Bin Laden: before Abbottabad (merged thread)

[jmm99]

Here is the 4-page article (+ 27 pages of comments) underlying the spot.

Elite Officer Recalls Bin Laden Hunt
Delta Force Commander Says The Best Plan To Kill The Al Qaeda Leader In 2001 Was Nixed
Oct. 5, 2008
....
In 2001, just 10 weeks after 9/11, he was a 37-year-old Army major leading a team of America's most elite commandos. Even now, 60 Minutes can't tell you his name or show you his face. 60 Minutes hired a theatrical make up artist to take this former Delta officer through a series of transformations to disguise him. He calls himself "Dalton Fury," and is the author of "Kill Bin Laden," a new book out this week.
.....
Fury says he'll donate his profits from the book to the Special Operations Warrior Foundation.

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/...n4494937.shtml

I have no way to determine whether this article is factual in whole, part or not at all. Others here may be better informed.

Ishmael Jones, The Human Factor, pp.238-239, blames the escape on CIA "HQs managers" taking over the operation after UBL's radio transmission was received.

[Entropy]

DefenseTech did two minutes of research and apparently found out who the guy is.

[Jedburgh]

Despite the comic book pseudonym he adopted, the guy is the real deal.

[Rank amateur]

Now that his bona fides have bee established, would anyone like to comment on what he said?

[Entropy]

Now that his bona fides have bee established, would anyone like to comment on what he said?

It sounds like old territory to me - much of the same was covered in other articles and books, although the request to mine the passes above Tora Bora was new to me. Given the realities of the time, it's not surprising that both of his requests (a blocking force or mining) were rejected.

What is bringing it up now going to do other than bring about a big old round of finger pointing, and possibly some scape goating?

The cynic in me suggests it might have something to do with the timing of his book being published.

[selil]

I think the big point is that the guys on the ground did their job, that oversight and politics (to many cooks in the kitchen problem) screwed up the mission. I think from the interview the idea that the Afghanistan support really wasn't and that the missions are incredibly more difficult based on trying to make them (the locals) look good.

[sullygoarmy]

Great. A fellow AMU professor.

http://www.amu.apus.edu/Academics/Fa...?facultyID=997

No doubt he is a hero and a stud but I agree with other posters. Where is the so what of his story? The Muj couldn't be trusted, liked Bin Laden and often had agreements with the Talibs...nothing new there.

[jkm_101_fso]

Great. A fellow AMU professor.

http://www.amu.apus.edu/Academics/Fa...?facultyID=997

No doubt he is a hero and a stud but I agree with other posters. Where is the so what of his story? The Muj couldn't be trusted, liked Bin Laden and often had agreements with the Talibs...nothing new there.

CBS went to all that work to mask his identity and his picture is right there on the AMU website.

That terrain model they had on the 60 minutes interview was pretty kick A**.

[Steve Blair]

Great. A fellow AMU professor.

http://www.amu.apus.edu/Academics/Fa...?facultyID=997

No doubt he is a hero and a stud but I agree with other posters. Where is the so what of his story? The Muj couldn't be trusted, liked Bin Laden and often had agreements with the Talibs...nothing new there.

Interesting....had him as an instructor not too long ago.

[Ski]

His brother is a professor there as well.

I've had a class with one of them, can't remember which one.

[Bodhi]

He instructed me as well for AMU's UW seminar a couple of years ago. Definitely a solid instructor; I learned a good deal from him, and he made the class really interesting. He also developed a great reading list for that course.

[Rank amateur]

Given the realities of the time, it's not surprising that both of his requests (a blocking force or mining) were rejected.

Could you please explain. Isn`t a blocking force one of the simplest and most basic ways to deploy troops.

The Muj couldn't be trusted

Isn`t that highly relevant given that our strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan to this day is to turn over security to the locals. Do you really think that its old news to the millions of Americans and millions of 60 Minutes viewers who our going to be voting in the next 30 days. (For example, I had no idea the local went home every night, and were sleeping peacefully in their beds, when our guys were very close to Bin Laden and knew exactly where he was and I think I`ve learned a thing or two from hanging around here that the average 60 minutes viewer might not know.)

[sullygoarmy]

Back in 2001, we were buying loyality...plain and simple. There was no buring Afghan desire for love and home and country to help us out. We paid them...plain and simple. Things have changed for the better over the years but back in 2001 when this story is about, our "allies" were paid mercenaries we used to help us out since we did not have enough of our own forces in theater.

Having worked with, lived with, ate with and fought with Iraqi units twice, there always has to be some skepticism in the back of an advisors mind. I'm sure the Delta guys in this story either a) knew or b) had strong feeling their local indig forces may be playing both sides of the game.

[Culpeper]

Could this be a situation where someone may have violated the need to know principle? I mean, this guy was in Delta. I'm not sure we were supposed to be finding out about this so soon. I was uncomfortable watching it.

[ilots]

Back in 2001, we were buying loyality...plain and simple.

Renting; not buying. You don't buy Afghan loyalty, you only rent it.

[Entropy]

Could you please explain. Isn`t a blocking force one of the simplest and most basic ways to deploy troops.

...I've been busy for a couple of days.

To answer your question, yes, in theory a blocking force is easy to deploy, but in practice I'll quote Ken: METT-TC applies. That blocking force has to be adequate to the task, able to deploy and operate along a stretch of 10k+feet series of peaks and saddles, in wintertime, with adequate supply and support. Assuming all that is available, there is the opportunity cost and risk which must be weighed against other missions for all the assets involved. Maybe the Rangers that were at Bagram could have done it (which was the only force available in a timely matter, IMO), but I don't know.

And even if the decisions had been different and the Rangers were in put in place, there's still no guarantee they would have got UBL.

[Tom Odom]

Reading the book now for a SWJ review. I will save my comments for that purpose but so far it is interesting read.

Tom

[bourbon]

The cynic in me suggests it might have something to do with the timing of his book being published.

Maybe, but subtlety doesn't really work in our nations discourse, in this case I reckon he would just come out and say it:

Ideological agendas cannot be pursued, and political and economic gains cannot be reaped, when you literally kill the pretext. With bullets and HE.

[Uboat509]

This is where the issue was discussed on PS.com. Most people in the community are pretty pissed about this. I don't have TV right now so I did not see the interview and I doubt that I will read the book. What I am wondering though is what the point is. I near as I can gather, he is pointing out what is basically a bad call that was made on the ground in Afghanistan during the Tora Bora operation. My question is why? Whether it was a good, bad or indifferent call, it is an old call. What is bringing it up now going to do other than bring about a big old round of finger pointing, and possibly some scape goating?

SFC W