JFQ - Point - Counterpoint - SWJ Early Exclusive

[Rob Thornton]

however lets play just a bit of devil's advocate to the piece you pasted from JFQ (understanding that there may be more context of course)

We also asked ourselves if we really think we’re going to build another country’s army and police forces and ministries from the ground up any time soon. And the answer was, probably not.

There are some interesting qualifiers in there, among them are the phrases

from the ground up

and

anytime soon

That leaves allot of room for policy (and politics) to create requirements that could tax our preferred "go to" bucket of capacity fairly quick. I'd also note that in the event we did find ourselves in a similar situation because we failed to anticipate there were alligators in the pool that we we were only dipping our toes in, you can still get eaten. That is less of a service decision, and more a course of idealistic policy, but the consequences are still real. As long as our policies provide the chance, and our strategic culture says we'll try to leave it better than we found it - my estimate is that it is as likely as unlikely we'll find ourselves in need of more capability and capcity then we'd assumed. While the uniformed side is pragmatic, our democracy is more subject to emotion (Dadgum Prussian sneak in there again) as it relates to fear, honor/prestige and interest (there, got the Greek guy too).

We’ve got several challenges: we’ve got to set ourselves up to do Iraq and Afghanistan for the long haul, and then figure out how we augment Special Forces to do the other engagement that we need.

I think wherever possible this is the way to go. But I am also convinced it is not always possible, and our exceptions tend to be really big ones that last for years not months - when we go big, we go really big. That means that if you are unprepared to go big and the conditions require it, you are now starting slower then you could have, and possibly creating additional risk to the policy objective. I think you can mitigate this risk some without reaching for the "O", and thus address the other risks that COL Gentile articulates well. We only have to do this smarter to do it better. We also have to account for the other things we would like Army SF to do for us. A SF soldier is a true investment, and the time and resources required to select, assess, train, educate and advance are commensurate. Like any high end capability, it is probably unwise to assume they will be available in the capacity required for every contingent need, or that given their range of specialization they can cover every need. However, for most needs this approach which also minimizes the footprint and burden is probably the best suited - we just need to understand when conditions require something different, and be able to generate those capabilities in a manner that makes a difference.

That’s kind of the direction we’re going. In the interim, we have a training center for transition teams that we’re going to continue to run, it’s going to move down to Fort Polk, out of Fort Riley, and we’re going to have a brigade dedicated to doing nothing but training transition teams. So we’ll continue to do that for a while.

Seem sensible and pragmatic to me, as well as a step up in resources. For the production of the bulk of advisory teams we say we currently need this is probably good enough, and does not overly jeopardize us in other areas. There are also some other initiatives out there that are helping collective units that are advising and partnering to better prepare.

I just came back from Afghanistan, and more and more I’m hearing Soldiers on the ground say that the partnerships—matching an Afghani battalion up with a coalition battalion or a coalition company—is having a greater impact on the indigenous forces than the transition teams.

I agree, the combination of advisor teams and "partner" units provides the most flexibility in meeting the development requirements in a way that not only builds better FSF CDRs and Staffs, but reaches down to the lowest soldier and shows them how they can make a difference. For our part, the IA BN we were with really took flight under this arrangement, and we started seeing the IA model themselves on our professionalism. However, I'm not sure its a blanket statement that they are having a greater impact - that in my mind is a subjective call based on METT-TC conditions and past efforts. Its also worth considering that a 1:1 ratio where we go may be both a logistics burden we can't overcome, and also intolerable to the HN, the population or both. Conditions matter, and no two are the same. While there are some things that can be extrapolated out of OEF and OIF experience, not all will be applicable to future requirements - one worth considering is the authority we have gotten used to in Iraq and Afghanistan would be very different in a set of conditions where there was an existing HN or regional authority that required our assistance on a large scale.

We may not need as many transition teams; just aligning them with the coalition forces may be a better way to go. In Iraq we had both; we had transition teams and partnership, and that seemed to work.

We should always be looking for better ways to do business, and if that provides something successful then we should consider it. However, we also have to consider the quality of the relationship. A 1:1 relationship provides a lot of quality time, a 1:3 less so, and a 1:10 far less. However, if your BN relationship is with 10 FSF BNs that are really competent, committed, capable and confident, and are as such low maintenance, hen you have less of a problem. Conditions as context matter. As a friend of mine said, if they are at a point where the training wheels need to come off or your are holding them back, then get out of their way - the trick is knowing when they are ready and when they are likely to drive off a cliff - here having an embedded team provides some real insights. When they are ready, take off the wheels and focus on another BN or security service in your neighborhood.

So I think you may see how transition teams are evolving a little bit in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we’re working with the theater to see what the best way to go is. But at least in Iraq, and to some extent in
Afghanistan, the proficiency of indigenous forces is getting to where they don’t need to have somebody with them every day; they can operate side by side. So I think it’s going to evolve a little bit, but I’m not exactly sure
how it’s going to go

I think the conditions the Chief describes is what we want to see. I'd note that in both OIF and OEF our challenges extend beyond the military component of their security sectors. Our transition is therefore not limited to "us to them", but also includes us helping develop capacity in other areas, or facillitate that development in other areas if the objective and conditions require it.

There is a great deal of interest in this not only in the services, but in DoD and the other agencies as we consider the question how do we do this better if we get told to again. Again the piece Niel pasted may have a greater context, but I'm not sure how much the 2008 NDS is going to change in substance. I'm looking at the GEF and and the GDF, seeing some of the thinking going on in the TCPs and they seem consistent with the 2008 NDS.

Its worth finishing with the idea its always good to match the best capabilities at your disposal to the requirements at hand, but its also good to understand that best is a relative qualification in light of conditions and circumstance.

Best, Rob