Impact of Foreclosures on Crime

[reed11b]

I have absolutely no idea what you think I might have said that would indicate I'm not aware of or would disagree with that...

Fascinating.

Sorry Ken, I mentally placed your name on a post by 120mm. All due apologies.
Reed

[jmm99]

120mm said it (post # 23) and I agreed with him (post # 24).

So, after containing the 10% and it is replaced by a new cohort, you contain that 10%. It's called the Whack-a-Mole theory of criminal justice. Anybody have a better approach - other than removing the "root causes" of crime.

PS: - Ken, it's because a Pink Bun dropping from the sky makes such an attractive target.

[120mm]

120mm,

Care to expound on that a little more please?

I wasn't prepared to really expound on it, as I've had a kernel of an idea for awhile, concerning this.

A couple months ago, the COIN center asked for research into the role of criminality on COIN.

I don't think most of what we call "criminality" in COIN is actually "criminal", as Society is mainly responsible for defining "criminal" activity. As insurgents really don't answer to our society, but to their own peers, what they're doing isn't actually criminal.

So the guy who grows poppies in Afghanistan to make into drugs isn't criminal, at all. He's just "making his way, the only way he knows how" as the country song goes. "His" society tells him that is acceptable behavior.

Same thing with so-called "criminal" gangs. As long as the government tolerates gang formation, gangs get to make their own societal rules, and the individuals committing crimes are not necessarily individually "criminal", but rather members of a sub-society behaving in accordance with that society's rules.

Where this ties in to pushing democracy to the lowest level, is that the lower you push democratic participation, to include things like policing and service in the military/government organization, the harder you crowd sub-societal groups, like criminal gangs.

The problem is, how do you prevent the lower level organizations from mimicking criminal gangs and prevent the creation of a bunch of independent and out of control militias in every neighborhood in America?

To me, democracy doesn't just magically appear on election day. It involves citizens acting within the community on things like security, infrastructure and decisions about direction and economics. The more "professional" police become, and the more tax dollars you send to higher than community level, and the more "professional" the military becomes, the less and less connection ordinary citizens feel toward the higher levels of gov't. And the less effective that central gov't becomes, vis-a-vis it's citizens.

Like I said, I wasn't prepared to really write a thesis on it. There are still holes in this idea, but I think there might be something there.

[120mm]

Sorry Ken, I mentally placed your name on a post by 120mm. All due apologies.
Reed

Which brings us to a fascinating concept that crime is a matter of "supply and demand", as theorized by Harry Harrison in his "Stainless Steel Rat" series of novels.

I think that the "justice" system's single most important role, is giving society the impression of "justice."

Without the perception that "criminals are punished", government loses its monopoly on nearly anything.

[reed11b]

Which brings us to a fascinating concept that crime is a matter of "supply and demand", as theorized by Harry Harrison in his "Stainless Steel Rat" series of novels.

I think that the "justice" system's single most important role, is giving society the impression of "justice."

Without the perception that "criminals are punished", government loses its monopoly on nearly anything.

I would add "criminals are universally punished" or else it fails as a deterrent or even as a concept. This is why the criminalization of "victimless" crimes undermines LE and correctional agencies. One becouse catching a high percentage of drug users and gamblers and simalier crimes is unlikely, two, becouse the manpower wasted on trying too, allows crimes such as car theft to be nearly free of risk of being caught.
Reed

[jmm99]

The posts below deal with community participation, whether the problem is unorganized crime, organized crime or insurgency - which represent something of a spectrum.

Slap post # 8
Could get really nasty out there. Hate to say it but Bill Lind has written about the Insurgency coming home to America...he might be right

Slap post # 14
According to SBW doctrine the government should buy up a bunch of houses that are being foreclosed on and GIVE them to Wounded Veterans and let them form a neighborhood watch group (give them a police radio set). Want be anymore crime in that community.

120mm post #43
Where this ties in to pushing democracy to the lowest level, is that the lower you push democratic participation, to include things like policing and service in the military/government organization, the harder you crowd sub-societal groups, like criminal gangs.

The problem is, how do you prevent the lower level organizations from mimicking criminal gangs and prevent the creation of a bunch of independent and out of control militias in every neighborhood in America?

I suggest the following as a cheap resource (free) to organizing the community and separating it from criminals, insurgents, etc.

MODERN WARFARE
A French View of Counterinsurgency
by
Roger Trinquier
....
(pp.16-21)
6. Defense of the Territory
....
THE INHABITANTS ORGANIZATION
....
COUNTRYWIDE INTELLIGENCE

http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/frenchview.pdf

Trinquier wrote at a time when Algeria was an integral part of France. So, unlike our manuals which address issues in a HN we are assisting, Trinquier's deals with fighting a domestic insurgency. He notes that forming the Inhabitant's Organization is simpler if the insurgency is less advanced.

Trinquier writes from an authoritarian viewpoint (necessary to deal with an advanced insurgency); but, since it is not a cookbook, its ideas could be adapted to our environment.

Progress along those lines would require political resolve - and a decentralization of control because community organizing has to be local (Saul Alinsky - Reveille for Radicals is worth the read if you can find it).

Given governments (both parties) whose answer to a crisis is something like "go out shopping", I am skeptical about the political resolve and acceptance of decentralization.

[slapout9]

Hi All, many of you have heard me talk about the crime triangle, here is a link to the whole theory. It is actually 2 triangles the inner one is the crime/problem triangle the outer one is the control/solution triangle.
It approaches the problem amd solution as a system not an either or type problem.

http://www.popcenter.org/learning/pam/help/theory.cfm

[Bill Moore]

jmm99, thanks for the link to Trinquier's writings, it even includes a bonus introduction by Bernard Fall. I read Trinquier's "On Modern War" and quickly realized he was one of the best military theorists on modern war to date. It was a library copy, but after reading this I'm breaking down and buying a hard copy for my library.

This really peaked my interest because I recently posted on the SWJ blog in response to the article titled "Between Clausewitz and Mao" about the importance of destroying the insurgent underground, or what Trinquier more eloquently refers to as the clandestine organization and a special organization.

One of his more interesting observations is our tendency to explain revolutionary warfare in a way that closely parallel's traditonal warfare, yet as he points out, it is far to simple and doesn't provide the understanding necessary to defeat this type of threat.

Studies have been made in many countries of what is called subversive warfare. But they rarely go beyond the stage of guerrilla warfare, which comes closest to the traditional form.

In modern warfare, we are not actually grappling with an army organized along traditional lines, but with a few armed elements acting clandestinely within a population manipulated by a special organization.

Getting back on topic, he also challanges the decapitation approach to attacking an insurgency (or HVI hunting). He emphasizes the need to completely remove the cancer from society so it can no longer influence the population, not simply killing a few select enemy personnel. This approach in some respects parallels the "broken glass" theory, we're not just getting the baddest of the bad, but we're getting all the bad.

The mission of the police operation is not merely to seek a few individuals who have carried out terrorist attacks, but to eliminate from the midst of the population the entire enemy organization that has infiltrated it and is manipulating it at will.

In modern warfare, we are not actually grappling with an army organized along traditional lines, but with a few armed elements acting clandestinely within a population manipulated by a special organization.

In a true insurgency I don't necessarily see direct parallels to crime, although what we call criminal acts may indeed be a means to raise funds to support the insurgency, such as insurgent tax collection (protection money). I suspect that much of the crime we see in insurgent affected areas is a result of increased lawlessness (broken glass). Some insurgent movements actually target criminals and severely punish them as a means of increasing insurgent legitimacy. Mao was adamant that his soldiers would not commit crimes against the populace, and if they did they would be severely punished.

This begs the questions, is insurgent legitimacy is less important today than it was during Mao's time? Is crime an effective means to fund an insurgency? Is there any other say to fund an insurgency if they don't have an external sponsor?

The reason I ask is that there are numerous studies suggesting that Al Qaeda operatives and related groups are now encouraged to conduct criminal acts (or criminal enterprise to include selling drugs) to fund their operations. It can be perceived as a double win, first your committing crime against your foe, thus undermining his society, second you're lining your coffers with cash to support operations. Yet I suspect insurgents who do this risk undermining their own integrity as an organization, and like many other insurgent groups risk evolving into an organized criminal group.

[Tom Odom]

Guys,

Before you put ole Trinquier up on a pedestal--and I have read modern war and used it in a history lesson--consider that the French did much of what Trinquier advocated and lost. Why?

Well the short answer lies in JMM's intro of Trinquier when he states that it was at a time when Algeria was part of France. Therein lies the root cause of failure because that was an illusion, one cherished deeply by les pieds noirs and certainly less so by indigenous Algerians.

Getting back on topic, he also challanges the decapitation approach to attacking an insurgency (or HVI hunting). He emphasizes the need to completely remove the cancer from society so it can no longer influence the population, not simply killing a few select enemy personnel. This approach in some respects parallels the "broken glass" theory, we're not just getting the baddest of the bad, but we're getting all the bad.

Also keep in mind that in the execution of what he advocated Trinquier was a practioner of torture on a broad scale. As Algeria collapsed, Trinquier and other veterans joined the mercenary circuit in africa--they ended up in Katanga with the knickname Les Affreux, one they earned by action.

From Modern Warfare: The interrogators must always strive not to injure the physical and moral integrity of individuals. Science can easily place at the army's disposition the means for obtaining what is sought

But we must not trifle with our responsibilities. It is deceitful to permit artillery or aviation to bomb villages and slaughter women and children, while the real enemy usually escapes, and to refuse interrogation specialists the right to seize the truly guilty terrorist and spare the innocent

There is a slippery cliff in that paragraph and the French lept over it.

Overall the theory sounds good but the author was in my opinion a French version of Klaus Barbie

Stick with Galula

Read Modern Warfare

Tom

[120mm]

I would add "criminals are universally punished" or else it fails as a deterrent or even as a concept. This is why the criminalization of "victimless" crimes undermines LE and correctional agencies. One becouse catching a high percentage of drug users and gamblers and simalier crimes is unlikely, two, becouse the manpower wasted on trying too, allows crimes such as car theft to be nearly free of risk of being caught.
Reed

Great points. Kind of like the adage about "not issuing an order you know will not be obeyed".

Or making promises you know you can't keep.

Or fighting a war against "terror".

[jmm99]

and some comments (by no means final).

Galula was not lacking in my reading (see next); but Trinquier's brief discussion of community organizing, and consequent intelligence sources, seemed (IMO) to be the most on point summary of the process.

Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare, in its operational chapter (chap. 7, pp.75-94), discusses a similar process in his 5th-7th steps (Local.Elections, Testing the Local Leaders & Organizing a Party at pp.89-92). Galula's model is more generalized and akin to organizing a local political party (been there, done that).

Trinquier's model is a more structured community group (subject to some centralized control) which is joined at the hip with the police and military to defeat the insurgents (or criminals). It seemed (IMO) more relevant to address the points made by Slap and 120mm (quoted in post # 46).

Galula goes into his application of the process in another freebie, which is here.

Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958
David Galula
New Foreword by Bruce Hoffman
Rand 2006
MG478
......
PART THREE
The Struggle for the Support of the Population
(pp. 139-210)

The link to the .pdf file (2.4 MB) is here.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG478-1/

This one, BTW, is a much better read (more interesting to me - lots of war stories) than his more formal work.

-------------------------------------------
There are three posts in a row here (Slap # 47, Moore # 48, Odom # 49), which should be discussed slowly - since we are discussing conceptual references, not cookbooks. And, we are dealing with situations and approaches that include the good, the bad and the ugly (the point made by Tom Odom in # 49).

- for non-Frenchies, Les Affreux = The Horribles. That tag name was applicable to many paramilitary groups in the Congo of those times. Wasn't there, but was fairly well read at the time about that sorry mess. Further discussion of Trinquier's ugly side (as to which I've some thoughts) would be a digression from this thread.

First, as to Slap's "A Theory of Crime Problems" (url in # 47), this is a simple (you can read it in a couple of minutes), but not simplistic, model based on a triangle of basic variables. This little thing grows on you as you sit back and think about it. Not only as to the examples given, but those you can imagine. For example, think of yourself as a victim and your house as a target. Who is the Guardian (in my case, moi); and what are the tools (home defense plans, capabilities, etc. - in my case, they exist). With not too much thought, these same basic concepts could be extended to an insurgency (which, in essence, both Trinquier and Galula do).

Bill Moore's comments (# 48) hit on a number of points that I simply have to take some time to think about - and have to read "Between Clausewitz and Mao" (I think that will be re-read, but I haven't got there yet). Expect I'll have more to say about the criminal-insurgent spectrum.

BTW, there is another thread, which is dealing with something of the same issue in Afghanistan - what is an insurgent ? - which is here.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...8608#post58608

Finally, Bill Odom issues a caution (# 49), which is very factual - Horne's Savage War of Peace goes into all of that in detail. Won't be as absolute as Bill - but, then I ain't a colonel.

My take on these sources is eclectic: Use the good; Sierra Charlie the bad and ugly - and pray God to have the wisdom to know the difference.

PS: - Bill Odom. Trinquier was a far deeper person than Barbie (albeit RT was misguided for religious reasons - reliance on an aberrant view of Thomist philosoiphy).

Those who are interested might want to Wiki such refs as Action Française and Cité catholique - all of that is right wing French politics, which underlay a lot of the OAS, Algeria, torture (as a redemptive cleansing of the terrorist !), etc.

The url ref. to Paul Aussaresses (linked in Odom # 49 at "torture on a broad" - have to consult Freud on that one) is also worth following up - going there takes us into areas that are well off-topic here.

[jmm99]

Realized I already had this as soon as I saw the authors.

Between Clausewitz and Mao: Dynamic Evolutions of the Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2008)
Thomas Renard and Stéphane Taillat

http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs...111-renard.pdf

A nice guy:

Lieutenant (réserve) Stéphane TAILLAT
Régiment d'Infanterie-Chars de Marine (RICM)

Hey Stéphane, Colonialement

[slapout9]

jmm99, I think you mean Tom Odom not Bill Odom on your post #51.

[Tom Odom]

PS: - Bill Odom. Trinquier was a far deeper person than Barbie (albeit RT was misguided for religious reasons - reliance on an aberrant view of Thomist philosoiphy).

Bill Who?

Probably so on Barbie--to our great disgrace we hired that SOB in the post-war era as an anti-communist advisor

Les Affreux I know from my Congo research and writing. Trinquier was not alone by any means and I would attribute much of what they did to the ends justifies the means that characterized virtually all colonial/frontier armies including the US on occasion. God was always a favorite reason and still is.

I also spent some time on OP with French Naval commandos, Marine Infantry, and Legionaires--one of whom was a rehabilitated 1st Parachute Regiment and OAS member. A few shots of Pernod and it was off to the bloody pulpit against the great DeGaulle sell out.

Bill, ehh Tom

[jmm99]

Also, here is Bill Moore's SWJblog comment on the Stéphane's article. Another conceptual piece worth reading.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...ewitz-and-mao/

[jmm99]

for linking you to the After World - I did promote you though

-------------------------------
For those interested in the Congo 1964-1965, you will want to read a mini-tome by then MAJ Thomas P. Odom - Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964-1965, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; Leavenworth Papers No. 14.

Here is the index to the LP series (you have a choice between .html and .pdf).

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resour...csi.asp#papers

[jmm99]

if Jedburgh can give some help on the second.

The SWC thread is here.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=2326

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies, Department of the Army Pamphlet 550-104, 1966, is still here.

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/show...ll9&CISOPTR=85

Jedbugh added:

The Human Factors DA Pam linked above was the second product of the Special Operations Research Office on undergrounds. Here is the first: SORO, Nov 63: ... Complete 349 page document at the link.

But, no url for the link

Searched at cgsc without success just now. Jedburgh or anyone else - please the link if not too much trouble. Thanks in advance.

[Tom Odom]

Now that I am back among the living. Merci Mingi

Also on mercs and related matters in the Congo

Shaba II: The French and Belgian Intervention in Zaire in 1978
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Odom

[jmm99]

= Thanks what or who ?

Contribute to my linguistic learning, as I dl your second mini-tome.

Mike

[Tom Odom]

= Thanks what or who ?

Contribute to my linguistic learning, as I dl your second mini-tome.

Mike

that would be thanks much!