Iraq: Strategic and Diplomatic Options

[Bill Moore]

Like it or not Iraq's neighbors get a vote, and they have a voice. A voice that will be heard on the battlefield through surrogates, or a voice that could be heard in civil negotiations. We don't go into these conversations with a weak hand, but we will have to go into them.

Every country that borders Iraq has an interest in a stable Iraq, since instability will eventually cross borders. Very few, if any, countries bordering Iraq has an interest in a democratic Iraq, which is a threat to their regimes, which some think was the purpose of the war to begin with. However, we missed the window of opportunity to achieve this.

Al-Maliki obviously must go, but the trick is determining how. Do we throw him out? Do we quietly allow an Iraqi military coup? It is obvious that martial law needs to be implemented, and tough security measures implemented. We need carrots (hard to come by where the unemployment in many parts of Iraq exceeds 40 plus percent) and big sticks. Big sticks best carried by Iraqi security forces that are not burdened by our rules based on political correctness instead of necessity.

As for a time table to withdraw U.S. forces, I think we need to push it hard. We can withdraw from the urban areas to remote desert locations where we can provide a credible military response to any Iraqi forces being overwhelmed. I think the security situation will improve when we pull out, despite all the empty rhetoric to the contrary. Let the Iraqis fight an all out war without our oversight, and they'll get to an end state. Al Qaeda will be desimmated after we pull out by the Iraqis. We are the center of gravity for the hostile forces, we pull out of the urban areas and turn the fight over to the Iraqis, we might take the wind out of their sails.

As we all know there are no good answers at this point, but I recommend reaching common ground with all of Iraq's neighbors, getting professionals to advise to the Iraqi military and police instead of putting third string NG troops on the MiTTs, invest in the surge of the money and manpower needed to bring the Iraqi Army and police up to an acceptable Arab level (largely based on their previous organizations), then rapidly pull back, then pull out.

Staying the course sounds nice, but we'll continue to waste human and monetary treasure to no end if we do. There are several other areas in the world that require our attention, we can't afford to let our pride tie us down needlessly.

[Rob Thornton]

As we all know there are no good answers at this point, but I recommend reaching common ground with all of Iraq's neighbors, getting professionals to advise to the Iraqi military and police instead of putting third string NG troops on the MiTTs, invest in the surge of the money and manpower needed to bring the Iraqi Army and police up to an acceptable Arab level (largely based on their previous organizations), then rapidly pull back, then pull out.

Most of the TTs are about 50/50. Believe it or not, our 3rd stringers provide balance and some mature perspective that their counterpart AC professionals just don't have (we have not trained nor conditioned them to - its a matter of available resources). They also bring what Marc had referred to as life experiences to the table - when you are dealing with people who have an agenda that is different than yours, you better have some leadership experience that requires getting people to come to a consensus for reasons other then because you rate them.

There is also the question of where you are going to resource the AC professionals from - as long as its a tasking your QA/QC on AC folks is going to be hit or miss - how many units really give up their best folks for a tasker? No, the problem is less about the people they send, then it is about how we are approaching the train up that puts people from disparate organizations into hastily organized teams and tries to educate them on everything from est. a TCP to political histories & culture in a short span of time. As one of the AC guys on the team, I can tell you that some of the RC guys have acquitted themselves far better then some of their AC contemporaries - professionalism extends beyond component and beyond technical competence. Professionalism originates from commitment.

As for the part about regional neighbors worrying about Iraq's instability spilling over - I'd say equally important is is the recognition of how they perceive the consequences of the act vs. the perceived benefits. Their actions may not make sense in a western sense, but then again they don't really need to. What is the cost of Iranian assistance in stabilizing Iraq? Does Iran really need to worry about sectarian violence spilling over the border when they have the political, military and religious means to limit it in pursuit of their more primary goals? What do past actions and statements tell us about what Iran is willing to risk? I'm as frustrated as anybody, about the lack of a clean solution, but I am cautious about improving the position of a state whose agenda runs in clear opposition to our own.

Iran recently ran a series of naval maneuvers in the Persian Gulf on the heels of our own for the purpose of making a statement - they consider the name of that body of water to imply ownership. They will also likely contest the rights to the Caspian in a louder voice as their military capability becomes stronger. They have aligned themselves with Russia and China in order to limit Western influence in the security council by using the promise of favored energy partner and regional influence. I'm not saying we cannot engage them, they do get a vote. I am saying that their motivations may not be what we think they are, just because we see them that way.