Lost Lessons of Counterinsurgency

[Ken White]

...what if Krepinevich is wrong; or, at least only half right?

What if he is? I submit that most works of history suffer from that problem. Certainly it is my observation, experience and firm conviction that all history I have read covering events in which I was involved and of which I thus have personal knowledge is deficient to nearly or more than that extent. That is, I suspect for ideological reasons, particularly true of Viet Nam. History as writ is an imperfect art.

What if he wrongfully neglected to mention in his book that the reason why Westmoreland had to go conventional with the American Army early on was because there was a substantial regular South Vietnamese communist threat along with a NVA regular threat that he could not just dismiss and go-Galula?

He could have mentioned that but he, a 1972 USMA Grad, would have been wrong to do so -- he could not possibly 'know' and thus had to rely on the papers of the MACV Staff -- who were a bigger problem than all the VC Main force in South Viet Nam. They were essentially a spent force -- well, the Staff was,too but I meant the VC Main Force, their combat units -- by early 1965 and that's why Uncle Ho sent the PAVN (later NVA) south in 65 and later -- after Westmoreland had committed to big battles. Giap was a sharp cookie...

Westmoreland did what he did due to a fundamental operational misunderstanding and a preference or desire to 'win decisiviely.' Laudable aim, wrong venue. Most revisionist looks at Viet Nam have been prompted by his former staff loyalists in a postwar attempt to justify what many perceive as a failure.

What if Krepinevich way overplayed the amount of difference between Westmoreland and Abrams? Basically what if he was just flat wrong in his interpretation of Vietnam?

He wasn't 100% right but he was close enough for guvmint work...

I am sorry buddy, but your essay essentially argues that Vietnam was just like Iraq, only this time since we have the lessons and principles provided to us in books like "The Army and Vietnam" we are on the road to success because we have learned and applied those lessons.

That was not my or apparently some others sensing of his essay and my perception is that you have elected to take it that way simply to make this point:

...your essay fits perfectly in with the Surge Triumph narrative. That Triumph Narrative is based on the trope of Vietnam.

We can disagree on that as well. That is, disagree on the thrust of his essay...

As you know, you and I essentially agree on the 'surge.' We differ only in that I mention it (was not necessary and only may have speeded things up slightly) occasionally instead of routinely