Lost Lessons of Counterinsurgency

[Rob Thornton]

COL G said:

in fact as many on the SWC council know I have often argued that even if the Army had embraced and dedicated resources to Coin in the 90s, Iraq still turns out like it does based on the amount of resources committed and the blunders made at the strategy and policy levels early on.

Sir, I think it is wise to admit the possibility exists that your argument is valid in part or in whole. I also think its wise to not easily dismiss the potential that had we considered our Vietnam experience for its relevance to our strategic culture and our policy goals, and as such incorporated it into out DOTMLPF processes better, it may have informed the CIV/MIL discussion over time in a way that led to better strategic decisions and policy. Hard to say for sure given the attraction to the object, but I do believe the body as a whole would have been better prepared, and as such adapted better.

It may also have informed the requirements for decisions on civilian appointments, promotions and major commands. It may even have lent greater credibility to dissenting voices who raised doubts, or provided contradictory advice to the accepted and preferred views at critical times.

Strategy may be centralized in its initial conception, but it is often informed, altered and refined from the various points in between the top and the bottom because that is where conditions occur that provide feedback on effectiveness, sustainability and feasibility. In other words, what we value as relevant is to some degree determined by what we have learned to value and that happens over time. Our actions are indicative of what we value as an institution.

My biggest fear is that we get too comfortable with any one perspective on war and by extension allow our elected civilian leaders and ourselves to believe that war is linear; to believe that both the nature of war and the character and requirements for war are exactly the same regardless of conditions, policy objective and the attraction to it; and to believe that war is a formulaic undertaking to be used easily and with little consequence to the user. Nothing could be further from the truth I think. It will be interesting to see what lessons are "available" and which ones are "learned" from our current wars over the next 10 to 20 years.

Best, Rob