I have a lot of respect for both these officers, at least their well thought out positions; however, I have yet to have seen an intelligent response to COL Gentile's challenge:

The Army under the Petraeus Doctrine “is entering into an era in which armed conflict will be protracted, ambiguous, and continuous—with the application of force becoming a lesser part of the soldier’s repertoire.” The concept rests on the assumption that the much touted “surge” in Iraq was a successful feat of arms, an assertion that despite the claims of punditry supporters in the press has yet to be proven. The war in Iraq is not yet over.
I share COL Gentile's concern that we are re-designing our Army to engage in endless irregular conflicts around the globe to accomplish what exactly? We have very few cases where our nation building efforts have been successful (unless it was after the conflict like Germany and Japan), I can't recall any where we successfully built a nation while fighting. I think much of the doctrine is based on loosely supported assumptions, rather than historical precedent. That doesn't mean it's incorrect, but it should at least prompt a caution light before we drive through this intersection. The so called new doctrine should support policy and its subsequent strategy to achieve that policy, and it should take into consideration that policy and strategy are shaped by our political culture and the international opinion. Going where we're not wanted to engage in a protracted, ambiguous and continuous conflict generally not well tolerated by our citizens. It can be terribly expensive on many levels (financially, politically, and a major drain on the military). The strategy can be right in a miltary sense, but if it isn't politically supportable, then it isn't feasible. In my opinion at least part of the debate should discuss the costs versus the "potential" gains? We should be able to clearly state why it is in our national interest to get engaged in these conflicts and to transform the Army to fight them (and assume the risk regarding our ability to fight other types of wars).

Irregular warfare has always been the most common form of warfare, what is may be new is our desire to intervene in it. It is almost like a desire to solve world hunger. A very noble pursuit, but is it realistic? If we have a choice, and the part of the question is "if", do we want get involved in these conflicts? If we do, what can the military realistically accomplish? These questions still haven't been answered. I have seen a lot of discussion on the way it should work, the whole of government, etc., but very little discussion on the limits of reality.

I disagree with COL Gentile's comment below:

The concept rests on the assumption that the much touted “surge” in Iraq was a successful feat of arms, an assertion that despite the claims of punditry supporters in the press has yet to be proven. The war in Iraq is not yet over.
GEN Petraeus's strategy did work, and it was the appropriate response to the problem at hand; however, the military can only succeed at providing a degree of security, which can present a window of opportunity to achieve some degree of political success, which in turn will allow us to remove the security blanket without the situation falling apart. If Iraq fails it won't be due to GEN Petraeus's strategy, without his strategy it would have failed already. This does get back to his original argument though, do we want to get involved in protracted and ambiguous conflicts? If there isn't a clear, achievable political objective in sight, then why try to build a nation?

I'm sitting on the fence on this debate, I see the merit of both arguments and think there must be an acceptable balance. I also think it would be foolish to assume that the OIF's and Afghanistan's are going to be the new norm. If they are, then maybe we're learning the wrong lessons from these conflicts.