USMC and SOCOM

[Bill Moore]

The only advantage I see to this course of action is that you’ll have a unit composed of senior NCOs capable of training foreign units. Too many times I have seen young Marines and Soldiers get put in a trainer role in a foreign nation without being trained to do it, and unsurprisingly fail miserably. Too often this results in these young Marine and Soldier trainers getting frustrated, then calling their students stupid, which in turn harms our relations with that nation, and the snow ball starts rolling downhill from there. The bottom line is you can’t get just grab a much of kids and tell them to train up a foreign unit and expect good results. This is a complex operation, not a “hey you” detail. So if the Marines want to embrace this trainer role (they have a long history of doing it effectively, albeit on a much smaller scale than what we face now), perhaps forming a unit composed of the right people is the right answer. The question remains, does it need to be under SOCOM? Is that the only way it will get funded?

The disadvantages were clearly stated by MAJ Strickland, and with the Marines being such a small force, I don’t see how they can bare the pain of losing this many senior NCOs without bearing a significant degradation to their ranks. As stated elsewhere on this website, this is the war of the strategic corporal, so having that experience in the ranks is critical to strategic success. If the Marines change are planning on changing their MTOE, so these slots don’t come out of hide, then it may work over time.

Since the Army can provide the same function, is this really what we need our Marines to focus on? I hope we haven’t degenerated to the point where we’re all chasing the latest mission of the day. I recall an argument being made in the early 90’s that the Big Conventional Army didn’t need Armor divisions anymore. I for one am very glad we had that tool when Desert Storm rolled around, and also think they were critical to our success in phase III of OIF.

The challenge of defending our democratic and capitalist nation that we all love, is that too many business practices transfer over to national defense. Just because all of our products are not selling off the shelf today, doesn’t mean they will not be needed tomorrow. For example, the Navy has played a limited role in GWOT, but their relative importance increases daily, as does China’s blue water navy. None of us know what threats tomorrow will bring, so I think we would want to maintain a joint force with a wide range of capabilities.

The Marines are unique in that they can bring a very capable functional combat team to the battlefield quickly. Furthermore, they can park a viable combat force off the shore of a potential hot spot giving our policy makers options short of full commitment. We in the Army on the other hand can deploy an Airborne Battalion rapidly, but their combat power is limited, and they can’t linger off the shore shy of an actual commitment. The point is that Marines have and continue to have a viable set of missions that the nation depends on the USMC being able to execute. Despite the fact that the Marines and Army have overlapping capabilities, the reality is that neither can do each other’s core missions based on training and task organization.
I think it is a mistake to assume that Iraq is the wave of the future; it is only the wave of today. Before we throw the baby out with the bath water, we need to assess the impact on our “joint” war fighting capabilities. That bright shinny thing on the horizon today may simply be a mirage.

While it may seem disingenuous coming from an Army guy, I think the Marines need to protect (better fund), and improve their capabilities in their current roles, which remain absolutely essential to our national security.

[DDilegge]

This is a complex operation, not a “hey you” detail. So if the Marines want to embrace this trainer role (they have a long history of doing it effectively, albeit on a much smaller scale than what we face now), perhaps forming a unit composed of the right people is the right answer. The question remains, does it need to be under SOCOM? Is that the only way it will get funded?

The disadvantages were clearly stated by MAJ Strickland, and with the Marines being such a small force, I don’t see how they can bare the pain of losing this many senior NCOs without bearing a significant degradation to their ranks.

Since the Army can provide the same function, is this really what we need our Marines to focus on? I hope we haven’t degenerated to the point where we’re all chasing the latest mission of the day.

The challenge of defending our democratic and capitalist nation that we all love, is that too many business practices transfer over to national defense. Just because all of our products are not selling off the shelf today, doesn’t mean they will not be needed tomorrow.

The Marines are unique in that they can bring a very capable functional combat team to the battlefield quickly. Furthermore, they can park a viable combat force off the shore of a potential hot spot giving our policy makers options short of full commitment. We in the Army on the other hand can deploy an Airborne Battalion rapidly, but their combat power is limited, and they can’t linger off the shore shy of an actual commitment. The point is that Marines have and continue to have a viable set of missions that the nation depends on the USMC being able to execute. Despite the fact that the Marines and Army have overlapping capabilities, the reality is that neither can do each other’s core missions based on training and task organization.

I think it is a mistake to assume that Iraq is the wave of the future; it is only the wave of today. Before we throw the baby out with the bath water, we need to assess the impact on our “joint” war fighting capabilities. That bright shinny thing on the horizon today may simply be a mirage.

I snipped several lines from your previous post here (quote) - well said Bill. Marines who are wary of this new relationship are not attempting to blow-off the importance of Special Operations and its increased importance in the GWOT. Rather, it is as you stated most eloquently – many are worried we will be sacrificing a core capability that is of vital importance to our national defense in order to address the ‘conflict of the day’ and fill gaps that may well be addressed by increasing the capabilities (manpower is but one example) of those that have been doing this since the early sixties.

The Marine Corps is a “young” force, it constantly replenishes its junior enlisted ranks with new recruits well beyond the rates of the sister services. This is a “good thing” – keeps the Corps’ lean and mean (no pun intended). But, if this relatively small force loses its best SNCO’s and NCO’s to the snake-eater community – there may well be dire second and third order effects. Enlisted leadership has always been the center-of-gravity when it comes down to the wire in accomplishing the missions assigned the Corps.