Lost in Translation

[Hacksaw]

Uboat,

Not that it is all that important whether people understand my comments, I wanted to clarify my "imagine being in the Afghan's shoes.."

There is an awful lot of negative commentary based on one short highly edited video... A number of people are imagining what it is like in the elder's shoes. Imagine what it is like for this NCO. Of course the "shoot them in the face" comment was unworkable but then what else could he have offered them? He has no control over what kind of security that village will or will not get...

SFC W

I'm not overly concerned at the surface level whether this guy is offended etc. However, I am concerned over the downstream impacts. If I'm the elder, my thoughts are we can't work with these guys (the coalition). I'm risking my a$$ out here and I can't get through to these a$$ clowns (not my perception of the SGT from Leavenworth, but I'd hazard a guess its his). I doubt the Afghan Elder is all that simpathetic to the SGT's fatigue and frustration, no lack of either for anyone in that region. My point is simply that once rebuffed after making the overture of cooperation, I can't imagine another until a new crew moves in (its the cascading effect of the engagement that elicited the comment of imagine being in that guy's shoes). Of course its an over-editted piece of film, but it doesn't change the probablity that the piece we viewed likely were the gems that most impacted the other party's impression of the engagement.

The degree of fear, frustration and fatigue may be mitigating factors when counseling the NCO on his perfomance, but they have no bearing on the outcome/effects of the engagement. We ought not loss sight of that, there is a difference between casting stones while living in a glass house, and honestly looking at an anecdotal event and assessing the impact (especially if it is a representative example).

On a much lighter note, and in honor of the coming Thanksgiving Holiday season... From yesterday's Jim Rome Radio Show... The uninspired, unimaginative and unreadable text of the day

"Just imagine... If the Indian's had give the pilgrams a donkey rather than a turkey to eat, we'd all be getting a piece of a$$ this Thanksgiving"

Live well and row

[Ken White]

As he's not, I strongly suspect that his attitude differed a bit. More patience -- much more -- and a generally far greater knowledge and acceptance of human foibles has in my experience been a hallmark of folks from the ME and South Asia. They emphatically do not think as we do and they mostly perceive offensiveness in a different vein than we do. They are also more polite and charitable in addition to being more tolerant of error and youthful attitudes. I'd suggest those qualities are shown to an extent in that video.

I think it's almost a certainty that the NCO in the video is far from the first western military representative that Afghan has talked to and that said Afghan knows and cheerfully accepts that SFC will not be the last...

And I'm still more concerned about the lingering potential for harm to US forces by demonstrated sloppy TTP than I am about possible communication disconnects that can and will be -- and probably already have been as we write -- repaired.

[John T. Fishel]

was that interpretation (or its lack) was symptomatic of a number of ills of operating in another culture. If you meant that the interpretation issue has been repaired, then I think there is a reasonable probaility you are right (but this is the US Army, remember, and we do know how to keep shooting ourselves in the foot).

If, however, the issue is one of cross cultural communication with its attendant empathy aspects, then I doubt very much that an effective repair job has been accomplished. Like you, I am sure that the elder has dealt with many Westerners and is prepared to deal with many more. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that he can empathize pretty well with the SGT. That does not mean he likes or agrees with him but I'm pretty sure he understands to the point of predicting his behavior. One of the interesting questions is whether to take the elder at face value. Is he really indicating some desire to work with the Americans or is he only showing us how stupid we are? I'm not sure it matters in the short run because, regardless of why and his intent, their is a lot of intel value in his story. I tend to go back to the Reagan quip, "Trust, but verify." for the longer term.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

...If you meant that the interpretation issue has been repaired, then I think there is a reasonable probaility you are right (but this is the US Army, remember, and we do know how to keep shooting ourselves in the foot).

Agree with both comments. It may have been repaired in that locale but it'll crop up elsewhere; Interpreters will always be a problem and while I think we should strive to better vet -- and train (when was the last time you saw a 'Terp training program?) -- them, one must accept that their use will always pose problems and harm efficiency and effectiveness. We also need to realize that we will absolutely not be able to get necessary or even minimally desired language skills embedded in the Force. Thus, interpretation will remain a problem and we will continually try to fix it...

If, however, the issue is one of cross cultural communication with its attendant empathy aspects, then I doubt very much that an effective repair job has been accomplished.

I'm not sure that is attainable or repairable. It is extremely difficult if not impossible to empathize with people you really do not understand -- and that applies both ways. There will always be a few on each side who can cross that chasm but most folks will not be able to do it at all well; that, as they say, is life. Kipling came to understand that. East is east and so forth...

Like you, I am sure that the elder has dealt with many Westerners and is prepared to deal with many more. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that he can empathize pretty well with the SGT. That does not mean he likes or agrees with him but I'm pretty sure he understands to the point of predicting his behavior.

Heh. I'd bet big money you're correct on that.

One of the interesting questions is whether to take the elder at face value. Is he really indicating some desire to work with the Americans or is he only showing us how stupid we are? I'm not sure it matters in the short run because, regardless of why and his intent, their is a lot of intel value in his story. I tend to go back to the Reagan quip, "Trust, but verify." for the longer term.

He may well be the local Talib honcho -- I've been surprised no one seems to have thought of that (except you and Ron). Or he could be the local poppy cake smuggling leader...

Nothing in the ME / South Asia region is as it seems and a recipe for disaster is to take things at face value. We should never forget that.

Simple things like "...that village was cleared yesterday, so don't waste time, hurry down there." are dangerous fallacies. Yesterday is not today, today's Farmer is tomorrow's Sniper. The benign village elder will slice your scrotum without a blink (and his wife will be meaner...) given the opportunity.

Nope, we should never forget those things. Nor should we forget a great military truth about US unit operations. A lot depends on the attitude of the local US Commander; if he's COIN oriented, the Troops pick up on that and emulate it. If he's a "kill 'em all and let god sort 'em out," and "...they're Ragheads..." type, then the Troops will pick up and operate on that. The Locals aren't stupid and they also pick up on the attitude and operate accordingly -- and they'll do that about as fast or faster than the Troops will...

I'd like to say there are no bad Commanders or Units out there but I know better. Show me an NCO that isn't doing right and I'll show you a unit that probably has problems...

[John T. Fishel]

and left on Afghanistan's plain
And the women go out to cut up what remains
Jes roll to your rifle and blow out your brains
An' go to your Gawd like a soljer!
R. Kipling

Agree with you on troubled units and who is responsible. But, sometimes, there is redemption! The Ray Odierno who commands MNFI is not the same Ray Odierno who commanded the 4th ID. Thank God people prove that they can learn and sometimes institutions do as well. Afghanistan is a particularly rough place to fight today as well as yesterday - as the the Brits and Soviets found out to their sorrow. Still, we can do better and (to bring this back where it started) we can begin by training our soldiers to work with interpreters. Starting with Wilf's rules (and modifying them to fit the circumstances) would be a good place to begin. Second, would be survival Pashto or Dari (depending where one is being assigned in country). It's never ceased to amaze me how much more receptive folk are if you say hello and how are you in their language. A touch higher level and you might even be able to figure out that your interpreter is not doing it straight.

I've rambled enough.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

Seen more than one mediocre commander get an epiphany from some source and turn out great; far, far more than go the other way. All things considered, the guys in Afghansitan are doing great. There's a learning curve on each rortation and that's to be expected, unavoidable and not terribly problematic. Some units go with little or no contact for a few weeks and get lazy; that's human nature and is always a problem in any COIN operation. Commanders just have to watch it and jack 'em up.

We can do better on language training -- seems to me there is no central authority directing the program so there is no program -- there should be one and it should include a structured by echelon series of courses of increasingly large vocabularies. It would help if CentCom would stop trying to play mix and match on who goes where and return units to the same AO for the continuity factor. There's no need for a bunch of Mech in Afghanistan and there was little need for light infantry in Iraq. Then people could get a language program going instead of wondering which language they might need...

There should also be a Theater/National (or Corps level at a minimum) training course for Interpreters...

[slapout9]

1-I am probably more sensitive to this being LE (Rodney King Changed Us) but it would not cost much to video soldiers in training and let them see themselves! Self awareness is a difficult skill to acquire but it is worth the effort especially because of the Info Op, Propaganda war waged by the enemy.

2-Also let Soldiers learn to fix their mistakes when possible. Everyone makes them but few learn how to repair them in a Human Relations sense, again this pays huge dividends.

[John T. Fishel]

Video of oneself is a very useful technique. As long as one does not use it to punish or ridicule but only as a teaching/learning tool.

During much of the 80s and 90s the Army used its ARTEP program to improve performance. Officers and NCOs were allowed to make mistakes and learn from them. The AARs after an exercise were brutal but they were not punishments - officers and soldiers learned from their mistakes. In the 70s, however, we had a zero defects Army - make a mistake and get punished for it. Some of what I have heard of today's training suggests that we may have returned to something like that. If true, it is terribly counterproductive (understatement of the year).

Cheers

JohnT

[Tom Odom]

1-I am probably more sensitive to this being LE (Rodney King Changed Us) but it would not cost much to video soldiers in training and let them see themselves! Self awareness is a difficult skill to acquire but it is worth the effort especially because of the Info Op, Propaganda war waged by the enemy.

2-Also let Soldiers learn to fix their mistakes when possible. Everyone makes them but few learn how to repair them in a Human Relations sense, again this pays huge dividends.

We do that Slap