Getting the Basics Right in Afghanistan

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Ken,

My question is who is involved in this dialog? To me, the 'dialog' should be >67% Afghani and <33% All Others. Somehow, my perception is that you and the writers are not looking at it that way. If I'm wrong, my apologies.

No apologies - you are partially right (at least wrt to me), I'd not really thought of it in percentages. It would seem that should be a goal that underpins some of the others. I am of the opinion though that if you can't get the Afghani to pick up the bulk of the conversation, then we're not facilitating, we're leading - and that is not where we want to be. I've been in conversations where the facilitator does most of the talking, it only works if the other participants have nothing to say, or are unwilling to say it - otherwise it just creates a backlash against the facilitator. It may do so anyway, there might be reasons why the other folks are not talking. In that case the facilitator has got to read the larger body and once he manages to get a discussion going, and reasonably on course he needs to back off, and only inject where absolutely needed. The goal I think should be to continually decrease his %. I also understand that is hard to do given the "are we there yet" pressures from the various domestic audiences the facilitator is subject to. No way around that I guess, but to continue to tell the kids in the back to hold their bladder.

I'm not at all sure what you mean here. Do you mean that the USG desired end state "must be a non-military solution even though the situation has military involvement?" If that's what was meant, I agree --

Yep, that is what I was driving at. I think the authors were too, but were spending the bulk of their argument trying to raise the issue of the form that military involvment should take - with the understanding that it would have to fill some of the gaps not being provided from civilians due to capability and capacity gaps within those organizations.

May I suggest without being pejorative that the put the other way version is closer to understandable English but it still is jargon. The point to me is that the JTF should NEVER have primacy unless all out major combat operations are the norm. That's the answer to your conundrum; DoD takes over by default and will not let go. It will not stop unless we break that model. DoD has been reluctant to let go as they -- correctly in my view -- perceive a huge vacuum at State. State in turn is reluctant to get assertive about what should be their turf because they're (1) short of personnel (2) short of money (3) have many people who do not want to go to less than desirable stations worldwide and deal with significant problems created by the fools we elect to office. It isn't easy. I know that. It still needs to happen.

(bold added by me)

Michael O'Hanlon wrote a pretty good piece the other day that Dave captured on the OP-ED roundup that addresses this issue pretty well. As DoD folks begin to look at the transition point to State, what might appear as a more natural one is more difficult to put your finger on because State lacks the means, as such it degrades into a circular argument. If we expect them to pick up the responsibilities, we have to provide them the means to match their authorities. That is a big shift for the reasons you point out, but the sooner we start doing it, the sooner they will be able to do it (kinda sounds like energy policy too). Right now the question of "when does the JTF transition authority to the State" seems muddied by the lack of resources State can bring to bear in a flexible manner. DoD can move to an "in support" relationship, but that is not entirely clear either if they are in reality doing the heavy lifting because State is not strong enough.

If our strategic outlook is that we will see more reasons to be involved on the ground and not less, and that while not the perfect tool, DoD does have the capacity, then doesn't it make sense for the USG to go ahead and invest in the more appropriate tools? While DoD may have to adapt to be both more agile in some of its roles, and in order to be a more supportive USG partner, the real challenge I think is growing our other USG agencies. First, we (big USG we) have to accept the "why", then we have to get busy on the "how" - currently we seem to be trying to do both - and S/CRS seems to be making some headway. There are a number of reasons why, to include gg's concerns about the costs, but also to include the question of who is the best person to do diplomacy? - but in this case its not necessarily over at someone else's embassy given the conditions.

I understand that -- my point is that is not -- or should not be -- ISAF's job; IOW it ain't 10USAC, it IS 22USC (jargon is contagious ) -- except it isn't really that either. Rightly or wrongly, we got NATO in there so it really and Afghan job with NATO support -- and they in turn are supported as necessary by ISAF; ISAF is the Caboose, not the Engine or even the Coal Car.

Sorry for the jargon - its the effect of thinking about a related problem, however, it is good to have an idea where the authorities originate and why. I agree. I see two roughly drawn areas in the "support column". One is reference security, and by extension, building security capacity. That one is interesting because while there is the building of tactical security capacity, there is also the issue of development in other areas which make it possible and gives it a better chance of being sustainable. We find those gaps, and because there is no one available to step into them, we fill them - because we recognize that to wait may mean losing the initiative, and/or sacrifice of any gains we made recently. However, it may also mean retarding HN development. Its a tough call, and when we decide to do it, we ought to know why, and start developing a replacement as fast as we can.

I don't just mean stepping into a gap that should be filled by an Afghani capability, but one that may need to be filled for the purpose of facilitation by a non-Afghani civilian. I think that was the basis for the authors' observation that Lawrence's maxim of what is tolerable may not fit as well under all conditions, and that as such ISAF should be prepared to fill those gaps, while also working hard to place an Afghani capability with an Afghani there. As long as we are in the gap, we are as much an impediment to that 66% > 33% conversation as we might be a facilitator - however from the ground perspective, it may be they feel there are no other real options.

I guess that in order for us to transition, there has to be something to transition with, and something to transition to. Again, that goes back to your and others' observation that we have a "strategy deficit" that identifies a feasible end, identifies the best ways, and allocates the required means. In this case allocation does not just mean "best" fit of what is available, but considering our outlook, it also means creating the best means we can across our elements of power.

Thanks for helping me work through that - time to go see if I can put it to use.