Did we see this disconnect (size vs. capability) play out with Rumsfeld's plan for Iraq?

I mean, did he believe that the size force we sent in could do the job because some previous size force in our history would have?

Does the failure of that force to contain the insurgent threat mean our military needs a (surge) size more troops to get the requisite number of men capable of doing the job? Or was it simply a numbers problem?

Is this an indicator of anything?

I have seen a dramatic drop in aggressive patrolling in Afghanistan from 02-03 to 05-06 and have heard of more of the same from friends there now. (Foxhole view, I know) A ten fold increase has not lead to more strategic success if one defines that as denying freedom of maneuver to the enemy. With 70K plus troops, there should be one in every valley.

Do these examples point to a misuse (or under-use) of our troops on the ground? If so, and if our current conflict is what is driving the "bigger military" idea I think there is any easier answer.

Our performance in this war as a military has not been as good as it could be. I don't mean this on a personal or personel level. I am speaking of raw capability and results.

The size military we currently have is capable of a great deal more. Barring a land war with China or Russia, the size is probably big enough if policy remains reasonable.

My pratical experience leads me to believe that there is an enormous amount of waste out there. Few soldiers spend more time on patrol than in the FOB. None, I would hazard a guess (SOF excluded). We need to recalibrate our force's incentives for going home and squeeze more productivity from the ones already deployed. This would reduce the perceived need for a larger Army.

I would propose linking redeployment to mission accomplishment. For instance, X BDE, you will pacify Anbar, you will meet these goals (civil, military, infastructure, political.....) and you will go home. Higher obviously verifies completion/success. If this takes 6 months, great, two years, fine, ten years, so be it. Individual replacement begins after two years on a points system.

Instead of "making it" to 365 days, however you do that, and punching out, this would give commanders a reason to risk casualties, be more aggressive, generally go after the enemy continously. Points for awards, patrols, whatever, are incentives for the soldiers. Also, knowing that their deployment is a mission makes it much easier to understand "why" they are there.

Not sure it is a good idea, but it is less expensive than adding a division.