Quote Originally Posted by sapperfitz82 View Post
Did we see this disconnect (size vs. capability) play out with Rumsfeld's plan for Iraq?
Had Rumsfled's plan been followed, we'd have been out of there in less than 90 days and there likely would have been no 'insurgency' -- though there certainly would've been some mayhem. His plan got changed and arguably, the changer also was instrumental in disbanding the Iraqi Army and Cops -- without which there'd have been a far different insurgency of far shorter duration.
I mean, did he believe that the size force we sent in could do the job because some previous size force in our history would have?
Partly that and partly he over relied on technology; remember, he was briefly an Aviator...
Does the failure of that force to contain the insurgent threat mean our military needs a (surge) size more troops to get the requisite number of men capable of doing the job? Or was it simply a numbers problem?
Four times the number of troops would've made little difference; Iraq is too big to dominate without well over 1M troops on the ground. Even then it would be dicey. If you're going to rotate units, then you'd need about 4M troops; we can't afford it, couldn't fill -- and don't need it.[quote]I have seen a dramatic drop in aggressive patrolling in Afghanistan from 02-03 to 05-06 and have heard of more of the same from friends there now. (Foxhole view, I know) A ten fold increase has not lead to more strategic success if one defines that as denying freedom of maneuver to the enemy. With 70K plus troops, there should be one in every valley.[quote]Worse problem than in Iraq; Afghanistan is even bigger, more populous and the terrain is far rougher -- and the people are more warlike. Adding X number of troops will make little difference and we don't -- couldn't -- have enough to 'occupy and pacify' the whole country.

As for the patrolling, I hear the same thing and also hear that it is very much unit peculiar; that is it's true with some units but not with others thus I suspect it's a matter of risk averseness in Commanders.
Our performance in this war as a military has not been as good as it could be. I don't mean this on a personal or personel level. I am speaking of raw capability and results.
I've been around since WW II and our performance in every war I've seen has been mediocre at best (with occasional rare and great exceptions in all of them). We've been saved by the fact that our opponents have generally been worse than we have. We will this time as well. Both theaters.
The size military we currently have is capable of a great deal more. Barring a land war with China or Russia, the size is probably big enough if policy remains reasonable.
I agree with that.
My pratical experience leads me to believe that there is an enormous amount of waste out there. Few soldiers spend more time on patrol than in the FOB. None, I would hazard a guess (SOF excluded). We need to recalibrate our force's incentives for going home and squeeze more productivity from the ones already deployed. This would reduce the perceived need for a larger Army.

I would propose linking redeployment to mission accomplishment. For instance, X BDE, you will pacify Anbar, you will meet these goals (civil, military, infastructure, political.....) and you will go home. Higher obviously verifies completion/success. If this takes 6 months, great, two years, fine, ten years, so be it. Individual replacement begins after two years on a points system.

Instead of "making it" to 365 days, however you do that, and punching out, this would give commanders a reason to risk casualties, be more aggressive, generally go after the enemy continously. Points for awards, patrols, whatever, are incentives for the soldiers. Also, knowing that their deployment is a mission makes it much easier to understand "why" they are there.

Not sure it is a good idea, but it is less expensive than adding a division.
Has some merit; I see two problems. The Army is risk averse but that is a reflection of the nation from which it comes, it reflects the values of this country and we have, as a nation, become quite risk averse. I don't think that will change soon. Thus the first prob is that you'll put Commanders at career risk for failure and in an Army that refuses to test people who are going to lead in combat that isn't likely to fly.

The second problem is that the proposal would be difficult to balance because of the vagaries of life and combat; Unit A gets an easy zone and goes home in six months; Unit B gets a hot spot and is there for three years. Unit C has a great commander and does well, Unit D has a dork and stumbles over everything. I could foresee big time morale and attitude problems...