Impact of Foreclosures on Crime

[slapout9]

Hi All, many of you have heard me talk about the crime triangle, here is a link to the whole theory. It is actually 2 triangles the inner one is the crime/problem triangle the outer one is the control/solution triangle.
It approaches the problem amd solution as a system not an either or type problem.

http://www.popcenter.org/learning/pam/help/theory.cfm

[Bill Moore]

jmm99, thanks for the link to Trinquier's writings, it even includes a bonus introduction by Bernard Fall. I read Trinquier's "On Modern War" and quickly realized he was one of the best military theorists on modern war to date. It was a library copy, but after reading this I'm breaking down and buying a hard copy for my library.

This really peaked my interest because I recently posted on the SWJ blog in response to the article titled "Between Clausewitz and Mao" about the importance of destroying the insurgent underground, or what Trinquier more eloquently refers to as the clandestine organization and a special organization.

One of his more interesting observations is our tendency to explain revolutionary warfare in a way that closely parallel's traditonal warfare, yet as he points out, it is far to simple and doesn't provide the understanding necessary to defeat this type of threat.

Studies have been made in many countries of what is called subversive warfare. But they rarely go beyond the stage of guerrilla warfare, which comes closest to the traditional form.

In modern warfare, we are not actually grappling with an army organized along traditional lines, but with a few armed elements acting clandestinely within a population manipulated by a special organization.

Getting back on topic, he also challanges the decapitation approach to attacking an insurgency (or HVI hunting). He emphasizes the need to completely remove the cancer from society so it can no longer influence the population, not simply killing a few select enemy personnel. This approach in some respects parallels the "broken glass" theory, we're not just getting the baddest of the bad, but we're getting all the bad.

The mission of the police operation is not merely to seek a few individuals who have carried out terrorist attacks, but to eliminate from the midst of the population the entire enemy organization that has infiltrated it and is manipulating it at will.

In modern warfare, we are not actually grappling with an army organized along traditional lines, but with a few armed elements acting clandestinely within a population manipulated by a special organization.

In a true insurgency I don't necessarily see direct parallels to crime, although what we call criminal acts may indeed be a means to raise funds to support the insurgency, such as insurgent tax collection (protection money). I suspect that much of the crime we see in insurgent affected areas is a result of increased lawlessness (broken glass). Some insurgent movements actually target criminals and severely punish them as a means of increasing insurgent legitimacy. Mao was adamant that his soldiers would not commit crimes against the populace, and if they did they would be severely punished.

This begs the questions, is insurgent legitimacy is less important today than it was during Mao's time? Is crime an effective means to fund an insurgency? Is there any other say to fund an insurgency if they don't have an external sponsor?

The reason I ask is that there are numerous studies suggesting that Al Qaeda operatives and related groups are now encouraged to conduct criminal acts (or criminal enterprise to include selling drugs) to fund their operations. It can be perceived as a double win, first your committing crime against your foe, thus undermining his society, second you're lining your coffers with cash to support operations. Yet I suspect insurgents who do this risk undermining their own integrity as an organization, and like many other insurgent groups risk evolving into an organized criminal group.

[Tom Odom]

Guys,

Before you put ole Trinquier up on a pedestal--and I have read modern war and used it in a history lesson--consider that the French did much of what Trinquier advocated and lost. Why?

Well the short answer lies in JMM's intro of Trinquier when he states that it was at a time when Algeria was part of France. Therein lies the root cause of failure because that was an illusion, one cherished deeply by les pieds noirs and certainly less so by indigenous Algerians.

Getting back on topic, he also challanges the decapitation approach to attacking an insurgency (or HVI hunting). He emphasizes the need to completely remove the cancer from society so it can no longer influence the population, not simply killing a few select enemy personnel. This approach in some respects parallels the "broken glass" theory, we're not just getting the baddest of the bad, but we're getting all the bad.

Also keep in mind that in the execution of what he advocated Trinquier was a practioner of torture on a broad scale. As Algeria collapsed, Trinquier and other veterans joined the mercenary circuit in africa--they ended up in Katanga with the knickname Les Affreux, one they earned by action.

From Modern Warfare: The interrogators must always strive not to injure the physical and moral integrity of individuals. Science can easily place at the army's disposition the means for obtaining what is sought

But we must not trifle with our responsibilities. It is deceitful to permit artillery or aviation to bomb villages and slaughter women and children, while the real enemy usually escapes, and to refuse interrogation specialists the right to seize the truly guilty terrorist and spare the innocent

There is a slippery cliff in that paragraph and the French lept over it.

Overall the theory sounds good but the author was in my opinion a French version of Klaus Barbie

Stick with Galula

Read Modern Warfare

Tom