Gian--

I agree with you that one should be very cautious about applying lessons from Iraq to operations in Afghanistan. Particularly, one needs to consider issues of small COPs in light of other historical experience there, such as the Brits in Kabul twice in the 19th century. That doen't mean that my friend John Nagl is necessarily wrong in his assessment but rather that it is both more complex and requires more in depth analysis before we decide on a strategy and operational plans and tactics. One fallacy is that we have a tendency to focus on a singular historical experience without comparing it to other similar and contrasting experiences. Another of our errors is that we prefer not to remember our own history at all (or rather remember it very selectively). I am thinking here of 300 years of American (both colonial and national) military experience fighting Indians and later the Philippine Insurrection that we did not wish to recall in the 30 years between the end of Vietnam and 9/11. Again, from my poly sci (and old soldier) perspective, the essence of using history to garner principles and lessons is to look for multiple cases that shed light on the subject.

In that context, I must disagree with your interpretation of the war in El Salvador. Our allies won! They won, largely because they learned from the lessons taught by the MILGP and 3 superb Ambassadors and their own pragmatism. I watched that fight up close and personal as the XO of the Combined ESAF Assessment Team in 87 and 88 and later at SSI and as a civilian prof at Leavenworth as the fight wound down and ended with the peace accords of 1992. Obviously, there is significant disagreement as to how much the Fall of the Wall in 89, the ending of Soviet aid to Cuba, and the fall of the USSR in 1991 contributed to the GOES victory. I believe it was important but not decisive although I am sure that many would disagree. But, my real point is that MILGP commanders like John Waghelstein and Ambassadors like Ed Corr and CINC's like Jack Galvin and Fred Woerner brought a much broader view of historical experience than merely that of COIN in Vietnam to the table.

Cheers

JohnT