Entropy asks:

One question on Soviet vs German school - is it possible to practice both at the same time? For example, could one "decide where the opportunities are ahead of time," as you put it earlier, in the planning process, yet allow for exploitation of those laterally-coordinated serendipitous opportunities should they appear?
While one can do that in the plan/concept of the operation, it's very hard to design, equip, and train to do one and still do well at the other. And if you do, you probably need to spend equal time practicing to do both. Typically, we talk about one but do the other (see previous thread postings on that)

The Germans could do either Soviet or German school MW in some cases, and that's what amazes me to this day. The march through the Ardennes was intensely planned and supervised using detailed/centralized control (anyone violating the road control parameters regarding scheduling and utilization would be shot), yet within hours/days of major contact, German forces could transition into a much looser "recon-pull" framework. Given the demands for detailed/centralized control for amphibious operations in getting "feet dry" from "feet wet," I'd love a very similar effect--once we make contact, we'd be able to fluidly transition to a recon-pull approach. So you ask a very good question.


Entropy also asks:

Was there a Marine-wide standard procedure you followed? If so, did you get to actually train beforehand, especially with actual aircraft?
Oh yes, we had a common standard and we trained it "live fire" at 29 Palms and at live-fire ranges in Korea and elsewhere. I personally loved bringing in the old A-6 because it could carry so many bombs. Never failed to pump me up. A-4 Skyhawks just could not compare. F-4 Phantoms were a bit better, but nothing beat an A-6 for suppressive effect!