So, is this insurgency, urban guerilla activity, terrorism etc?
It seems that North Caucasus daily routine has entered throurgh Roki tunnel.
Two quick comments regarding the situation and article:
There's much more than mere anecdotal evidence of looting and this particular scenario affords an ideal opportunity to get into an otherwise "secure" area and cause mayhem. Based on our initial forensics, the Russians in occupied areas have far more to fear than simple VBIEDs.There has been widespread looting and arson in ethnic Georgian villages in and around South Ossetia since the war. Residents and refugees from the area have reported the theft or confiscation of their cars by South Ossetian militias and marauders.
They call themselves sappers with some actual demolitions background and even have Peace Keepers that, have and employ howitzers.Despite high tension since the war, Russian troops at checkpoints on roads leading into South Ossetia from Georgian-controlled territory often carry out only cursory searches of cars, glancing in trunks and waving drivers through.
But, their Engineers and MPs are not qualified for the task at hand as noted here:
As a returning volunteer opined: "This famous place now resembles the last bus stop before the end of the world!"The explosion occurred Friday outside the headquarters of the Russian peacekeeping forces in the breakaway Georgian republic. A car bomb went off in a vehicle that had been moved to the capital, Tskhinvali, from a village in the buffer zone outside South Ossetia controlled by Russian forces.
Last edited by Stan; 10-04-2008 at 05:17 PM. Reason: forgot the link
If you want to blend in, take the bus
So, is this insurgency, urban guerilla activity, terrorism etc?
It seems that North Caucasus daily routine has entered throurgh Roki tunnel.
and thought twice about posting it at all - which means I am probably screwing up.
Anyway, here is one way to cook up some very complicated theories - which seem subject to Crabtree's Bludgeon (IMO):
http://www.antiwar.com/justin/?articleid=13555October 6, 2008
Justin Raimondo
Al-Qaeda in the Caucasus
A mysterious car bombing in Ossetia raises the specter of a sinister alliance ....
Hard to separate some possible truths here from fantasies.
Not a bad find, but there's no evidence to back up this theory. The vehicle in question was stolen and later in front of the HQ when it went high order; and not at some patrol check point in the buffer zone. Nice touch though, adding a little Al-Qaeda to the equation.
No wonder why they won't allow EU and NATO observers into that area (just yet).
Sorry, but I'm having a hard time with this article
If you want to blend in, take the bus
did I. Is anything in the article factually plausible ?from Stan
Sorry, but I'm having a hard time with this article
And, I also caught the factual error re: checkpoint.
jmm99
About terrorists and insurgents in Southern Caucasus.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgia..._Equip_ProgramThis program implemented President Bush's decision to respond to the Government of Georgia's request for assistance to enhance its counter-terrorism capabilities and addressed the situation in the Pankisi Gorge.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pankisi_GorgeIt had allegedly often been used as a base for transit, training and shipments of arms and financing by Chechen rebels and Islamic militants, many of whom followed Ruslan Gelayev.
Russia has attempted to attack the Chechen militants in the gorge. Georgia has also accused Russia of carrying out bombing raids in the gorge region in which at least one Georgian civilian was believed to have perished.
http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/d...s/caucasus/P37
Why young people are going to mountains and resisting goverment in North Caucasus is so long story. Political stalemates (with violent solutions), bad governance, blood feud, tribalism, deprivation etc are the causes of mess. Just take a look at this site.
http://www.jamestown.org/chechnya_weekly/
It just seems that free space for terrorists/insurgents has become bigger. In the North Caucasus there is same number of Russian troops but theatre has become 4000 sq km bigger.
This car bombing reminded me this Chechen act from 2002 in Grozny.
http://video.kavkazcenter.com/clips/grozny_buil.wmv
... and Znamenskoye.
http://video.kavkazcenter.com/battle...namenskoye.wmv
Goble writes about this boming here
http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/...osions-in.html
Last edited by kaur; 10-07-2008 at 07:02 AM.
and Chechens in the news today.
Hey K, your references to Pankisi Gorge were timely.
http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/1007/p04s01-woeu.htmlfrom CSM
Georgia's Chechens relive own Russian war
Russia's military presence in Georgia has unnerved refugees who fled here from Chechnya in the 1990s.
By Paul Rimple | Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
from the October 7, 2008 edition
.....
Pankisi Gorge, Georgia - When Russian tanks rolled toward Tbilisi, Georgia, in August, shops closed and streets emptied as residents stayed indoors, glued to their televisions and radios. A hundred miles northeast, in the mountainous enclave of Pankisi Gorge, Chechen refugees also watched Russian troops advancing on TV, but with less stupefaction and more cynicism.
.....
Four to five thousand refugees spilled over the mountain border into Pankisi Gorge and found sanctuary with fellow Muslim Kisti, ethnic Chechens who had arrived in the Georgian region some 150 years earlier.
Most refugees were women and children, though many guerrillas also used the area as a haven from which to launch operations into Russia. By 2003, however, with the help of US military training, Georgia cleared the area of these paramilitary fighters. ....
So, from the viewpoint of this report, the Pankisi Gorge problem was solved in 2003.
Goble's concluding comment (in the last url cited by you) is insightful (IMO):
In short, there is a lot of political spin going on - and not that much factual analysis - nothing new about that.Areshev’s words clearly reflect the view of many in the Russian security agencies who oppose a pullback. And their beliefs, especially if carefully and cleverly articulated by Russian officials, almost certainly would find understanding among many in the West who are increasingly willing to accept Moscow’s version of the Russian-Georgian war in which Tbilisi is to blame even though it did not invade another country and Moscow is innocent even though it did.
I'm not going to take the whole article apart, but will comment on a few paras that based on anecdotal evidence are, pathetically off, way off base.
The HQ was in the capital, not anywhere remotely near the buffer zone, or any check point. My previous point about Engineers performing EOD - Two very different skill fields (other than perhaps the ability to use explosives, which is also in question).they stopped a car with Georgian license plates in which the occupants were armed. The car was taken to a Russian checkpoint, where it promptly exploded. Nine Russian soldiers, including a Russian general in the nearby headquarters, were killed, and seven others were wounded.
Not sure I follow the author here. We have better criminals that barely use 250 grams of HE and do far more damage. The sad fact herein is: Russian soldiers had been stealing vehicles and property, taking said directly to the General for (ahem) inspection (and redistribution of possessed assets), and they established a pattern that even a 1st grader could follow.A car bomb in the Caucasus?
This is a weapon, and a method of terrorism, with a very familiar signature. It points to the introduction of a rather sinister aspect to the Russia-Georgia conflict – the entrance of radical Islamic elements on the field of battle, and clearly on the side of the Georgians.
This part I agree with. They got caught with their pants down thinking the Georgians gave up. Maybe they should consider the fact that nearly 30 percent of their targets were not hit, and, less than half of what was dropped failed to go high order. WWII munitions on a modern battlefield - maybe they were getting rid of their stockpilesYet, far from being all-controlling, the Russkies are hardly in the drivers' seat on the far fringes of their supposedly resurgent empire...
I think the total is now collectively 25 billionHow many millions are we sending to Tbilisi? We're training their coast guard on American ships anchored in the Black Sea. Are we also training their intelligence service in the fine art of car bombing – or do they farm that out to the real experts?
Pure conjecture or, Bravo Sierra.
Sorry, can't do much more with the Obama and McCain syndromes (don't even want to).
Regards, Stan
If you want to blend in, take the bus
It was interesting reading the article just discussed, and others in the popular press and spin sites, after reading through (and being a bit involved in) the threads here on Georgia.
Let us say that I was able to be much more fact-critical than I would have been without the knowledge gained from SWC. That applies to many other areas as well.
and, as to this:
agreed, agreed & agreed - oh well, less than a month left. Deo Gratias.Sorry, can't do much more with the Obama and McCain syndromes (don't even want to).
A quick email sitrep from an (ahem) observer in the buffer zone:
Overall, life in Georgia is slowly returning to normalcy with locals going about their daily routines. Interesting to note are those locals that typically cross the buffer zones and Russian checkpoints without giving it another thought. It appears that it will only be a matter of time before everything is back to normal. There are even signs of the previous infrastructure returning to normal at schools, stores and government institutions.
NGO HALO Trust is spooling up for their first month working on the UXO problems. Their initial task will be to control areas and declare those either free of UXO, or in need of additional clearance operations. HALO thinks 6 to 9 months.
Departing Russians
05 OCT planned departures actually began on the morning of the 8th !
The initial plan called for Russian units to depart in unison beginning at 0800. However, some fruity MG Kulakhmetovi ordered that each checkpoint would depart only when at least 3 EUMM members were present. If that wasn’t already confusing for the Russian troops, the good general decided that each checkpoint could depart as individuals. This only led to a further delay with some of the checkpoints deserted and “Engineering” equipment left behind. (Trust me when I say their equipment is stone age Bravo Sierra).
The Georgian locals are convinced this was intentional with Russians returning throughout the night to recover their equipment. On a side note, don’t the Russians give their peacekeepers port-a-poties when deployed? I mean seriously, they like took dumps everywhere. The Russian troops are still hanging around Akhalgori as if it was strategic (it is after all real friggin close to Tbilisi).
Say, does that Colonel you worked with in Africa still do Ace hardware? Holy Moses, he could make a killing here.
If you want to blend in, take the bus
Finland Sees a Familiar Pattern in Photos From the Georgia Conflict
MOSCOW — One of the stranger questions to emerge after the August conflict between Russia and Georgia: Did Russians go to war in camouflage filched from Finland?http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/21/wo...se&oref=sloginToday, the two countries share a quiet 800-mile border. Asked whether Finnish authorities were concerned about distinguishing their troops from Russians on the battlefield, Captain Karhuvaara noted that the uniforms under scrutiny belong to troops in the Russian Ministry of the Interior, which oversees police forces inside Russia. “If Russian Ministry of the Interior troops would invade Finland,” he said, “we would have big trouble.”
The Georgia conflict of August 2008: Exponent of Russia's assertive security policy,
Marcel de Haas
Carré Januari 2009
http://www.clingendael.nl/publicatio...20conflict.pdfHowever, if the Kremlin maintains its military
ambitions and is capable of realizing them, then the West,
confronted with a resurgent Russia, might have to change
its defence plans into those in which collective defence has
once again a central focus.
ARAG, 6 Mar 09: Provocation, Deception, Entrapment: The Russo-Georgian Five Day War
Complete 21-page paper at the link.Key Points
• Russian annexation of Abakhazia and South Ossetia has increased instability throughout the region.
• Georgians will not accept annexation of their territory
• Within weeks snow will melt increasing the danger of war
• Tbilisi must be made aware of the need for restraint
• Cross-border ethnic groups possessing dual nationality are vulnerable to manipulation
Wartime Approaching in the Caucasus
March 12, 2009
The period when war was physically impossible in the Caucasus is now almost over, but the halfhearted attempts by European Union mediators to strengthen the ceasefire have accomplished virtually nothing.http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_...ash=aef92993f9There are still several weeks left for the West to recognize the imminent threat and begin a high-level round of shuttle diplomacy to compel or coerce all sides to genuinely strengthen the ceasefire and disengage forces. Moscow must understand all the disadvantages of a new crisis and agree to strengthen the observer mission's mandate. The Georgians must find a way to contain internal political strife. The Ossetian and Abkhaz leaders must stop mindlessly provoking a new war. In short, a miracle is needed.
I just wonder why Flegenhauer left out variable "Russian internal clan fight". This has been getting sharper and sharper due to the economic crisis.
Last edited by kaur; 03-13-2009 at 11:59 AM.
The Bear Went Through the Mountain: Russia
Appraises its Five-Day War in South Ossetia
TIMOTHY L. THOMAS
US Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/doc...e-mountain.pdf
Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces and the Georgian War
ROGER N. McDERMOTT
Spring, 2009
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/p.../mcdermott.pdf
Fresh Russian report in Russian.
http://www.cast.ru/comments/?id=351
I'm looking for the Russian lessons learned and for details about why a Russian general was wounded when he was with his advance guard during an ambush (I am not used to reports about modern generals - especially not Russian ones - leading from the front).
So far I found this
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/doc...e-mountain.pdf
The bad news is that Russia’s military performance was marred by inadequate equipment and organization. This point was underscored many times in the press to include by some prominent military figures. Electronic warfare systems did not work well, command and control was hampered by radios that performed poorly, and operations were disjointed due to an
inadequate Global Satellite Navigation System (GLONASS). Night operations remained weak. In short, many of the same problems affecting the Russian armed forces in Chechnya were once again evident.Overall nothing unusual, such problems happen in most wars after long periods without involvement in a similar war - and the Russian forces were obviously impaired in their abilities by more than a decade of very tight budgets.... that there were operational and combat support issues that left room for improvement. First, a lack of satellite support left the troops in an information deficit. The main problem was noted as “the lack of the requisite space grouping and GLONASS receivers.”26
Electronic warfare systems were not used to suppress Georgia’s air defense systems and there was an absence of aircraft controllers. This caused armored columns to advance without the proper cover. Second, traditionally weak areas for the Russian army, such as nighttime actions, reconnaissance, communications, and logistical support, remain weaknesses. Night sighting devices are blinded by gunfire flashes and old tanks did not have global navigation systems or friend or foe systems. Third, it was rare to see vehicles
fitted with shields or additional armor and, as a result, soldiers still prefer to ride on the outside of these vehicles where, if thrown off, they have a chance of surviving. There was poor interaction between tanks and motorized infantry units and, on occasion, units sometimes fired on one another. Fourth, there was a shortage of modern precision weapons in the Russian air
force and virtually a total lack of drones. Pchela drones used in Chechnya are
practically worn out. Finally, a 1998 decision to remove helicopters from the ground force has turned out to be a problem. There are no experts in army air aviation in the air force that know how to support ground troops.
Recommendations by Tsyganok included creating information troops that take into account state and military media, modernizing forces by the end of 2015, reconstituting army aviation in the combined-arms armies and corps, and equipping aircraft and helicopter gunships with modern systems.
It is also necessary to put more satellites in orbit (24 are needed but only 13 are in orbit) and procure more GLONASS receivers, to develop friend or foe systems, and to develop new radar stations. Journalist Mikhail Lukanin wrote that insufficient use was made of ground attack and tactical aviation. Other errors on the part of Russia’s armed forces were a lack of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) use, inadequate organization of communications, inadequate personal gear and equipment, and the absence of precision weapons.
On 19 August the Presidium of the Globalization Problems Institute talked about South Ossetia and the question of information. They concluded that the Russian political and military leadership experienced indescribable panic and confusion when they realized Georgia was actually
invading South Ossetia. They also wrote that the Russian military command acted with incompetence. Soldiers in many cases had no knowledge of how to counter Georgian guidance systems which were searching for Russian signals from radios and mobile telephones. They concluded that the main goal of the war was to draw the Russian army into military operations.
...
Deputies wanted to know why all types of reconnaissance had failed, why there were serious organizational shortcomings, why there were such tangible losses in heavy equipment (helicopters, jet aircraft, etc.) against such a haphazard army, and why so much equipment
broke down while the world was watching.
I found no explanation for the WIA of a formation leader in an advance party, though.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 10-10-2010 at 11:34 AM. Reason: Spacing
Take a look at page 61.I'm looking for the Russian lessons learned and for details about why a Russian general was wounded when he was with his advance guard during an ambush (I am not used to reports about modern generals - especially not Russian ones - leading from the front).
http://www.cast.ru/files/The_Tanks_of_August_sm_eng.pdf
From Wikipedia in Russian you can find also some details
Хрулёв, Анатолий Николаевич
Sustainable Armor Capability for Small Powers: The Case of Georgia in the August War - Frederic Labarre
http://www.bdcol.ee/files/files/docu...l%20Powers.pdf
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