One good thing about OODA

[wm]

Additionally, it is implicit that to find gaps you have to have some idea of where the enemy is--otherwise how do you know a gap is a gap? So I'm a bit mystified regarding Wilf's point on that score. He says FIND--find the enemy. I say find the enemy, too. Of course we want to know where the enemy is. I think we agree on that. Where we part ways is what is next. Wilf is after bringing destructive power to bear. I'm not necessarily interested in that right off the bat. If uncertainty is high and the situation is fluid, I'm more interested in where the enemy isn't--where can we go around him? Through him? How can I most quickly get to his critical vulnerability or key weakness? I'm aiming at pre-emption, or dislocation, or disruption first and foremost. If I see an enemy force, one of the first questions I'm thinking is whether the gaps/weaknesses I see in it are worth going after now...or are there other gaps that promise an even bigger payoff later? And when I bring down destructive power, it's only where I want to (1) deceive my enemy where the main effort will be, and (2) suppress those elements of the enemy array that are slowing down my maneuver.

Now, the situation is uncertain and highly fluid--as a higher formation leader, I don't want to have wait for the situation to clarify before these things happen. I want them to happen as automatically as I can make it. As contact is made and the two formations grapple, the situation will begin to clarify. What is most important to me is that I get myself to that place in the fight where I can help speed up major "fast transients" to throw this force off-balance.

The first paragraph certaintly seems to describe what we used to call the active defense. The second paragraph seems to describe Soviet MW as EMW has characterized it. What's new here?

Imagine an enemy probe. Pick your favorite kind of formation--Soviet-style MRD advance guard, Route Opening Detachment, "Groupe Mobile 100," it doesn't matter. Some commanders might adopt the superficial aspects of recon pull--they put out the recon screen. But they still reserve the right to change unit missions and move units unto themselves. So the recon screen finds where the enemy is pushing with his probing element and may detect an exploitable gap between elements (the march column is looking like an accordion...and there are fleeting times when you can get in there and pick off elements). Let's imagine that the enemy flankers got held up by some particularly nasty terrain but the road-bound artillery serials are hanging out there for any ground force that wants to charge in there to take them out. But by the time CO gets the report, gets oriented, figures out what to do, and issues the order, too much time has gone by. The flankers that were held up when the initial report came in have long since wriggled free and are back in place covering the roadbound guns...and no doubt a new vulnerability exists that the CO doesn't know about--say the air defenders in their eagerness to get the engagement envelopes over that same artillery gaggle have left the rear logistical element out of adequate coverage. What is more, the follow on force behind the column is lagging WAY behind, and there's an entry venue to get into the enemy's rear/operational depth and wreak all kinds of havoc for a friendly force bold enough to try it.

Examples again look like active defense (or meeting engagement as part of active defense). How about cases for deliberate attack or movement to contact where our side starts on the offensive--perhaps something more like Marines storming ashore at Tarawa.

Imagine that we see all three simultaneously, or sequentially. Take your pick. Which ones we go after depends on what the intent is and what our mission is. We can argue whether it's better to go after the artillery in one moment, or the log train in another moment, or ignore this meeting engagement force altogether and plunge ourselves into "the great beyond" in the enemy rear. The point is, those decisions are made on the spot by the units that see them. They aren't calling back to the Headquarters asking "mother may I?" They know what their commander would want. They are communicating laterally and forces are moving, cooperating, improvising--and they are calling back and TELLING the commander what they are doing. If the CO doesn't like what they are doing, he'll command "by negation."

What keeps this from becoming a series of piecemeal attacks that get defeated in detail? By the time the formation commander has enough situational awareness to "command 'by negation,'" things may have gone too far to extract some or all of the committed elements that got the commander's intent wrong, misread the situation, or just plain got surrounded by "Indians at the end of that box canyon they stormed into" because the bad guys reacted/acted faster than our own forces did.

Getting back to OODA Loop applications, the CO of this force ought to be considering what he wants most. There are opportunities in this example to pre-empt, to dislocate, and to disrupt (to use Leonhard's categories from The Art of Maneuver) The OODA Loop application aplies to all of them. It's a matter of relative speed. And it's a matter of tempo and timing, particularly the latter. The CO is best advised to choose recon-pull technique if timing is essential and the window for action is small...so small that only leaders on the spot can action them effectively.

Are these situations more likely to be the exception or the rule? I suspect that as the size of the formations grows, the likelihood of such "moments of decision" will be fewer and fewer.