As contact is made and the two formations grapple, the situation will begin to clarify. What is most important to me is that I get myself to that place in the fight where I can help speed up major "fast transients" to throw this force off-balance.

Steve.Blair writes:

Part of the point of recon pull in the MW context as I understand it is to avoid the meeting engagement by moving where the enemy either isn't or where he's so weak that you can punch through quickly.
Not exactly true. It's not that you want to avoid the meeting engagement every time. There are some times you want the meeting engagement--you just want it on your terms. You hope to shape it in such a way you uncover a weakness you can exploit. This issue here is how that would be done. Wilf isn't sure of how a "formation-level meeting engagement" would work under recon-pull concepts. I'll try to provide a very general illustration below--and even give Wilf his wish to apply some "tooth and claw" against it...

Imagine an enemy probe. Pick your favorite kind of formation--Soviet-style MRD advance guard, Route Opening Detachment, "Groupe Mobile 100," it doesn't matter. Some commanders might adopt the superficial aspects of recon pull--they put out the recon screen. But they still reserve the right to change unit missions and move units unto themselves. So the recon screen finds where the enemy is pushing with his probing element and may detect an exploitable gap between elements (the march column is looking like an accordion...and there are fleeting times when you can get in there and pick off elements). Let's imagine that the enemy flankers got held up by some particularly nasty terrain but the road-bound artillery serials are hanging out there for any ground force that wants to charge in there to take them out. But by the time CO gets the report, gets oriented, figures out what to do, and issues the order, too much time has gone by. The flankers that were held up when the initial report came in have long since wriggled free and are back in place covering the roadbound guns...and no doubt a new vulnerability exists that the CO doesn't know about--say the air defenders in their eagerness to get the engagement envelopes over that same artillery gaggle have left the rear logistical element out of adequate coverage. What is more, the follow on force behind the column is lagging WAY behind, and there's an entry venue to get into the enemy's rear/operational depth and wreak all kinds of havoc for a friendly force bold enough to try it.

If we're waiting for the commander to make the call, it's going to be too late.

Recon pull doesn't wait. If we are units in the recon screen, we look at the mission and the intent and decide what to do. In the above example, there's all kinds of gaps/weaknesses. Imagine that out of six elements in the recon screen, three see enemy units in column with nothing that looks promising and three spot gaps--one sees the arty uncovered by flankers, one sees the log train uncovered by air defense, and one sees the big hole to "the green fields beyond" into the enemy depth. Imagine that we see all three simultaneously, or sequentially. Take your pick. Which ones we go after depends on what the intent is and what our mission is. We can argue whether it's better to go after the artillery in one moment, or the log train in another moment, or ignore this meeting engagement force altogether and plunge ourselves into "the great beyond" in the enemy rear. The point is, those decisions are made on the spot by the units that see them. They aren't calling back to the Headquarters asking "mother may I?" They know what their commander would want. They are communicating laterally and forces are moving, cooperating, improvising--and they are calling back and TELLING the commander what they are doing. If the CO doesn't like what they are doing, he'll command "by negation."

There are issues with this, however, and that is on maintaining coherence. Recon-pull will naturally cause disunity if leaders aren't ruthless in sticking to commander's intent (at minimum) and where the main effort is aimed against.

Getting back to OODA Loop applications, the CO of this force ought to be considering what he wants most. There are opportunities in this example to pre-empt, to dislocate, and to disrupt (to use Leonhard's categories from The Art of Maneuver) The OODA Loop application aplies to all of them. It's a matter of relative speed. And it's a matter of tempo and timing, particularly the latter. The CO is best advised to choose recon-pull technique if timing is essential and the window for action is small...so small that only leaders on the spot can action them effectively.

Are there ways to "exploit opportunity" without doing recon-pull? Sure. Recon pull is but one way to exploit opportunity, but what that particular command technique brings to the table is timing and ambiguity of action, perhaps more so than other methods.