McMaster on war (merged thread)

[Entropy]

Interesting read and I agree with a lot, but I also have a few problems:

First, "balanced joint forces" used three times in the piece:

Post-9/11 experience highlights the enduring uncertainty of combat and the need for balanced air, ground, and maritime forces that can both project power from a distance and conduct operations on the ground to defeat the enemy and
secure critical terrain.

and

In doing this, we must avoid viewing force design as a zero-sum game among the services. Precision strike, information, and surveillance technologies cannot substitute for balanced
joint forces, but they are nonetheless vitally important.

and

The above factors militate for the development of balanced joint forces capable of operating against determined enemies that will attempt to evade and attack our technological advantages.

What does "balanced" mean in real terms? He doesn't really explain. And similarly, in his conclusion:

Forces ought to be designed explicitly to fight under conditions of uncertainty and to achieve effectiveness rather than efficiency.

Fighting under conditions of uncertainty seems more like a mindset problem than a force structure problem to me, provided one has a full-spectrum force. His comments on uncertainty seems to argue for a full-spectrum force (something I support) - is that what he's calling for? I couldn't really tell.

I also think his comments on RMA and transformation are a bit too critical and it seems he might want to throw the baby out with the bathwater in that regard:

Our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the 2006 Lebanon war, provide strong warnings that we should abandon the orthodoxy
of defense transformation and make appropriate adjustments to force structure and development.

Although I agree the concepts of RMA and transformation were oversold as a grand-unified-theory of warfare, they should not be simply abandoned because they still have utility in certain kinds of conflict. RMA and transformation concepts should be kept in those areas where they work and discarded in those areas where they don't.

That is why the U.S. Joint
Force must expand its ability to deter, coerce, or defeat nations that either threaten U.S. vital interests or attack those vital interests through proxies.

Personally, I see this more as a political problem than a force structure problem. Differences in force structure are not going to matter much in terms of deterring or coercing states that utilize proxies - it's ultimately political will to hold a state accountable for what proxies do that matters. History seems to show that such political will rarely exists which is why proxies are so effective.

However, recent conventional combat experience also suggests that we should reject the notion that lightness, ease of deployment, and reduced logistical infrastructure are virtues in and of themselves. What a force is expected to achieve once it is deployed is far more important than how quickly it can be moved and how easily it can be sustained. As we endeavor to improve ground force capability, we must
therefore increase airlift and sealift capabilities.

I do think rapid deployability is a virtue which is why I agree with his call for more airlift and sealift capabilities. Regarding the second sentence, if a force can't be moved quickly enough to intervene in a timely manner then it won't be able to achieve anything at all - nor will it be able to achieve much without sustainment. And this contradicts what was earlier said regarding Tora Bora:

At Tora Bora, for example, surveillance of the difficult terrain could not compensate for a lack of ground forces to cover exfiltration routes.

He's right about surveillance, but the reason there was a lack of ground forces was the inability to rapidly deploy and sustain a more adequate force quickly. These limitations were what drove planners toward using locals as a proxy ground force. The recent combat experience of Afghanistan would therefore seem to argue for the opposite of what he suggests. Additionally, logistics continues to be a limiting factor for Afghan operations, so ISTM forces with reduced logistical infrastructure requirements are a virtue in that theater.

Finally, I strongly agree with Ron's comments regarding the relationship between strategy and resources.